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Abstract 
Natural disasters strike every year, and they are often very harsh. It is scientifically proven that climate 
change is increasing the frequency of extreme weather events, such as hurricanes, cyclones, floods 
and droughts. So was the hurricane season 2017 one of the most devastating on the record, while in 
2019 the strongest cyclone ever recorded to hit the African continent made landfall just a few weeks 
after the devasting cyclone Idai. Sadly, these phenomena are slowly becoming the new normal. The 
international law behind natural disasters is fragmented. The Geneva Conventions do not apply, since 
they are limited in their scope to armed conflicts. Therefore, also the ICRC has no mandate to ensure 
relief for the victims of natural disasters. However, this issue is currently being addressed. The ILC 
included a project, called Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, into their programme of 
work. A full set of articles was submitted to the UN General Assembly for treaty adoption in 2016. 
Next to the fact that there is a legal uncertainty with regard to natural disasters, there is also the other 
fact that low-GHG-emitting developing States are more prone to disasters than are other States. It 
seems unfair that the poorest of the poor suffer the most from anthropogenic climate change triggered 
primarily by the conduct of developed States. At the same time, the victims of natural disasters are 
extremely reliant on the conduct of the affected States. In one possible case, the affected State is 
overwhelmed with the natural disaster and does not seek international help. This research focuses on 
such a case of injustice, and as such aims to answer the following questions:  
 (1) Do developed States and emerging markets have a responsibility under international law to 
financially assist disaster-prone developing States with regard to early warning mechanisms and post-
disaster reconstruction? 
 
(2) Does the by a disaster affected State affected by a disaster have an obligation under international 
law to provide early warning and humanitarian assistance to the affected population? If the affected 
State is not able to provide early warning and humanitarian assistance by itself, does it have an 
obligation to seek international assistance? 
 
In order to answer these two questions, this research examines the current relevant international law, 
in particular also customary international law and the case law of international judicial bodies.  
The first major result of this study is the recognition that there is no coherent international law 
governing natural disasters. The latest attempt of the ILC is not the first. Several other attempts had 
already been made to codify the law applicable to natural disasters, yet they were unsuccessful. Thus, 
there are currently over 200 different legal instruments governing different areas of IDL. This 
fragmentation is also mirrored with regard to the definition of ‘disaster’, where different approaches 
exist.  
The second result is linked to the first research question, which can be answered in the affirmative. 
The question was examined within the context of international climate change law and international 
environmental law in general. The no-harm rule, which is part of customary international 
environmental law, applies to both the question of financing early warning mechanisms and post-
disaster reconstruction. With regard to the latter, this research argues that post-disaster reconstruction 
is, like early warning, a preventive and not a reactive measure and that as such the no-harm rule 
applies.  
The third result concerns the second research question, which also can be answered in the affirmative. 
Both humanitarian assistance and early warning are means to fulfil human rights obligations. The 
human rights that are triggered are in particular the right to life, right to an adequate standard of living, 
the right to health and the right to safe drinking water and sanitation. With regard to humanitarian 
assistance the affected State has also the duty to seek international assistance if it is not able to cope 
with the disaster situation with its own resources. 
International disaster law is a fast-evolving area of international law. This research with its findings 
has the potential to sharpen the development. This research suggests (1) the adoption of the Draft 
Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disaster get adopted into the form of a treaty; (2) 
the enhancement the concept of loss and damage within the international climate-change-law regime, 
since this would open door for disaster-prone developing States to receive appropriate funding; (3) the 
incorporation of a legally binding financial target for climate finance; and (4) the enhancement of the 
affordability of sovereign risk transfer possibilities for disaster-prone developing States. 
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1. Part: Introduction and general principles 1 
Part 1: Introduction and General Principles  
Are extreme weather events like cyclones, hurricanes and heatwaves the new normal? This question 
is heavily discussed around the globe.1 It is a scientific fact that global warming induced by 
anthropogenic climate change increases the frequency of extreme weather events.2 This increase in 
frequency also increases the number of cases in which such extreme weather events turn into natural 
disasters and devastate societies, communities or even whole nations: One very prominent example of 
a country struck by such devastation is Haiti.  
Haiti was hit by a severe earthquake in 2010, and six years later, in 2016– while the country was still 
struggling from the consequences of that earthquake–it was hit by a severe hurricane, Matthew. 
Hurricane Matthew’s consequences in the Caribbean and in particular Haiti were extreme, leading to 
mass displacement, humanitarian crises and property damages.3 In 2017, several cyclones and 
hurricanes again gained attention. In March and beginning of April, cyclone Debbie, one of the 
strongest to impact Australia, made landfall in Queensland.4 At the same time, the 2017 hurricane 
season was one most severe ever recorded, because several high category hurricanes affected different 
Caribbean islands.5 The 2018 hurricane and cyclone season had impacts upon disaster-prone States: 
for example cyclone Gita, which impacted several Pacific island States in February 2018.6 The 2019 
cyclone season was one of the most severe yet recorded. In March 2019, the tropical Cyclone Idai 
caused severe floods in Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe.7 The death toll was over 600 in 
Mozambique alone. Roughly one month later, in April 2019, cyclone Kenneth also made landfall in 
Mozambique, the strongest cyclone ever recorded to hit the African continent.8 
Such extreme events have their foremost impacts on human lives and livelihoods. The consequences 
are also costly, however, which easily is able to put a massive financial burden upon the affected State. 
 
1 Nature, Extreme weather events are the new normal (8 April 2018) nature 
<https://www.nature.com/news/extreme-weather-events-are-the-new-normal-1.22516>; The Economic 
Times, Extreme weather events the new normal? Experts discuss (8 April 2018) The Econimic Times 
<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/extreme-weather-events-the-new-
normal-experts-discuss/articleshow/60294099.cms>; Oliver Milman, Hurricanes and heatwaves: stark 
signs of climate change ‚new normal‘ (8 April 2018) The Guardian 
<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/dec/28/climate-change-2017-warmest-year-extreme-
weather>; The Straits Times, Warming Arctic is 'new normal’, extreme weather events will be more 
frequent: Report (8 April 2018) The Strait Times <http://www.straitstimes.com/world/united-
states/warming-arctic-is-new-normal-extreme-weather-events-to-be-more-frequent-report>. 
2 IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the 
Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, Geneva, 2015) 53; for 
a comperhensive discussion on the critics of climate change see: Riley Dunlap and Aaron McCright, 
'Climate change denial: sources, actors and strategies' in Constance Lever-Tracy (ed), Routledge handbook 
of climate change and society (Routledge, 2010) 240. 
3  OCHA, Haiti: Situation Report No. 35 (04 March 2017) (15 March 2017) 
<http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA%20Situation%20Report%20%2335%20Hur
ricane%20Matthew%20Haiti%2004%20March%202017.pdf>. 
4  Cyclone Debbie reaches category four, thousands in low-lying Mackay areas told to leave, (11 April 2017) 
ABC News <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-03-27/cyclone-debbie-reaches-category-four-off-north-
queensland/8390904>. 
5  OCHA, Hurricane Season 2017 (16 October 2017) <http://www.unocha.org/hurricane-season-2017>. 
6  Reliefweb, Tropical Cyclone Gita - Feb 2018 (8 April 2018) Refliefweb <https://reliefweb.int/disaster/tc-
2018-000102-ton>. 
7  OCHA, Cyclones Idai and Kenneth (12 Augsut 2019) <https://www.unocha.org/southern-and-eastern-
africa-rosea/cyclones-idai-and-kenneth>. 
8  ibid. 
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Dominica, for example, requested in 2017 a total of USD 31.1 million in its flash appeal, in order to 
help the victims of the hurricane season.9  
Next to the fact that humanitarian crises are costly for the affected State, the emergency situation needs 
also to be managed properly, and procedures must be in place in order to reach the victims.  
Yet no coherent international framework exists for disaster situations. Following the 2004 Indian 
Ocean tsunami, the international community started, again, to think about the possibility of a coherent 
international framework, dealing with disaster situations.10 This was not the first attempt; the League 
of Nations had established an International Relief Union (IRU), which had the purpose to render relief 
to victims of natural disasters within a given legal framework. This organisation did not succeed, 
however. Despite adopting different approaches over time, they met success with none.11 The newest 
approach, a project of the International Law Commission (ILC), namely Protection of Persons in the 
Event of Disaster, has been transferred to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) for treaty 
adoption in 2016, which decided to discuss it in 2018.12 In 2018, the United Nations UNGA took note 
of the ILC’s Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters (Draft Articles) and 
decided to bring to the attention of Member States, that it was advised by the ILC to adopt a treaty 
based on this draft.13 
However, since anthropogenic climate change is increasing the frequency of natural disasters, also the 
international environmental and, in particular, international climate change law plays a significant role 
in this areas of international law. This connection is also recognised by various specific instruments 
that acknowledge natural disasters to be an adverse effect of climate change.14 Yet, since natural 
disasters have extreme effects on humans, not only do international environmental law and 
international climate change law have to be considered, but also human rights. Since many victims of 
natural disasters are in desperate need for relief, international humanitarian law (IHL), by analogy, is 
also crucial. As, such, the law behind natural disasters is fragmented, and different sources are 
applicable and therefore not limited to the project concerning the Protection of Persons in the Event 
of Disasters.  
This research is primarily guided by the connections between anthropogenic climate change, the 
frequency of natural disasters and the unfairness thereof: low-greenhouse-gas-emitting developing 
States are among the most severely and commonly affected by natural disasters. Thus, this research 
focuses on two important questions:  
(1) Do developed states and emerging markets have a responsibility under international law to 
financially assist disaster-prone developing States with regard to early warning mechanisms and post-
disaster reconstruction? 
 
9  OCHA, 'Flash Appeal Hurricane Maria, September to December 2017' 
<http://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/Dominica_FlashAppeal_EN_20170929.pdf>. 
10  Report of the International Law Commission, fifty-eigth session (1 May - 9 June and 3 July - 11 August 
2006), GAOR, 61st sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/61/10, 8-9 [22]. 
11  Convention establishing an International Relief Union, opened for signature 12 July 1927, 135 LNTS 247 
(entered into force 27 December 1932) ('IRU Convention'); for a comprehensive discussion on this topic 
see below: Disaster event and emergency response. 
12  Protection of persons in the event of disasters, GA Res 71/141, 71st sess, Agenda Item 78, UN Doc 
A/RES/71/141 (19 December 2016). 
13  Protection of persons in the event of disasters, GA Res 73/209, 62nd plenary mtg, UN Doc A/RES/73/209 
(20 December 2018). 
14  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 
107 (entered into force 21 March 1994) Art. 8(d) ('UNFCCC'); Paris Agreement, opened for signature 12 
December 2015, (entered into force 4 November 2016) Article 8(1) ('Paris Agreement'). 
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(2) Does the disaster-affected State have an obligation under international law to provide early 
warning and humanitarian assistance to the affected population? If the affected State is not able to 
provide early warning and humanitarian assistance by itself, does it have an obligation to seek 
international assistance? 
 
This research has four main parts. The first serves as an introduction, which has the aim to define 
terms, to provide the context of the topic and to map the legal framework surrounding this research. 
Part 2 deals with the first research question: the financial obligations of strong greenhouse-gas-
emitting States towards disaster disaster-prone developing States with regard to early warning 
mechanisms and post-disaster reconstruction. Part 3 deals with the second question and therefore 
examines the affected State’s duties towards the victims of a natural disaster, in particular with regard 
to the provision of humanitarian assistance and early warning. Part 4 includes a summary of this 
research and draws this research’s conclusions.  
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Chapter I:  Disasters Defined 
The notion of ‘disaster’ is at the heart of this research. Therefore, it is important to define ‘disaster’. 
Yet, international disaster law (IDL), as a fast-evolving legal area, is suffering from incoherence. At 
this point, not one single legal framework deals with natural disasters; in fact, there are over 200 
different legal instruments, either bilateral or multilateral, dealing with natural disasters.15 One effect 
of this fragmentation is that multiple definitions of the notion ‘disaster’ also exist. Therefore, this 
chapter aims to define and explain the notion of a ‘disaster’. It begins with an examination of the 
various definitions of different instruments. Its second section explains the approach of this research 
with regard to the definition and understanding of ‘disaster’.   
 
15  Andrea de Guttry, 'Surveying the Law' in Andrea de Guttry, Marco Gestri and Gabriella Venturini (eds), 
International Disaster Response Law (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2012), 4. 
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1.Disasters Defined 
Basically, two major groups of definitions exist: The first views ‘disaster’ as the devastating event 
itself, while according to the second approach, ‘disaster’ means the consequent situation after a 
devastating event. Both aspects are considered in the sections below, while a special focus is given 
to the work and approach of the ILC.  
 
 
1.1. Disaster as event or situation 
Current instruments cover both understandings: A disaster is either referred to as a situation that occurs 
in the aftermath of a calamitous event, such as a cyclone, or the event itself. This distinction is 
important for two reasons. Firstly, as the Special Rapporteur on the Protection of Persons in the Event 
of Disasters has pointed out, an accurate definition helps to identify the situations that are governed 
by the respective law and its protection,16 including not only when the protection starts but also when 
it ends.17 Contemplating whether a disaster is the calamitous event or the subsequent consequence 
raises the question of whether the protection should begin during the event as such or later on. 
Secondly, this distinction is also necessary for the application of disaster mitigation: for example, 
whether it solely includes measures to prevent the event from happening or whether measures should 
be taken to decrease the effects of the event in consequent situation.  
Thus, both approaches are discussed in this section, while later on the specific approach of this research 
is defined. 
 
 
1.1.1. Instruments that define disaster as an event 
The importance of a coherent system in relation to disaster relief management was recognised already 
in the 1980s, when the Draft Convention on Expediting the Delivery of Emergency Assistance (1984 
Draft Convention) was drafted.18 Yet, the project was dropped, and the 1984 Draft Convention was 
never formally adopted and never gained legal status.19 Nevertheless, the text cannot be ignored, 
especially since it includes a definition of ‘disaster’:  
 “[…] any natural, accidental or deliberate event [not being an ongoing situation of armed conflict] as 
a result of which assistance is needed from outside the State upon whose territory the event occurred, 
or which has been affected by the consequences of the event.”20 
This definition affords a clear example that a disaster might be seen as an event creating a need for 
international assistance and not the consequent situation. This rendering of the term is clearly indicated 
by the last half sentence of the definition, which clearly distinguishes between the event, the disaster, 
 
16  Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, Second report on the protection of persons in the event of disasters, 61st sess, 
UN Doc A/CN.4/615 (7 May 2009), 11 [31]. 
17  ibid. 
18  Draft Convention on expediting the delivery of emergency assistance, UN Doc A/39/267/Add.2 and 
E/1984/96Add.2 (18 June 1984). 
19  Michael Eburn, 'International law and disaster response' (2010) 36 Monash University Law Review 162, 
166. 
20  Draft Convention on expediting the delivery of emergency assistance, UN Doc A/39/267/Add.2 and 
E/1984/96Add.2 (18 June 1984), Art. 1(b). 
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and its consequences. The 1984 Draft Convention is not the only instrument to define ‘disaster’; more 
recent instruments, such as the Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of 
International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance (IFRC Guidelines),21 include a definition 
that describes a disaster as an event.22 The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies (IFRC) introduced these Guidelines in 2007. The Guidelines contribute to the domestic legal 
preparedness of States. In order to reach that goal, they impose guidelines for policymakers to 
strengthen their domestic law with regard to international disaster relief law.23 Not only the Guidelines 
adopted by the IFRC but also the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations in Disaster Relief (IFRC Code of Conduct)24 
introduces the event approach for its definition of ‘disaster’.25  
Finally, the very latest example is the final draft of the ILC’s Draft Articles .26 The Draft Articles also 
follow the event approach.27 The project of the ILC with regard to its definition of ‘disaster’ is detailed 
below. 
 
 
1.1.2. Instruments that define disaster as a situation 
As explained above, some instruments view the notion ‘disaster’ as a situation triggered by a 
calamitous event. The Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for 
Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations (Tampere Convention), for example, defines a ‘disaster’ as 
 “[…] a serious disruption of the functioning of society, posing a significant, widespread threat to 
human life, health, property or the environment, whether caused by accident, nature or human activity, 
and whether developing suddenly or as the result of complex, long-term processes.”28 
This definition has a focus on the post-event situation, by equating a disaster to a ‘serious disruption 
of the functioning of society’. It is not the event itself that causes a threat, rather the subsequent 
disruption. This disruption can be caused by an accident, by nature or by human activity.29 That the 
Tampere Convention understands a disaster to be a situation is also supported by its explanations with 
regard to the various hazards that have the potential to trigger a natural disaster.30 It distinguishes 
between health hazard and natural hazard.31 In both cases, the treaty text clearly states that these 
hazards are events that have ‘the potential for triggering a disaster.’32 Therefore, the Tampere 
 
21  IFRC, Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial 
Recovery Assistance, 30IC/07/R4 annex, (26 - 30 November 2007). 
22  ibid Guidline 2(1). 
23  ibid Guidlines 1(1) and (3). 
24  IFRC and ICRC, Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Cresent Movement and Non-
Gernmental Organisations (NGO's) in Disaster Relief, (31 December 1994). 
25  ibid Preamble: “[…] a calamitous event in loss of life, great human suffering and distress, and large-scale 
material damage.”  
26  Report of the International Law Commission - Sixty-eight session (2 May - 10 June and 4 July - 12 August 
2016), GAOR, 71st sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/71/10, 13 -7 [48]. 
27  ibid 14, Art. 3(a). 
28  Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief 
Operations, opened for signature 8 June 1998, 2296 UNTS 40906 (entered into force 8 January 2005) Art. 
1(6) ('Tampere Convention'). 
29  ibid Article 1(6)  
30  ibid Article 1(8) and 1(9). 
31  ibid Art. 1(8) and 1(9). 
32  ibid Article 1(8) and 1(9). 
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Convention is the perfect example that ‘disaster’ can be understood as a situation caused by a 
calamitous event.  
Other legal instruments include a similar approach. One example is the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations’ (ASEAN’s) Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER).33 
The AADMER, like the Tampere Convention, views a disaster as ‘a serious disruption of the 
functioning of a community or a society […].’34 The instrument not only defines ‘disaster’ but also 
other related terms such as, in particular , ‘disaster management’, ‘disaster risk’, ‘disaster risk 
reduction’ and ‘disaster emergency’.35 The definition of a disaster emergency suggests that the 
AADMER follows a situational approach. It declares in Article 1(7) that a ‘“Disaster Emergency” is 
a situation where a Party declares that it is unable to cope with a disaster.’36 In other words, the 
AADMER views the situation in which the state is declares it is unable to handle the disaster situation, 
and not the devastating event itself, as the official disaster emergency. Therefore, the AADMER 
follows the Tampere Convention with regard to its situational understanding of ‘disaster’. 
Next to these, two hard-law instruments and also soft-law instruments, as well as other sources, 
support this approach. In addition to the IFRC Guidelines, the IFRC also introduces a different 
definition of ‘disaster’ on its website: 
[…] a sudden, calamitous event that seriously disrupts the functioning of a community of society and 
causes human, material, and economic or environmental losses, that exceed the community’s or 
society’s ability to cope using its own resources.37 
In order to explain this understanding, the IFRC uses the following formula: ‘(Vulnerability + Hazard) 
/ Capacity = Disaster’.38 
Although the wording of the definition suggests that the IFRC views ‘disaster’ as an event, like in the 
IFRC Guidelines, the formula makes clear that the IFRC actually follows a situational approach with 
this definition. The formula demonstrates that the focus lies on the ratio between the vulnerability to 
a certain risk, the risk itself and the society’s ability to cope with the subsequent situation. Thus, the 
formula describes a situation and not an event. Therefore, although the wording ‘event’ is used in the 
definition, this definition understands ‘disaster’ as a situation.  
Next to the IFRC, also the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) uses in its Operational 
Guidelines and Field Manual on Human Rights Protection in Situations of Natural Disasters a ratio 
to define ‘disaster’.39 The consequences of a calamitous event ‘overwhelm local response capacity’ 
and as such ‘exceed the ability of the affected community or society to cope by using its own 
resources.’40 The ratio lies between the effects of the event and the society’s capability to cope with 
the situation at hand. This definition uses, therefore, a situational approach, since it depends on the 
circumstances and situation after the event has passed. 
 
33  ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response, opened for signature 26 July 2005, 
(entered into force 24 December 2009) ('AADMER'). 
34  ibid Art. 1(3); the full definiton: " 'Disaster' means a serious disruption of the functioning of a community 
or a socieity causing widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses.".  
35  ibid Art. 1(4) - (7). 
36  ibid Article 1(7). 
37  IFRC, What is a disaster? (04 January 2016) <http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-
management/about-disasters/what-is-a-disaster/>. 
38  ibid. 
39  Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Human Rights and Natural Disasters - Operational Guidelines and 
Field Manual on Human Rights Protection in Situations of Natural Disaster (Brookings-Bern Project on 
Internal Displacement, 2008). 
40  ibid 5. 
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1.2. Disaster in human rights treaties 
Human rights play an important role within IDL because they serve as a tool for guidance for states 
with regard to the management of disasters. The importance of IHRL will be discussed in depth below 
in the respective chapter, as this section concentrates solely on the definition of the notion ‘disaster’. 
At this point, however, only two major human rights instruments deal explicitly with disasters.  
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)41 and the African Union 
Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala 
Convention)42 both make reference to disasters. As they entered into force in 2008 and 2012, 
respectively, they are among the youngest human rights instruments.  
The CRPD refers to ‘Natural Disaster’ in Article 11. It does not, however, include any definition of 
the notion ‘disaster’.43 The Kampala Convention, on the other hand, introduces several references to 
natural disasters, such as in Article 5(4). This provision makes a clear connection between natural 
disasters and climate change:  
“State Parties shall take measures to protect and assist persons who have been internally displaced due 
to natural or human made disasters, including climate change.”44 
Although, the Kampala Convention refers six times to ‘Disasters’,  like the CRPD it does not define 
this term. Only the preamble gets close to a definition. The preamble states that the convention 
addresses “[…] displacement caused by natural disasters, which have a devastating impact on human 
life, peace, stability, security, and development.”45 
The question arises of whether the Kampala Convention covers only natural disasters, which have a 
distressing effect on human life, peace, security and development. According to Article 31(2) Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) the preamble should be used in the treaty interpretation in 
order to define the purpose and intention of the specific treaty.46 This imperative extends into the fact 
that, indeed, the preamble may include supplementary provisions in addition to the interpretative 
purpose.47 The natures of supplementary provisions in preambles are intended to actually fill gaps in 
the convention.48  
 
41  Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2515 UNTS 44910 (entry into force: 3 May 2008). 
42  African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa 
(Kampala Convention), opened for signature 23 October 2009, (entered into force 6 December 2012) 
('Kampala Convention').  
43  Article 11 CRPD: “States Parties shall take, in accordance with their obligations under international law, 
including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, all necessary measures to 
ensure the protection and safety of persons with disabilities in situations of risk, including situations of 
armed conflict, humanitarian emergencies and the occurrence of natural disasters.“ 
44  Kampala Convention Art. 5(4); other articles with references to Natural Disasters: Preamble,Art. 1(k), Art. 
4(1) and (4)(f), Art. 12(3). 
45  ibid Preamble para 6.  
46  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered 
into force 27 January 1980) ('VCLT'). 
47  for example the preamble to the Charter of the United Nations which includes also supplementary provisions 
in its preamble; Makane Moïse Mbengue, Preamble (9 September 2015) Max Planck encyclopedia of public 
international law, online edition <www. mpepil. com.>.  
48  ibid.47. 
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Since the treaty text of the Kampala Convention leaves open whether both natural and human-made 
disasters or only natural disasters are covered, it is possible to argue that the preamble contains 
supplementary provisions, because the preamble refers to only natural disasters with a certain effect 
on society. Yet, although the preamble refers to only natural disasters, the treaty text is not limited to 
natural disasters and rather also includes human-made disasters.49 In Article 1(k) the Kampala 
Convention refers to both natural and human-made disasters.50 
Additionally, although the preamble does not include environmental aspects, this omission does not 
mean that they play no role. Environmental damage enjoys significant importance and should not be 
understood as left out. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has recognised the importance of the 
environment in the human habitat, saying that ‘the environment is not an abstraction but represents 
the living space, the quality of life and the very health of human beings, including generations 
unborn.’51 Thus, although the preamble does not speak about environmental damage, a calamitous 
event that causes severe environmental damage might also have a ‘distressing effect on human life’. 
This view is also supported by the Special Rapporteur on the Protection of Persons in the Event of 
Disasters.52 The opinion and work of the special rapporteur are discussed in the following section.  
 
 
1.3. Work of the ILC 
After the attempt to unify IDL with the 1984 Draft Convention in the 1980s, the UN made a new 
attempt in 2006. The ILC decided to include the project on the protection of persons in the event of 
disasters in its long-term programme of work.53 In 2007 the ILC decided to include the project in its 
current work and appointed Eduardo Valencia-Ospina as special rapporteur.54 He issued his first report 
in 2008, mainly dealing with the background, as well as with the specific scope of the topic.55 In the 
second report, the special rapporteur dealt, with the definition of ‘disaster’ among other things.56  
By drafting the definition of ‘disaster’, the special rapporteur used the definition of the Tampere 
Convention as guidance for two main reasons: Firstly, it is limited to neither natural disasters nor solely 
to human-made disasters, and as such it acknowledges that the cause of a disaster might involve a 
complex set of factors.57 Secondly, it takes also environmental as well as material damages into 
account. These kinds of damages can be severe enough to result in the need for protection of the 
affected persons.58 Contrary to the IASC, the special rapporteur did not want to include a link to the 
 
49  expressively mentioned in: Kampala Convention Art. 1(k). 
50  ibid Art. 1(k) which states: “ ‘Internally Displaced Persons’ means persons or groups of persons who have 
been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result 
of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human 
rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State 
border. 
51  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, 241 [29]. 
52  Valencia-Ospina, 61st sess, UN Doc A/CN.4/615 (7 May 2009), 13-4 [38]. 
53  Report of the International Law Commission, fifty-eigth session (1 May - 9 June and 3 July - 11 August 
2006), GAOR, 61st sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/61/10, 8-9 [22]. 
54  Report of the International Law Commission, fifty-ninth session (7 May - 5 June and 9 July - 10 August 
2007), GAOR, 62nd sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/62/10, 230 [375]. 
55  Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, Special Rapporteur, Preliminary report on the protection of persons in the event 
of disasters, 60th sess, UN Doc A/CN.4/598 (5 May 2008). 
56  Valencia-Ospina, Second report on the protection of persons in the event of disasters, 61st sess, UN Doc 
A/CN.4/615 (7 May 2009), 11-5. 
57  ibid 15 [44]. 
58  ibid.; see also: Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, 
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capacity of the affected State to actually cope with the situation.59 He argued that such an approach 
takes away the intended focus solely on the persons who are in need of protection.60 By taking this 
into consideration, the special rapporteur drafted the following definition: “‘Disaster’ means a serious 
disruption of the functioning of society, excluding armed conflict, causing significant, widespread 
human, material or environmental loss.”61 
This definition, however, has not been included into the final version of the Draft Articles.62 The ILC 
had several concerns with regard to the proposed definition by the special rapporteur. Firstly, certain 
members of the ILC wanted the definition, contrary to the Tampere Convention, to define a ‘disaster’ 
as an event and not as the consequence of an event.63 Secondly, the attributes ‘serious’, ‘significant’ 
and ‘widespread’ would impose a threshold that is too high. This language in the definition could lead 
to a loophole for affected States not to seek international humanitarian assistance if the event is not 
considered to meet any of the thresholds.64 Thirdly, the phrase ‘excluding armed conflict’ also gave 
rise for concern. The ILC suggested it rather belongs to the question of scope than to the definition.65 
Thus, the ILC suggested taking the reference to armed conflicts out of the definition and replacing it 
by a ‘without prejudice clause’.66 However the ILC also pointed out that, in some situations, it could 
be difficult to distinguish between a pure disaster and an armed conflict, and that it should be the main 
goal to ensure the application of IHL as lex specialis in situations of armed conflicts.67  
By having all these concerns in mind, the final draft defines disasters as  
 “[…] a calamitous event or series of events resulting in widespread loss of life, great human suffering 
and distress, or large-scale material or environmental damage, thereby seriously disrupting the 
functioning of society.”68 
Thus, all concerns have been implemented into the current definition. The Draft Articles also embody 
with Art. 18 a ‘without prejudice clause’.69 This provision governs the relation of the Draft Articles to 
(a) other rules of international law and (b) to IHL.70 The full set of Draft Articles was referred to the 
UNGA in May 2016, with the recommendation to adopt a convention.71 In 2016, the UNGA took note 
of the Draft Articles and decided to include them into its Agenda for 2018.72 In 2018, the UNGA again 
 
241 [29].  
59  Valencia-Ospina, Second report on the protection of persons in the event of disasters, 61st sess, UN Doc 
A/CN.4/615 (7 May 2009), 15 [46]. 
60  ibid. 
61  ibid [45]. 
62  Report of the International Law Commission - Sixty-eight session (2 May - 10 June and 4 July - 12 August 
2016), GAOR, 71st sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/71/10, 14 Art. 3(a). 
63  Report of the International Law Commission - Sixty-first session (4 May - 5 June and 6 July -7 August 
2009), GAOR, 64th sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/64/10, 339 [169]. 
64  ibid 339 [170]. 
65  ibid 340 [172]. 
66  ibid. 
67  ibid. 
68  Report of the International Law Commission - Sixty-eight session (2 May - 10 June and 4 July - 12 August 
2016), GAOR, 71st sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/71/10, 14 Art. 3. 
69  ibid 17 Art. 18. 
70  ibid. Art. 18: “(1) The present draft articles are without prejudice to other applicable rules of international 
law. (2) The present articles do not apply to the extent that the response to a disaster is governed by the 
rules of international humanitarian law.” 
71  ibid 13 [45] - [46]. 
72  Protection of persons in the event of disasters, GA Res 71/141, 71st sess, Agenda Item 78, UN Doc 
A/RES/71/141 (19 December 2016), paras 1 and 3. 
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took note of the Draft Articles and decided to inform the states that it was advised by the ILC to adopt 
the draft into a treaty.73 
 
  
 
73  Protection of persons in the event of disasters, GA Res 73/209, 62nd plenary mtg, UN Doc A/RES/73/209 
(20 December 2018). 
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2.The Approach of This Research  
The question now arises as to which understanding of the notion of ‘disaster’ is the most suitable for 
the research at hand. The answer to this question is simple: the situational approach seems to fit the 
best, as it is found, for example, in the Tampere Convention. Yet, for the purposes for this research, 
the local capacity requirement should also be included.  
This research focuses on the obligation of States before and in the aftermath of a calamitous event. 
Since the event as such cannot be prevented, the access point to this research should regard what can 
be done to prevent the situation from escalating in such a way – in other words to minimise the risk. 
Therefore, the approach in this research needs to be a situational approach. Additionally, as mentioned 
above, it is also necessary to take into account environmental and material damages. As those can have 
a devastating effect on the quality of life also of human beings. Additionally, not every potential 
calamitous event calls for international help. For example, in March 2017, Tropical Cyclone Debbie, 
category 4, hit the shore of Queensland, Australia.74 As the Australian Government was capable of 
coping with the consequences of the disaster situation, however, no international assistance was 
needed. Since this research focuses on situations where international assistance is needed, the logical 
conclusion is that the local capacity element, as found in the definition of the IASC and introduced in 
the formula of the IFRC, has to be included into the definition. 
The IFRC sees a disaster as the impact of a hazard on vulnerable people and uses the following formula 
to explain: “(Vulnerability + Hazard) / Capacity = Disaster”75 
According to the IFRC, this formula shows that “the combination of hazards, vulnerability and 
inability to reduce the potential negative consequences of risk results in disaster.”76 At the same time, 
it understands ‘hazard’ as a “threatening event, or probability of occurrence of a potential damaging 
phenomenon within a given time period and area.”77 In other words, ‘hazard’ means the risk of a 
calamitous event occurring. 
However, this understanding, and in particular the formula, has to be modified for two reasons. Firstly, 
a risk needs to be multiplied and not added. Secondly, although this formula describes the subsequent 
situation and not the event itself, the hazard should be replaced with the event itself, as it depends 
more on the event and its respective intensity and not on the general risk of whether it will be a disaster 
situation. 
This can be achieved by merging the two understandings of the IASC and the Tampere Convention. 
The merging is necessary because the definition by the IASC does not make any references to slow-
onset and sudden-onset disasters.78 This reference is, however, made in the Tampere Convention. 
Since this research focuses mainly on the consequences of climate change, it is necessary to include 
slow-onset events in the definition in order to subsume climate-change-related disasters.  
As such, the best approach for this research is a combination of the Tampere Convention as well as 
the ISAC definition, which is as follows:  
 
74  Cyclone Debbie reaches category four, thousands in low-lying Mackay areas told to leave, above n 4. 
75  IFRC, above n 37.  
76  ibid. 
77  IFRC, Types of disasters: Definition of hazard (12 April 2017) <http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-
do/disaster-management/about-disasters/definition-of-hazard/>. 
78  Inter-Agency Standing Committee, above n 39, 5; reaffirmed in: Inter-Agency Standing Committee, IASC 
Operational Guidelines on the Protection of Persons in Situations of Disasters (The Brookings-Bern 
Project, 2011) 55. “A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society causing widespread 
human, material, economic or environmental losses which exceed the ability of the affected community or 
society to cope using its own resources.” 
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‘Disaster’ means a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or society. Posing significant 
threat to human life, health, property or the environment, whether developed suddenly or as the result 
of complex long-term processes, and which exceed the ability of the affected community or society to 
cope using its own resources. 
In order to explain this rather long and complex definition in one single line, the formula introduced 
by the IFRC can be used as an example. As explained above, it requires some modification in order to 
be practical for this research:  
(Vulnerability × Event) / Ability to Cope = Intensity of Disaster Situation. 
Vulnerability means the current vulnerability to the negative consequences to a specific event. For 
example, it is common sense that people living in extreme poverty are more likely to suffer from 
damages to their housing after an earthquake or hurricane, as they do not have, per se, the resources 
to build safer.  
Taking into consideration the ‘ability to cope’, not all events and their consequences lead to major 
disasters that call for international aid. Thus, this factor indicates whether the community or the society 
has the means to cope with the situation at hand.  
At this current stage, and for the purposes of this research, the above shown formula is not used to 
calculate the exact intensity of a disaster situation. It rather serves as an illustration and should help to 
explain the notion of ‘disaster’ used for this research.  
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Chapter II:  Disaster Cycle and Legal Framework  
With definition of disaster used in this research established, this chapter puts now the term ‘disaster’ 
into its context. That IDL is a complex area of international law that lacks coherence has been 
explained above. The question of the context in which ‘disaster’ applies is first explained in this 
chapter. The second part deals with the complexity of IDL, as such, and maps its legal framework.  
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1.The Disaster Cycle and Historical Background  
Calamitous events and the following disaster situations do not occur in uniform order. Other factors 
such as compensation and rebuilding also play a significant role, in particular for future events. In 
order to fully comprehend the complexity of IDL, it is important to acknowledge this fact and view 
disasters as a cycle that will be repeated over time and not only one time:  
 
Figure 1: Disaster cycle79 
 
In order to understand the full complexity of disasters, and as such, IDL, it is important not to focus 
on only one of these five phases, for example the most predominant in the media: the emergency 
phase.80 The disaster cycle has not only the purpose to serve in an explanatory way; rather, it can also 
serve as a disaster-management tool.81 In every phase, steps can be taken in order to minimise the 
negative consequences for a society or community and, thus, increase the ability of the community or 
society to cope with the situation.82 
The following sections explain the content of the various stages of a disaster and introduce also some 
historical background to explain how IDL developed in international law over the last centuries.  
 
 
1.1. Risk mitigation 
The phase of risk mitigation deals primarily with pre-disaster mitigation.83 Mitigation has the aim to 
reduce the possible impact or the likelihood of the calamitous event before it happens.84 Mitigation 
and its success or failure also plays a significant role in whether the upcoming calamitous event results 
 
79  Daniel A Farber, 'International Law and the Disaster Cycle' in David D Caron, Michael J Kelly and 
Anastasia Telesetsky (eds), The International Law of Disaster Relief (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 
7, 10; Daniel A Farber, 'Legal Scholarship, the Disaster Cycle, and the Fukushima Accident' (2012) 23 Duke 
Environmental Law & Policy Forum 1, 3. 
80  Farber, 'Legal Scholarship, the Disaster Cycle, and the Fukushima Accident', above n 79, 4.  
81  ibid 3. 
82  ibid 4. 
83  Farber, 'International Law and the Disaster Cycle', above n 79, 10. 
84  ibid. 
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in a routine, manageable disruption or in a major disaster.85 Yet, as already mentioned, risk mitigation 
is performed not only at this stage, it can rather also be applied in all other stages.  
The importance of risk mitigation, or disaster risk reduction, was stressed out by the UN with the 
declaration of the 1990s as the ‘International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction’.86 The UNGA 
decided to include a World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction in its work during the 1990s.87 
The conference took place in Japan in 1994, and the outcome was the Yokohama Strategy and Plan of 
Action for a Safer World (Yokohama Strategy)88 that was endorsed by the UNGA in the same year.89 
The Yokohama Strategy includes general principles, a strategy and a plan for action.90 A second 
conference was held, also in Japan, in January of 2005, about one month after the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami. During this conference, the Hygo Declaration91 and the Hygo Framework for Action 2005 – 
2015: Building Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters (Hygo Framework)92 were 
adopted. In 2015, the third conference was held in Sendai, Japan. The outcome was the Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015 – 2030 (Sendai Framework), which is the current policy 
in place.93 At the end of the disaster reduction decade, the UNGA decided to establish an inter-agency 
task force and an inter-agency secretariat for disaster reduction (UNISDR).94 This research deals with 
risk reduction as presented in the various sections below.95 
 
 
1.2. Disaster event and emergency response 
Risk-mitigation measures are closely linked to whether the approaching event will cause a routine 
response that is manageable for the affected state or community or whether it instead leads to a major 
disaster situation that calls for international response. This section focuses on major disaster situations 
and, as such, situations in which international help is required. It aims to give a historical overview of 
how the law concerning emergency responses in the aftermath of disasters slowly developed in the 
international law community over the past few centuries and how it stagnated after World War II.  
 
1.2.1. The 1755 Lisbon earthquake and Emer de Vattel 
 
85  ibid. 
86  International decade for natural disaster reduction, GA Res 42/169, GAOR, 96th plenary mtg, UN Doc 
A/RES/42/169 (11 December 1987), para 14. 
87  International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, GA Res 46/149, GAOR, 77th plenary mtg, UN Doc 
A/RES/46/149 (18 December 1991), para 12. 
88  Report of the World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction (Yokohama, 23-27 May 1994), UN Doc 
A/CONF.172/9 (27 September 1994) Annex 1 ('Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World'). 
89  International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, GA Res 49/22, GAOR, 74th plenary mtg, UN Doc 
A/RES/49/22 (2 December 1994), para 11. 
90  Report of the World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction (Yokohama, 23-27 May 1994), UN Doc 
A/CONF.172/9 (27 September 1994) Annex 1, 7, 9, 11 ('Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World').  
91  World Conference on Disaster Reduction, Report of the World Conference on Disaster Reduction - Kobe, 
Hyogo, Japan, 18 -22 January 2005, UN Doc A/CONF/206/6 (16 March 2005), 3 - 5. 
92  ibid 6 - 27. 
93  World Conference on Disaster Reduction, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, UN 
Doc A/CONF.224/L.2 (7 April 2015). 
94  International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction: successor arrangements, GA Res 54/219, GAOR, 
54th sess, Agenda Item 100 (b), UN Doc A/RES/54/219 (3 February 2000), para 12. 
95  See below Chapters: Financing Early Warning Mechanisms,  Funding for the Reconstruction Phase and  
The Responsibility of the Affected State before the Disaster on the pages 49, 78 and 139.  
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On the 1 November 1755, a tragic earthquake hit Lisbon.96 The earthquake was followed by severe 
fires, caused by cooking fires and candles as well as a tsunami that hit the city with three waves.97 This 
series of events caused the death of about a quarter of the inhabitants of Lisbon.98 After this tragic 
event, King George II of England asked the British parliament to send speedy relief to Lisbon.99  
Emer de Vattel referred to this relief operation carried out by England as an example of natural 
international solidarity.100 He introduced the idea that every State should have ‘offices of humanities 
between nations’.101 Those ‘consist generally in doing everything in our power for the preservation 
and happiness of others, as far as such conduct is reconcilable with our duties towards ourselves’, and 
thus consist in altruistic obligations.102 De Vattel names famine, in particular, as an example where 
such humanitarian assistance should be rendered from one State to another.103 However, those 
obligations to assist are only secondary; first a state has to fulfil its duties toward itself.104 Additionally, 
linked to de Vattel’s understanding of sovereignty as the independence of states, a state cannot force 
its offices of humanities upon one another, in the sense that ‘every nation being free, independent, and 
sole arbitress of her own actions, it belongs to each to consider whether her situation warrants her in 
asking or granting anything on this head.’105  
As such, by introducing this altruistic obligation of states, de Vattel moved away from the 
understanding that humanitarian assistance is rendered only on the basis of bilateral contracts or 
private initiatives.106 Next to this obligation, he also describes the limits that are remain current in 
contemporary international law, namely the obligation of a State to protect its own citizenry and the 
dependency of other States on the willingness of the affected State to accept humanitarian 
assistance.107  
 
 
1.2.2. The beginning of the Red Cross and Crescent Movement  
Around a century later, in 1859, Henry Dunant witnessed the battle of Solferino and was shocked by 
the treatment of wounded soldiers. In answer to his experience, he started to advocate for rules for the 
protection of victims of international armed conflicts and for the establishment of a relief organisation 
 
96  USGS, Historic Eearthquakes - Lisbon, Portugal 1755 (14 January 2015) 
<http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/events/1755_11_01.php>. 
97  Jan T. Kozak and Charles D. James, Historical Depictions of the 1755 Lisbon Earthquake (14 January 2015) 
<http://nisee.berkeley.edu/lisbon/>. 
98  USGS, above n 96. 
99  T.C. Hansard, Parliamentary History of England (1813) vol XV, 1753 - 1765, 543. 
100  E. de Vattel, Le Droit Des Gens, Ou Principes De La Loi Naturelle: Appliqués à la conduite & aux affaires 
des Nations & des Souverains (1758) vol 1, 260 [5]; Peter Macalister-Smith, International Humanitarian 
Assistance: Disaster Relief Actions in International Law and Organizations (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1985) 17. 
101  de Vattel, above n 100, 255; translated in: Stéphane Beaulac, 'Emer de Vattel and the Externalization of 
Sovereignty"(2003)' 5 Journal of the History of International Law 237, 263. 
102  de Vattel, above n 100, 258; transtlated in: Beaulac, above n 101, 263.   
103  de Vattel, above n 100, 260-261; translated in: Beaulac, above n 101, 263. 
104  de Vattel, above n 100, 8-9; translated in: Beaulac, above n 101, 264. 
105  de Vattel, above n 100, 9; translated in: Beaulac, above n 101, 264. 
106  Stefanie Jansen-Wilhelm, Accepting Assistance in the Aftermath of Disasters - Standards for States under 
International Law (Intersentia, 2015) 26. 
107  ibid.; see as an example for contemporary international law dealing with sovereignty and international 
assistance: Report of the International Law Commission - Sixty-eight session (2 May - 10 June and 4 July - 
12 August 2016), GAOR, 71st sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/71/10, 16 Art. 13. 
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caring for those victims.108 This effort led to the establishment of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) in Geneva, 1863. One year later the initial Geneva Convention was adopted.109 The 
1864 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field has 
been revised and replaced several times. In fact, revisions in the years 1906 and 1929 marked the basis 
of the current 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva Convention I).110  
In addition to the idea of the creation of the ICRC, Henry Dunant proposed that national societies 
should be adopted, which would help military medical services.111 The first society was formed in the 
German State of Württemberg in 1883, and other European countries later followed.112 The First 
World War showed that there was a need for cooperation between the various national societies and, 
thus, that a governing body should be formed.113 This body was formed in 1919 in Paris, with the 
League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, (known today as the IFRC, as the organisation was 
renamed in the year 1991).114 
Contrary to the ICRC, the IFRC has no mandate in the Geneva Conventions and the relating Additional 
Protocols. Thus, its humanitarian actions are not limited to times of war. The IFRC rather proclaims 
its involvement in humanitarian assistance in the case of natural disasters.115 Yet this freedom has also 
limitations: the IFRC does not have the same strong legitimacy by international law as the ICRC, 
which benefits from a protection granted with its mandate from the Geneva Conventions and the 
relating Additional Protocols. This issue could have been solved with the IRU, which is discussed in 
the next section. 
 
 
1.2.3. The International Relief Union  
After the devastating earthquake in Messina in the year 1908, the president of the Italian Red Cross 
Society presented the idea of constructing an organisation that ensures solidarity and humanitarian 
assistance for victims of natural disasters.116 This idea was presented at the International Conference 
of the Red Cross in the year 1921 and was taken up by the League of Nations in the year 1922.117 The 
Convention and the Statute for the IRU were adopted on 12 July 1927.118 In its short duration, the IRU 
rendered relief actions in two disasters. Firstly, in 1934 as an earthquake struck Orissa (India) and in 
the year 1935 in Baluchistan (Pakistan) when serious earthquakes also struck this region.119 After 
 
108  Macalister-Smith, above n 100, 9; Henry Dunant, A Memory of Solferino (Internatonal Committee of the 
Red Cross (1986), first published 1862); Jansen-Wilhelm, above n 106, 27. 
109  ICRC, Founding and early years of the ICRC (1863-1914) (22 January 2016) 
<https://www.icrc.org/eng/who-we-are/history/founding/overview-section-founding.htm>. 
110  ibid. 
111  ibid.  
112  ibid. 
113  IFRC, The Formation of the IFRC (28 January 2016) <http://www.ifrc.org/en/who-we-are/history/>. 
114  ibid.  
115  Disaster Response is the first strategic aim of the IFRC for 2020: IFRC, Strategy 2020 - Saving Lives 
Changing Minds (IFRC, 2010) 11. 
116  MD Byrne, 'The International Relief Union' (1928) 134 The Contemporary Review 365, 365; Peter 
Macalister-Smith, 'International Relief Union-Reflections on the Convention Establishing an International 
Relief Union of July 12, 1927' (1986) 54 Tijdschrift voor rechtsgeschiedenis 363, 364. 
117  Macalister-Smith, 'International Relief Union-Reflections on the Convention Establishing an International 
Relief Union of July 12, 1927', above n 116, 364-365. 
118  ibid 366; IRU Convention.  
119  Macalister-Smith, 'International Relief Union-Reflections on the Convention Establishing an International 
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World War II, when the United Nations replaced the League of Nations, the majority of the members 
of the IRU found it reasonable to transfer the IRU into an appropriate UN agency.120 It was not until 
the year 1967 when the final transference happened, and the IRU was transferred into the United 
Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and thus had to cease all its 
activities.121  
 
 
1.2.4. United Nation’s undertakings in disaster relief 
Already, before the United Nations was formally founded with the adoption of the Charter of the 
United Nations (UN Charter) in the year 1945122, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration (UNRRA) was adopted on 9 November 1943.123 The UNRRA’s purpose was to offer 
relief to the victims of the Second World War by providing relief goods such as food, fuel, clothing 
and shelter.124 Thus, contrary to the IRU, the UNRRA focused on the response to war and not on 
natural disasters. After World War II, the UNRRA was terminated.125  
After the UNRRA was liquidated and the IRU was successfully terminated and transferred to 
UNESCO, the United Nations established in 1971 the position of the Disaster Relief Co-ordinator.126 
The Disaster Relief Co-ordinator proposed the 1984 Draft Convention, which was never turned into a 
legally binding convention.127 Then, around 20 years later, the ILC started its work on the topic of the 
protection of persons in the event of disasters, which was been submitted in 2016 to the UNGA for 
the adoption of an international treaty in this matter.128 This treaty would represent the first 
comprehensive binding legal instrument dealing with the rights and obligations of individuals and 
States in the area of IDL.  
 
 
 
Relief Union of July 12, 1927', above n 116, 370. 
120  ibid 371. 
121  ibid 372; Assistance in cases of natural disaster and other disaster situations, GA Res 2816 (XXVI), UN 
Doc A/RES/2816(XXVI) (14 December 1971). 
122  Charter of the United Nations, ('UN Charter'). 
123  United Nations, Summary of AG-018 United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) 
(1943-1946) (18 February 2016), 1 
<https://archives.un.org/sites/archives.un.org/files/files/Finding%20Aids/2015_Finding_Aids/AG-
018.pdf>. 
124  Agreement for United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, opened for signature 9 November 
1943, (entered into force 9 November 1943) art. 2(a) ('UNRRA Agreement'). 
125  United Nations, above n 123, 1; Agreement between UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration) and the United Nations concerning the transfer to the United Nations of the residual assets 
and activities of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, signed 27 September 1948, 
27 UNTS 349 (entered into force 27 September 1948); for a comperhensive overview of the actions of 
UNRRA: Macalister-Smith, International Humanitarian Assistance: Disaster Relief Actions in 
International Law and Organizations, above n 100, 10-14. 
126  Assistance in cases of natural disaster and other disaster situations, GA Res 2816 (XXVI), UN Doc 
A/RES/2816(XXVI) (14 December 1971), para 1; for a comperhensive overview: Macalister-Smith, 
International Humanitarian Assistance: Disaster Relief Actions in International Law and Organizations, 
above n 100, 129-141. 
127  David P Fidler, 'Disaster relief and governance after the Indian Ocean tsunami: what role for International 
Law' (2005) 6 Melb. J. Int'l L. 458, 464; Eburn, above n 19, 166-167. 
128  See above section: Work of the ILC on page 9. 
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1.3. Compensation, insurance and rebuilding 
Compensation, insurance and rebuilding, together with the risk mitigation, play a very important role 
in disaster management. As explained above, the separate phases of the disaster cycle cannot be seen 
individually, but rather all together, especially since every phase contributes to successful risk 
mitigation. Thus, during the rebuilding phase, methods can be applied that lessen the impacts of future 
events.129  
However, the financing of the rebuilding and reconstruction of the affected area is usually a challenge. 
Generally, three possibilities exist for financing: (1) private insurance, (2) tort litigation and (3) 
governmental aid or aid from international organisations.130 As such, it is no surprise that insurances 
or the World Bank are conducting a significant part of the research concerning disaster risk assessment 
and risk reduction.131 Although insurances seem to play a significant role in financing the 
consequences of a natural disaster, the numbers on how many loss events are not insured are dramatic. 
According to a 2017 study of the reinsurer Munich Re on the loss events, in 2016 a total of 750 loss 
events were counted.132 Those lead to an estimated overall loss of USD 175bn whereof only USD 
50bn was covered by insurance: a mere 28.57%.133  
The second pillar, tort litigation, has its limits, especially also in developed countries.134 In 2015 a 
Peruvian farmer sued a German energy company for climate-related possible future damages on his 
property. His claim was based on the idea that the energy company with its high share of the global 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is responsible for climate change and its related damages. The 
Landgericht Essen dismissed the claim in December 2016, inter alia, on the grounds of causation.135 
There are several international organisations relevant to the third option. For example, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) can make funds available for States struggling with the financial consequences 
of a natural disaster.136 The World Bank also has funds available for those countries; such funds were 
made available, for example, in Indonesia after the 2004 Southeast Asian Tsunami and the devastating 
earthquake in Haiti in 2010.137  
Consequently, when talking about disaster management, not do only the emergency response phase 
and the risk-mitigation phase have to be considered. The above-mentioned rebuilding and 
compensation phase is as important. However, the current system exhibits gaps, and it is shocking that 
roughly only around 28.57% of all material losses are insured. This research focuses in its second part 
 
129  Farber, 'Legal Scholarship, the Disaster Cycle, and the Fukushima Accident', above n 79, 4. 
130  Farber, 'International Law and the Disaster Cycle', above n 79, 17. 
131  For example: Swiss Re, Natural catastrophes and man-made disasters in 2016: a year of widespread 
damages (Swiss Re,, 2017); Munich RE, NatCatSERVICE (19 April 2017) 
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Hallegatte et al, Unbreakable - Building the Resilience of the Poor in the Face of Natural Disasters (World 
Bank, 2017). 
132  Munich RE, Natural Catastrophes 2016 - Analyses, assessments positions (Munich RE, 2017) 54. 
133  ibid 55. 
134  Farber, 'International Law and the Disaster Cycle', above n 79, 17. 
135  Landgericht Essen, 'Lliuya ./. RWE AG: Klagen wegen behaupteter Eigentumsbeeinträchtigung durch CO2 
Ausstoss' (2016) 
 <http://www.lg-essen.nrw.de/behoerde/presse/Presseerklaerungen/Archiv-2016/Lliuya-___-RWE-
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136  see in general: Joseph Gold, 'Natural disasters and other emergencies beyond control: assistance by the IMF' 
(1990) 24 The International Lawyer 621; Farber, 'International Law and the Disaster Cycle', above n 79, 
17. 
137  Jenny R Hernandez and Anne D Johnson, 'Call to Respond: The International Community's Obligation to 
Mitigate the Impact of Natural Disasters, A' (2011) 25 Emory International Law Review 1087, 1093; Farber, 
'International Law and the Disaster Cycle', above n 79, 17. 
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on the financial aspect of natural disasters and how other States have an obligation to financially assist 
affected developing States.138  
 
138  See below the Chapters:Financing Early Warning Mechanisms and  Funding for the Reconstruction Phase 
on pages 49 and 78. 
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2.Mapping the Legal Framework 
As described above, IDL is a fragmented area of law. Therefore, various areas of international law are 
applicable. This section aims to map the already existing legal framework applicable to this research.  
The first part of this sections deals with the applicability of IHL and IHRL. Those fields of law are 
especially relevant to the questions of what rights the individuals have and, by contrast, what 
obligations the affected State has. The second part deals with international environmental law with a 
strong focus on international climate change law. This area of law is relevant for the questions dealing 
with the relationship between States, in particular between suffering and polluting States. 
 
 
2.1. International humanitarian and human rights law 
International humanitarian and human rights law is of great relevance during the emergency response 
phase but is obviously not limited to it. This section firstly discusses IHL, which helps establish the 
rules and guidelines that need to be followed with regard to delivering humanitarian assistance to the 
persons in need. The second discusses IHRL, which helps to elucidate the general guidelines for States, 
on how to manage an emergency situation and early warning in the risk-mitigation phase.  
 
 
2.1.1. International humanitarian law 
Because this research focuses on natural disasters and not on armed conflict, it seems at first glance 
not entirely correct to include IHL into the legal framework of this study. However, there are 
overlapping ideas and values in both areas, such as humanitarian assistance and the humanitarian 
principles, which have been included in the Draft Articles.139 Therefore, this section applies IHL by 
analogy to the case of natural disasters.  
This section focuses on the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the respective Additional Protocols 
thereto, as well as on an analysis of the concept of State sovereignty.140 State sovereignty holds a 
special position within IDL and such is analysed first. Afterwards, a special focus is rendered on the 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians Persons in Time of War (Geneva 
 
139  Report of the International Law Commission - Sixty-eight session (2 May - 10 June and 4 July - 12 August 
2016), GAOR, 71st sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/71/10, 15 Art. 6.  
140  Geneva Convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sich in armed forces in the 
field, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (entered into force 21 October 1950) ('Geneva 
Convention I'); Geneva Convention for the amelioration of the condition of wounded, sick and shipwrecked 
members of armed forces at sea, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85 (entered into force 21 
October 1950) ('Geneva Convention II'); Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, 
opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950) ('Geneva 
Convention III'); Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilians persons in time of war, opened 
for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950) ('Geneva Convention 
IV'); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the protection of 
victims of international armed conflicts, opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 
7 December 1978) ('Additional Protocol 1'); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949 and relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts, opened for signature 8 
June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (' Additional Protocol 2'). 
1. Part: Introduction and general principles 23 
Convention IV), as it deals with the protection of civilians during armed conflict and, as such, also 
includes rules on the provision of humanitarian assistance.  
 
2.1.1.1. State sovereignty and humanitarian assistance 
The idea of equal nations within the international legal order goes back to the Peace of Westphalia 
(1648), which consisted in treaties among the European leaders at that time to end what is known as 
the 30 Years War in Europe.141 From this understanding the modern concept of State sovereignty 
developed.142 The concept of State sovereignty is divided into an external as well as an internal aspect. 
The external aspect of State sovereignty has been described with the maxim: par in parem non habet 
imperium and reflects the equality of states.143 This maxim is reflected by Article 2(1) of the UN 
Charter.144 Thus, the equality of States embodies the territorial integrity of states, which is “[…] an 
essential foundation of international relations.”145  
On the other side, there is the internal aspect of State sovereignty. This aspect defines the competence 
of a state within its jurisdiction, which is often referred as the domaine reservé. According to Article 
2(7) of the UN Charter, the UN is not allowed to intervene in matters purely within a State’s domestic 
jurisdiction.146 This implies that not only does the UN have to refrain from intervening in matters that 
belong to the domaine reservé, but rather also by other States.147 
This concept of State sovereignty and especially the respect for the territorial integrity of States has 
started to be redefined within the international legal order. So have, for example, the current ‘war on 
terror’ and humanitarian interventions inflamed the discussion on State sovereignty.148 In the context 
of this research, in particular the provision of humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of a natural 
disaster, especially the principle of non-intervention, is crucial. Specifically, since humanitarian 
assistance comprises not only the provision of supplies but rather also includes relief personnel that 
need to be deployed to the affected area in the territory of the affected State.149 As such, if these 
personnel enter the territory of the affected State without permission, this could constitute a violation 
of the principle of non-intervention.150 
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The principle of non-intervention has its roots from the principles of sovereignty and equality of states 
and is enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.151 In its Nicaragua decision, the ICJ discussed also 
the principle of non-intervention. The court explained that any direct or indirect interference in to the 
internal affairs of a State and in particular with force is a violation of this principle.152 However, the 
court further declared that the provision of humanitarian assistance cannot be regarded as an 
interference with the internal matters of State, if it is carried out in the light of the fundamental 
principles of the Red Cross and as such is, in particular, delivered without discrimination.153 Yet, the 
ICJ did not discuss how the entry into the territory of the State for the purpose of humanitarian 
assistance has to be legal classified and left the legal community in limbo in this regard.154 
This limbo was notable after the Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar in 2008 and its government refused to 
accept international humanitarian assistance for close to a month.155 Subsequently, the international 
community started discussing whether they should enter the territory of Myanmar without consent of 
the government in order to provide humanitarian assistance to the victims of the cyclone.156 The idea 
was to get a Security Council Resolution authorising humanitarian intervention in Myanmar.157 Yet, 
this proposal was not successful.158 This example shows how important the consent of the respective 
State is in gaining access to the territory of the affected country. This difficulty has been reflected by 
the ILC in its Draft Articles, where Article 13 affirms, 
“(1) The provision of external assistance requires the consent of the affected State. 
(2) Consent to external assistance shall not be withheld arbitrarily. 
(3) When an offer of external assistance is made in accordance with the present draft article the 
affected State shall, whenever possible, make known its decision regarding the offer in a timely 
manner”159 
The ILC argues that this principle of consent is fundamental to international law.160 Furthermore, the 
ILC describes the notion of consent as  
“the expression of the will of the sovereign who, thereby, permits activities on its territory that may 
otherwise constitute violations of the principle of non-intervention.”161  
This view not only is reflected by the Draft Articles, but also has a basis in other instruments such as 
the Geneva Conventions, the Tampere Convention or the UNGA Resolution 46/182.162  
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However, at the same time, the Draft Articles express that consent to outside humanitarian assistance 
should not be withheld arbitrarily.163 This specification  corresponds to the idea that State sovereignty 
not only embodies rights but also includes obligations.164 Thus, the affected State has the obligation 
to ensure protection and assistance to those are in need and those in its territory or under its 
jurisdiction.165 This obligation has also been acknowledged by the UNGA, where it considers that  
“the abandonment of the victims of natural disasters and similar emergency situations without 
humanitarian assistance constitutes a threat to human life and an offence to human dignity.”166  
Consequently, in order to respect the territorial sovereignty of the affected State and as such the 
principles of non-intervention, the humanitarian actors that wish to enter the affected territory need 
the consent of the affected State. Although the ICJ has not ruled on that particular matter, it has been 
reflected several times by various international bodies, such as just recently by the ILC with the 
adoption of the Draft Articles. Yet, the ILC affirms at the same time that this understanding of 
territorial sovereignty is not absolute, since the consent may not be withheld arbitrarily. This topic will 
be discussed in more detail and depth below in the respective section that deals with the provision of 
humanitarian assistance.167 
 
2.1.1.2. The concept of humanitarian assistance 
The concept of humanitarian assistance is not clearly defined in international law, especially with 
regard to the content of humanitarian assistance. Although the exact content is not exhaustively 
defined, it is at the same time clear that not everything is able to fall within the scope of humanitarian 
assistance. As this research focuses in the second part also on humanitarian assistance, it is necessary 
to define the concept of ‘humanitarian assistance’. In order to define this concept, it is appropriate to 
have a look on IHL and how it defines ‘humanitarian assistance’. Relevant in this context are, on first 
sight, Geneva Convention IV and the First Additional Protocol, which both deal with the protection of 
civilians during armed conflict. 
The provisions with regard to Humanitarian assistance found in Geneva Convention IV, deal primary 
with the situation in an occupied territory.168 The occupying power has primarily the obligation to 
supply the civilian population with “necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles […]”.169 
This, however, only if the resources found in the occupied territory are insufficient.170 If the occupying 
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power is not able to supply the civilian population with those goods, then the occupying power shall 
agree to relief schemes, which consist in the facilitation of relief goods such as ‘the provision of 
consignments of foodstuff, medical supplies and clothing.’171  
These lists of relief goods have been elaborated by the AP1.172 The Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts (AP 1) extends the possible content of basic needs in occupied territories: Article 69 AP1 
mentions expressively “clothing, bedding, means of shelter and other supplies necessary to the survival 
of the civilian population […] and objects necessary for religious worship.”173 Article 70 AP1 deals 
with relief actions and is applicable in situations other than occupied territories. The provision makes 
a reference to Article 69 AP1 by saying relief actions shall be undertaken if the civil population “is 
not adequately provided with the supplies mentioned in Article 69 […].”174 Nonetheless, Article 70 
AP1 does not specify what the possible content of humanitarian assistance could be. Yet, through the 
reference to Article 69 AP1 the provision makes clear, that the minimum standard are the items and 
services listed in Article 69 AP1. Thus, also relief actions in not occupied territories should at least 
consist in these consignments or even go further, as the individuals in those situations lack the most 
basics in their everyday live that is necessary for survival.  
Yet, Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols are not the only source for identifying the 
concept of ‘humanitarian assistance’. Other bodies within the international community have taken an 
approach with regard to defining ‘humanitarian assistance’ and in particular the content.  
Within the UN system the UNGA took an approach in its resolution 2717 (15 December 1970). There 
it described the content of humanitarian assistance inter alia to be consistent of “medicines, non-
perishable foodstuffs, blankets and clothing, and the earmarking of other facilities such as logistical 
equipment and helicopters.”175 One year later the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) adopted 
its Resolution 1612 (LI), which deals specifically with the assistance in the time of natural disasters. 
There it makes references to emergency aid and states that it consist inter alia of “[…]food supplies, 
medicines, personnel, transportation and communications […]”.176 In the same time, the ECOSOC 
also invites potential affected States “to establish stockpiles of emergency supplies such as tents, 
blankets and non-perishable foodstuffs.”177 Also the 1984 Draft Convention included a possible 
definition of the content of humanitarian assistance.178 In its provision the 1984 Draft Convention also 
included a list of goods as a possible content again that list is non-exhaustive.179 In the 1990s the UN 
came up with a new resolution that, again, included rather a list of possible goods and services than 
an abstract formulation of the content of humanitarian assistance.180 Moreover also the ICJ looked on 
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the concept of humanitarian assistance in its decisions. It also used a very narrow approach in its 
Nicaragua Judgment, by giving examples of a possible content of humanitarian assistance.181 The ICJ 
further elaborated, that the assistance needs to be strictly humanitarian and must reflect the principle 
of non-discrimination.182 
By looking outside of the UN system, it there exist indeed abstract formulations. For example the 
International Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance Operations defines ‘humanitarian assistance’ 
as “urgent material consignment and related services of exclusively humanitarian character including 
personnel.”183 Through this abstract formulation, this understanding is broader than that within the UN 
system, which uses specific examples. Two years later, in 1993, the San Remo Principles were 
adopted. Contrary to the International Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance Operations they, like 
the UN system, mention a list of possible items and services rather than an abstract formulation.184 At 
the same time, however, they recognise the importance of religious and spiritual assistance, which the 
International Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance Operations do not.185 Around 10 years later, 
the Institute for International Law came up with the Bruges Resolution, which specifically focuses on 
humanitarian assistance.186 The Bruges Resolution uses an abstract description of humanitarian 
assistance. It defines this assistance as  
“[…] all acts, activities and the human and material resources for the provision of goods and services 
of an exclusively humanitarian character, indispensable for the survival and the fulfilment of the 
essential needs of the victims of disasters.”187 
 In order to give teeth to this abstract formulation, the Bruges Resolution also defines the terms services 
and goods in subparagraphs. These definitions are again lists of possible items and services. Here, also 
religious, spiritual and psychological services are included.188  
For the purposes of this research, the understanding of the Bruges Resolution seems the most adequate 
and acceptable approach for two reasons. Firstly, the definition combines an abstract formulation with 
a non-exhaustive list of possible goods and services. This approach is beneficial because the abstract 
formulation makes it possible to adapt the list of goods and services to the specific circumstances, 
which are mostly complex situations. Secondly, it takes both services and goods into consideration. 
This dual consideration is of great importance since the mere supply of goods might in many 
circumstances not be enough, and in particular, medical and psychological services are also needed.  
 
2.1.1.3. The principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and non-discrimination 
Next to the content of humanitarian assistance, there are of course also standards on how the 
humanitarian assistance has to be delivered to the persons in need. Both the UNGA with its Resolution 
46/182 as well as the ILC with its work on the Draft Articles acknowledge that the provision of 
 
181   Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) 
(Judgment) [1986] ICJ Rep 14 ('Nicaragua Case'). 
182  ibid 124 [242].  
183  Peter Macalister-Smith, International Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance Operations (Max Planck 
Institute for Comparative Law and Internatonal Law, 1991) Principle 2 (a). 
184  International Institute of Humanitarian Law, Guding Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance 
(International Institute of Humanitarian Law, 1993). 
185  ibid Principle 9.  
186  Institute of International Law, Resolution 'Humanitarian Assistance', Bruges sess, (2 September 2003). 
187  ibid 3 [1].  
188  ibid 3 [1a].  
1. Part: Introduction and general principles 28 
humanitarian assistance has to be guided by the cardinal humanitarian principles of humanity, 
neutrality, impartiality and non-discrimination.189 These principles are addressed in this section.  
 
a) The principle of humanity 
The principle of humanity is a cornerstone principle for the protection of persons in international 
law.190 The principle of humanity was already reflected in the 1899 Martens Clause, which is 
embodied toady in Article 1(2) of AP I.191 This provision stipulates that even if the Geneva 
Conventions and its related protocols and any other instrument are not applicable to the specific 
situation, civilians and combatants remain under the protection of customary international law, the 
principle of humanity itself and the public conscience.192 Article 3, common to all four Geneva 
Conventions, reflects this idea too.  
The principle of humanity has also been considered in jurisprudence. The ICJ was confronted several 
times with the principle of humanity in its decisions. In its Corfu Channel Case,193 the ICJ explained 
that the principle of humanity cannot be invoked only during wartime; rather, it also applies and is 
even more exacting in time of peace.194 In a later decision, the ICJ highlighted the importance of the 
humanitarian principles by observing that the fundamental principles of IHL, including humanity, 
“constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law.”195 
The substance of the principle of humanity is divided into three pillars:196 (1) to prevent and alleviate 
suffering.197 This is the primary function of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, 
not just in times of war but also in peace.198 With regard to disaster relief also other non-binding 
instruments as the Oslo Guidelines as well as the Mohonk principle address that “human suffering 
must be addressed wherever it is found.”199 (2) The second pillar is to protect life and health,200 and 
(3) the third is to assure respect for the individual.201 Thus, in order to explain the meaning of humanity, 
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it is easier to explain what it is certainly not.202 The principle of humanity is the clear opposite of 
“inhumane treatment, the denial of human rights or the degradation of the person, all of which imply 
the absence of respect and dignity.”203 
 
b) The principle of impartiality 
Within the statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the principle of 
impartiality means that the movement 
 “[…] makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It 
endeavours to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give 
priority to the most urgent cases of distress.”204  
Thus, the substance of impartiality is divided into three different components: (1) non-discrimination, 
(2) proportionality and (3) impartiality as a distinguished principle.205  
With regard to the context of IDL, the ILC has expressed in its commentary to the Draft Articles that, 
in their view, the principle of non-discrimination needs, because of its importance, to be addressed 
separately as a distinguished principle.206 Because of its significance, this research addresses the 
principle of non-discrimination separately below. 
The notion of proportionality serves as a mechanism for the provision of humanitarian assistance.207 
Proportionality means that the humanitarian actors prioritise individuals whose need of humanitarian 
assistance is more urgent than that of others.208 The distinguished principle of impartiality, on the other 
hand, does not refer to the means of delivery of humanitarian assistance. Rather, it refers to the 
obligation of the individual or the organisations delivering humanitarian assistance to be impartial in 
their decision-making process.209 Thus, “humanitarian assistance should be provided on an impartial 
basis without any adverse distinction to all persons in need.”210 
 
c) The principle of neutrality 
The Geneva Conventions make no specific reference to the principle of neutrality. However, there are 
a few provisions that clearly indicate that any humanitarian actor, in order to be under the protection 
of the Geneva Conventions, must follow the fundamental principles, of which neutrality is one.211 
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The fundamental principle of neutrality asks humanitarian actors to neither take sides in hostilities nor 
engage in any controversies of any kind, such as of political, racial, religious or ideological nature.212 
Neutrality is important in order to enjoy the confidence the parties give to the humanitarian actor in 
place.213 In the context of humanitarian assistance in the situation of a disaster, neutrality ensures that 
humanitarian activities follow only the purpose of responding to the disaster.214 Thus, the interests of 
the individuals affected by the disaster have to be the primary concern of the involved humanitarian 
actor.215  
 
d) The principle of non-discrimination  
As explained above, traditionally this principle belongs to the notion of impartiality. However, the 
ILC decided to treat the principle of non-discrimination, because of its importance, as a separate 
principle.  
The principle of non-discrimination is not only anchored in IHL, it is also a very important cornerstone 
of international human rights law (IHRL). Thus, major human rights instruments deal with the 
principle of non-discrimination.216 The principle of non-discrimination demands that there is no 
discrimination based on any grounds such as race, ethnic origin, sex, political opinions, religion or 
disability.217 Yet, this list is, in its very nature, inexhaustive, and other grounds are consequently 
possible.218  
Providing humanitarian assistance in the case of natural disasters, nevertheless, requires that the needs 
of particular vulnerable individuals be taken into consideration – despite the principle of non-
discrimination.219 The ILC has expressed this idea in Article 6 of the Draft Articles, by including the 
phrase “[…] while taking into account the needs of the particularly vulnerable.”220 At the same time, 
the ILC decided not to include a list of vulnerable groups, as all affected individuals by a disaster are, 
per se, vulnerable.221 Moreover, by not including a list of vulnerable groups, the ILC reflects the 
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relative nature of vulnerability, which depends on who is disadvantaged in a particular situation.222 
This flexibility  recognises the fact that the principle of non-discrimination includes the positive 
obligation to pay specific attention to the needs of particular vulnerable individuals.223  
 
 
2.1.2. International human rights law  
International human rights law is another important source for IDL, since it governs the vertical sphere 
between State and individual. International human rights law, contrary to IHL, does not only apply in 
a certain situation but rather in every situation and universally to all individuals. As such, in a disaster 
situation, the victims obviously also enjoy protection under IHRL.224 Because of its applicability to 
every situation, IHRL serves not only as a tool for individuals to enforce their rights, but also as a 
guideline for the affected State concerning how to manage disaster situations and the pre-disaster 
phases. 
Explicit references to natural disasters in human rights treaties are rare. On the global level, only the 
CRPD makes specific reference to natural disasters.225 While on a regional level, hence in Africa, the 
Kampala Convention also mentions natural disasters in several provisions.226 However, the Kampala 
Convention not only includes references to disaster relief but rather also to disaster risk reduction and 
disaster preparedness.227  
Yet, although the bigger global and regional human rights instruments, such as the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR) or the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) do not include a specific 
reference to natural disasters, they are still applicable in a disaster situation. So are various rights that 
are at stake in a disaster situation, as well as pre- and post-disaster, for example the right to life, the 
right to food, right to health, right to water, right to adequate standard of living and right not to be 
discriminated against.228 However, the list is, of course, not limited to these examples.  
In order to examine the application of human rights to disaster situations, this section is divided into 
the post-disaster event- and pre-disaster event situation. The specific rights and their duties are 
discussed in the respective sections below.229 
 
2.1.2.1. Application of human rights in the aftermath of a disaster situation 
Hurricane Matthew hit Haiti on 4 October 2016. The hurricane affected 2.1 million people of which 
about 1.4 million people, thus more than half, were in need of humanitarian assistance, with about 
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175,500 people displaced.230 As mentioned above, there were several human rights at stake during this 
disaster situation, like for example the right to adequate housing as well as the right to life, right to 
food or the right to health. Yet, at this stage the specific rights are not discussed, since the applicable 
rights vary from situation to situation.231 Some rights are elaborated below in the context of the right 
to receive humanitarian assistance.232  
Art. 5 of the Draft Articles, does not mention a single specific human right. The provision rather serves 
as a reminder to states that human rights do not stop being applicable in a disaster.233 At the same time, 
the ILC points out that the best practices for the protection of human rights inter alia are non-binding234 
such as the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Operational Guidelines on the Protection of Persons in 
Situations of Natural Disasters (IASC Operational Guidelines)235 as well as the Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement (Guiding Principles).236 As the example of Haiti in 2016 shows, natural 
disasters often force the affected persons to leave their homes and thus displace them.237 Thus, both 
the IASC Operational Guidelines as well as the Guiding Principles present a good pathway for states 
to approach the situation.238  
As mentioned, both instruments are non-binding and, as such, not per se enforceable. However, neither 
instrument creates new rights or obligations; they rather apply well-established international human 
rights law to the situation of displaced persons. Thus, the question arises whether the relevant human 
rights, as enshrined in international or reginal treaties, are possible subjects for any limitations or even 
derogation.  
Not every guaranteed freedom or right in international human rights treaties is an absolute right or 
freedom. Restrictions and limitations are possible.239 Generally, in order to justify a limitation of any 
fundamental right or freedom, a State must fulfil the following criteria: (1) the limitation needs to be 
in accordance with national law; (2) the limitation needs to be free from any arbitrariness; and (3) in 
the most cases, the limitation needs to meet the ‘necessity’ test, which demands that the limitation 
itself responds to a social or public pressing need, pursues a legitimate aim and needs to be 
proportionate to that aim.240 Thus, it seems very clear that in a disaster situation, the concerned 
StateState is entitled to limitations, as it will most likely meet the requirements for lawful interference. 
However, the justifications are based on case-by-case decisions. Therefore, the question remains 
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whether the state suffering from a disaster may invoke the derogation clauses as for example found in 
Art. 15 ECHR, Art. 4 ICCPR or Art. 27 ACHR.  
Derogation means that a State is allowed to abrogate certain obligations during time of war or public 
emergencies. Yet, firstly, a State cannot derogate from all rights and secondly, not every human rights 
instrument includes a derogation clause.241 Additionally, even if a certain instrument includes a 
derogation clause, the question is whether a disaster situation fulfils the requirement of ‘public 
emergency’ as enshrined for example in Article 4 ICCPR, Article 15 ECHR and Article 27 ACHR. 
So far, the derogation clauses have been invoked by at least three States in the aftermath of calamitous 
events leading to disaster situations.242 (1) Guatemala used the derogation clause under the ICCPR 
four times: in 1998 and 2005 in the aftermath of devastating hurricanes, 2009 while dealing with the 
‘swine flu’ pandemic and, lastly, in 2010 after the eruption of the Pacaya volcano and in the aftermath 
of a tropical storm.243 (2) In 2010, Chile derogated from certain rights under Article 4 ICCPR after a 
severe earthquake.244 (3) Georgia made use of the derogation clause in relation to a health crisis, trying 
to stop the further spread of the avian flu virus.245 At the same time, these have been, so far, the only 
cases under Art. 15 ECHR.246 These applications of the derogation clause have not been tested on their 
conformity with the law.247 Yet, in its general comment on Article 4 from the year 2001, the Human 
Rights Committee (HRC) expressed its views on invoking the derogation clause during the time of a 
natural catastrophe. It expresses concerns and requires States to justify why the derogation is “strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation.”248 Additionally, the HRC pointed out, the appropriate 
restriction of rights, such as the freedom of movement as well as the freedom of assembly, should be 
sufficient enough, and as such no derogation would be justified generally in such situations.249 Despite 
this view, the derogations, as mentioned above, have not been tested by the HRC. Nevertheless, it 
seems that the threshold for a State to claim the situation of a public emergency during a disaster 
situation is relatively high.  
The ILC does not take part in the discussion of whether States should be allowed to derogate human 
rights obligations in disaster situations. Yet, by including the reference that human rights are 
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applicable in “accordance with international law”250 the ILC leaves the door open for limitations and 
derogations, however in consistent with international law.251  
Consequently, the limitations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the aftermath of a 
calamitous event are justifiable, as long as they are proportionate and necessary. In very severe 
situations, the derogation of certain rights and freedoms is also possible. However, derogation should 
be used as a last resort and, as explained by the HRC, needs to be justified by the exigencies of the 
situation at hand. Additionally, it should be borne in mind that not all human rights instruments include 
derogation clauses (e.g., ICESCR).  
 
2.1.2.2. Application of human rights prior to the disastrous event 
Each human right in IHRL enjoys a three-sphere protection: the obligation of States to respect, to 
protect and to fulfil.252 The obligation to respect is the negative obligation of States not to violate 
human rights and the fulfilment of rights requires that States give access to the right itself.253 The 
obligation to protect, however, requires States to protect the right holders from interferences by third 
parties, but at the same time, it also asks for the prevention of the occurrence of human rights 
violations, and thus it imposes a positive obligation to prevent.254 The Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (IACtHR) has described the positive obligation that derives from the duty to prevent as follows: 
“This duty to prevent includes all those means of a legal, political, administrative and cultural nature 
that promote the protection of human rights and ensure that any violations are considered and treated 
as illegal acts, which, as such, may lead to the punishment of those responsible and the obligation to 
indemnify the victims for damages. It is not possible to make a detailed list of all such measures, since 
they vary with the law and the conditions of each State Party.”255 
This understanding of prevention is very closely linked to the notion of ensuring human rights, as 
found in Article 2(1) ICCPR. 256 By demanding States to ensure rights, positive steps need to be taken, 
in order to ensure that neither State action nor third parties can violate human rights.257 Thus, the duty 
to prevent human rights violations requires States to take preventive measures before a calamitous 
event strikes, in order to protect and ensure, for example, the right to life. This argument is supported 
by two decisions, in particular with reference to the right to life, by the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR).258  
In 2004, the ECtHR delivered its first judgment in relation to a disaster. The Öneryldiz v. Turkey case 
dealt with a human-made disaster, where a violation of the right to life has been found.259 In this case, 
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39 people died from a methane explosion of a public rubbish dump. Several years beforehand, 
authorities were warned about that danger. The authorities were, however, not taking any steps to 
reduce the risk.260 One of the alleged violations was that the Turkish authorities violated the applicant’s 
right to life according Article 2 ECHR. The ECtHR recognised the positive obligation of states under 
this provision to actively establish ‘a legislative and administrative framework designed to provide 
effective deterrence against threats to the right to life.’261 The ECtHR went on to stress the need for 
preventive measures, among which also the public’s right to information plays a certain role.262  
The ECtHR reaffirmed this reasoning in 2008 in its Budayeva v. Russia judgment.263 Also in this case, 
the ECtHR found a violation of the right to life.264 This case dealt with deaths caused by a natural 
disaster. A mudslide killed several people and destroyed many buildings. The affected town has 
always been prone to mudslides, and as such was protected by mud-retention dams. These were 
heavily affected after a mudslide in 1999 and had not been repaired after. A few weeks before the 
incident, the authorities were warned by the State meteorological institute of the imminent danger, and 
the agency proposed several measures, of which none were taken by the authorities. Thus, a first 
mudslide hit the town, without causing any causalities, and the population was evacuated the same 
day. However, they returned the next day when the mud levels were lower, and the main mudslide hit, 
killing several people.265 The applicants complained, with regard to Article 2 ECHR, that the Russian 
authorities failed to comply with the positive obligation of their right to life, because they were not 
taking appropriate measures to mitigate the risk the natural hazard imposed on their lives; they 
complained also of the failure of the authorities to put in place effective early warning mechanisms.266 
Here, the ECtHR applied its reasoning from the Öneryldiz v. Turkey case, and thus, extended the 
application to natural disasters.267  
Consequently, the right to life, as enshrined in Article 2 ECHR, requires States to take positive 
measures, such as adopt and implement laws on disaster risk mitigation, put in place early warning 
mechanisms and evacuate the people in an appropriate manner.268 
Thus, human rights law serves – especially with regard to natural disasters – as a tool for States that 
shows how to handle and manage disaster situations. Before a calamitous event hits, human rights law 
asks States to take preventive measures to reduce the risk of casualties. As the right to life, as it is 
enshrined in Article 2 ECHR, is found in all major human rights instruments, other human rights 
bodies might come to the same conclusion as the ECtHR.269 Also with regard to the application of 
human rights in the aftermath of the calamitous event, during the disaster situation, the IHRL gives 
good guidance to States on how to handle disaster situations.  
 
 
2.2. International Environmental Law 
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The connection between the frequency of natural disasters and climate change is scientifically 
verified.270 Since climate change has such an enormous impact on the frequency of natural disasters, 
the law concerning climate change, and as such international environmental law in general, cannot be 
ignored. This section aims firstly to give an overview of the principles international environmental 
law that are applicable to this research. Secondly, it offers an overview of the international climate 
change regime as well as of important aspects of the LOSC that cannot be ignored.  
 
 
2.2.1. Principles of international environmental law 
The principles of international environmental law of particular relevance for this research and applied 
in the chapters below271 are the no-harm principle, the prevention principle, the precautionary principle 
and the polluter-pays principle.272 This section first discusses these principles, respectively.  
The formulation most often used to describe the no-harm principle appears in the Trail Smelter 
Arbitration (United States v. Canada).273 The Tribunal described the principle as follows: 
“no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by 
fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious 
consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.”274 
This principle has been confirmed by the ICJ and even recognised as customary international law.275 
Later, with the adoption of the Stockholm Declaration in 1972, the notion was extended that no harm 
should occur not only to other States but also to the environment.276 Principle 21 of the Stockholm 
Declaration embodies not only the no-harm principle but also the related prevention principle: 
“States have […] the sovereign right to exploit their own resources […] and the responsibility to ensure 
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other 
States of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”277 
The first part of Principle 21 reaffirms the no-harm principle, while the second part embodies the 
principle of prevention. In a comparison of both principles, the principle of prevention goes further 
than does the no-harm principle, as it asks states not only to respect the environment of other states 
but also areas beyond national jurisdiction, such as the high seas.278 Furthermore, this principle has 
been acknowledged by the ICJ as a principle of customary international law.279  
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The precautionary principle is especially relevant to international climate change law and is, therefore, 
reflected in the relevant legal framework.280 The principle deals, in general, with the idea that even 
when no scientific proof has been found for potential damage by a certain activity, States nonetheless 
have to take appropriate steps to avoid damages to the environment.281 Yet, the legal implications of 
this principle have not been clarified and remain debated.282 However, the principle was acknowledged 
at the conference in Rio in 1992, during which also the UNFCCC was adopted.283 Nonetheless, it has 
not been acknowledged as a principle of customary international law by the ICJ.284 
The polluter-pays principle is like the precautionary principle and the principle of prevention 
embodied in the Rio Declaration. Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration states, 
“National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of environmental costs and the 
use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, 
bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting international 
trade and investment.” 285 
This internalisation of the costs, which the principle mentions, means that not the society at large, but 
for example the company who pollutes the environment or the consumers who are demanding a certain 
product, should bear the costs.286 
As mentioned above, these principles are applied to the substantive matter of this research in the 
relevant sections below. Thus, at this point it is more important to give a comprehensive background 
of two substantive areas of international environmental law: climate change law and the law of the 
sea.  
 
 
2.2.2. International climate change law 
This section presents a comprehensive overview of the international climate-change-law regime. It 
starts by giving a historical overview of the development of international climate change law. It moves 
then to an overview of the various aims and objectives of this area of international law and, finally, to 
a discussion of the compliance mechanism. 
 
2.2.2.1. International climate law regime 
The first international platform that dealt with climate change and the danger of global warming was 
the First World Climate Conference, held in Geneva in 1979.287 The conference was attended only by 
experts on climate and humankind and thus cannot be considered a political conference.288 
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Nevertheless this conference made an appeal to all nations ‘to foresee and to prevent potential man-
made changes in climate that might be adverse to the well-being of humanity.’289 It took, however, 
nine years for international politics to respond to this appeal: The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) was establish jointly by the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) and 
the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in 1988 and got endorsed by the UNGA.290 One year 
before the official establishment of the IPCC, the UN released the Report of the World Commission on 
Environment and Development ‘Our Common Future’, also known as the Brundtland Report. This 
report embodies the first definition of ‘sustainable development’.291 The report declares that  
“sustainable development seeks to meet the needs and aspirations of the present without compromising 
the ability to meet those in the future.” 292  
This notion is important in the area of international climate law, as all instruments make reference to 
sustainable development as a cardinal principle.293 In 1990, the IPCC released its first assessment 
report, and the Second World Climate Conference took place.294 Both called upon the international 
community to finally adopt an international legal instrument and relevant subsequent protocols to deal 
with climate change.295 In the same year, the UNGA adopted its resolution 45/212, which initiated the 
negotiations process for a framework convention on climate change.296 This led to the adoption of the 
UNFCCC, which opened for signature in 1992 and entered into force in 1994. The UNFCCC is the 
first international binding treaty that acknowledges climate change as a threat to human life.297  
During the negotiations process, two major challenges emerged.298 Firstly, the question of the scope 
of the instrument arose; secondly, how it should deal with the differences between developing and 
developed States.299 With regard to the first issue, some States, such as the US or other oil-exporting 
countries, preferred the adoption of a framework convention, and as such they did not want to include 
any substantial obligations. While as other States, for example European States or Small Island States, 
advocated against a simple framework convention.300 The latter issue is still pressing and still highly 
discussed today. It refers to the problem that, in fact, not every State is contributing the same amount 
to the problem of climate change and global warming.301 The UNFCCC represents a compromise and 
takes both issues into account.  
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The UNFCCC acknowledges in its preamble that, indeed, “the change in the Earth’s climate and its 
adverse effects are a common concern of humankind.”302 Thus, the parties to the convention 
recognised impact of climate change. This recognition is mirrored, by the order of definitions in the 
first article. There again, the notion of ‘adverse effects of climate change’ is the first that is 
explained.303 After the definitions, the convention sets out its objective, several principles and finally 
some few substantive and procedural obligations.304 
The main objective of the UNFCCC and its related instruments is described in Art. 2. The provision 
explains it as the 
“[…] stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within 
a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food 
production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable 
manner.”305 
Thus, the main focus lies on the stabilisation of GHG concentration in the atmosphere alongside with 
the prevention of any harm caused by climate change. This objective has been relativized by the 
objective article in the Paris Agreement.306 This agreement, which was concluded at the Conference 
of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP) 21 in Paris in the year 2015, introduces the target of limiting the 
average global warming to well below 2°C and even tries to cap it at 1.5°C.307 Thus, the COP 
acknowledges, in formulating such an objective, that the stabilisation of GHGs in the atmosphere, as 
the UNFCCC requires, is not possible. This impossibility is also reflected by the scientific assessments 
of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere. According to the IPCC, instead of a reduction of GHGs 
since the adoption of the UNFCCC, there has been an increase.308  
Article 3 discusses the principles that the UNFCCC and its related instruments follow. The main 
principles are intergenerational equity and the important notion of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities’309 (CBDRCC) and the precautionary principle.310 The first 
principle also leads to the distinction between Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 States, which is essentially 
the distinction between developed and developing countries.  
The Paris Agreement primarily mirrors those principles. However, with regard to the second, it makes 
a distinction. While negotiating the agreement in December 2015, the developed countries wanted to 
demolish the wall between developed and developing countries, thus to terminate the distinction 
between Annex 1 States and non-Annex 1 States. The developing countries, on the other hand, wanted 
to keep this distinction, as they were not obliged to fulfil any substantive commitments under the Kyoto 
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto Protocol).311 The 
Paris Agreement engages with this conflict in its Article 2(2), which is now a compromise between 
the two positions. This provision reflects the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ 
of the UNFCCC. However, it introduces also that this principle has to be implemented in ‘the light of 
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different national circumstances’.312 Although the Paris Agreement makes no clear-cut distinction 
between Annex 1 states and non-Annex 1 States anymore, it still includes a distinction between 
developed and developing States. This distinction is expressed through this amendment to the 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ principle.313 
Article 4 UNFCCC introduces commitments for State parties. The article imposes reporting duties 
upon all states, but takes the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ into account.314 
In its second paragraph, the difference between the commitments of Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 States 
is demonstrated.315 Annex 1 States have to adopt national policies in order to reduce GHG emissions 
and enhance GHG sinks and reservoirs within their jurisdictions.316 However, the UNFCCC is, as the 
name states, solely a framework convention. As such, in order to give full effect to the convention, 
additional instruments are necessary. This is commonly known as the framework – protocol technique. 
Art. 17 UNFCCC declares that the COP may adopt protocol to the convention. This has been done the 
first time with the Kyoto Protocol in the year 1997. However, it took until 2005 for the Kyoto Protocol 
to enter into force. The Kyoto Protocol introduces substantive obligations for its signatory States. 
According to Article 3 (1) Kyoto Protocol, no Annex 1 State is allowed to exceed its assigned carbon 
dioxide (CO2)-equivalent amounts, as listed in Annex B. In order to fulfil this commitment, the Kyoto 
Protocol introduces also three market-based instruments: emission trading (cap and trade), joint 
implementation and the clean development mechanism.317 These instruments are mitigation 
mechanisms, and as such they aim to prevent future impacts from further accelerating  climate change 
and to global warming. Originally, the Kyoto Protocol knew a commitment period from only 2008 – 
2012.318 The COP 15 in Copenhagen in the year 2009 was considered to be the platform in order to 
develop the post-2012 regime.319 Although the signs were more than good that a consensus would be 
possible, the outcome was only a political agreement: the Copenhagen Accord.320 It was not until 2012 
at the COP 18 in Doha that the parties decided to extend the Kyoto Protocol by a second commitment 
period from 2012 to 2020.321  
Three years later, in 2015, the Paris Agreement was adopted at the COP 21 for the post-2020 period. 
There are several differences between the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. The most 
important difference between the two instruments are the reduction targets. While as the Kyoto 
Protocol imposes binding reduction targets, the Paris Agreement does not. Rather, it leaves the targets 
open to the states, with so-called nationally determined contributions.322 Thus, it lies absolutely within 
the domestic politics of the states to develop their own goals. The first State to submit its nationally 
determined contributions was Switzerland, in February of 2015. Switzerland pledged to reduce its 
GHG emissions by 50% over 1990 levels by 2030.323 Yet, since those contributions are all nationally 
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determined, they are not all as ambitious as the Swiss target. For example, already the target of the 
European Union (EU) is less ambitious. The target for countries within the EU is a reduction of at 
least 40% compared to 1990 levels by 2030.324 Both, the EU and Switzerland are using 1990 as the 
baseline. There are other countries, such as Australia, that uses 2005 as its baseline.325 As already 
explained, the emissions of GHGs are still increasing, and thus it is easier to cut emissions from a 2005 
baseline than from the 1990 baseline, as they were lower further in the past. New Zealand explains 
this difference very well in its target formulation. It says that it will reduce about 30% compared to 
2005 levels, which is the same as a reduction of about 11% compared to 1990 levels.326 However, 
these are not the only options for setting a baseline. India and China, for example, refer to their gross 
domestic product (GDP), and measure their baseline from there.327 Finally, there are also states that 
do not intend to reduce their GHG emissions, such as Bahrain and Qatar.328 Thus, the Paris Agreement 
offers no coherent system. The effectiveness of those nationally determined limits is also questionable. 
As explained above, the Paris Agreement introduces the well-below-2°C target. Yet, the now-
communicated commitments by the States are not enough to achieve this goal.329 As such, more effort 
is needed to achieve this goal. This leads to the conclusion that it is questionable whether nationally 
determined contributions represented an effective path to achieving the well-below-2°C target.  
Next to the introduction of nationally determined contributions, the Paris Agreement also embodies 
other major changes. The Kyoto Protocol had a strong focus on mitigation mechanisms, such as the 
clean development mechanism or the emission-trading schemes. The Paris Agreement on the other 
hand, includes a variety of possible contributions. Article 3 refers to mitigation, adaptation, finance, 
technology, capacity-building and transparency as possible forms of contribution.  
The developing countries have been asking for a stronger focus on adaptation for many years.330 Yet, 
it took the international policy makers until the Paris Agreement to put stronger legal language into 
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effect, along with its financing.331 Although both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol mention 
adaptation, their emphasis on it is not as strong as introduced within the Paris Agreement. The 
UNFCCC embodies adaptation in its principle article and acknowledges adaptation as a form of 
commitment by the states.332 The Kyoto Protocol, by contrast, embodies adaptation solely in its 
reporting system and as part of the clean development mechanism.333 The Paris Agreement, for its 
part, introduces a “global goal on adaptation of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience 
and reducing vulnerability to climate change […].”334  The legal language used here is stronger and 
more demanding than that found within in the Kyoto Protocol and UNFCCC. Additionally, it dedicates 
a whole article of 14 paragraphs to adaptation.335 Next to the demand to include adaptation strategies 
into the national contributions and thus into domestic policies, the Paris Agreement also stipulates that 
there has to be a balance between adaptation and mitigation with regard to their financing.336  
The new post-Kyoto regime includes, next to the variety of forms of contribution, also a provision on 
loss and damages.337 The concept of loss and damages applies to the adverse effects of climate change, 
to which no adaptation is possible.338 This concept was discussed on the agenda for international 
politics before the Paris negotiations. Already at the COP 16 in Cancun, the concept of loss and 
damages was tabled.339 There, the COP decision refers inter alia explicitly to sea level rise.340 In 2013, 
the COP established the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with 
Climate Change Impacts (WIM).341 The purpose of the WIM is to address loss and damage connected 
to the impacts imposed by climate change in developing countries, which are particularly vulnerable 
to the adverse impacts of climate change. These adverse effects include extreme weather and slow-
onset events.342 Despite this political achievement, the discussion of loss and damage did not progress 
significantly afterwards.343 However, the way was opened for the concept to be included in the Paris 
Agreement. During the negotiations of the Paris Agreement, the developed countries, including the 
United States (US), accentuated that this provision should not be understood as a basis for any liability 
claims.344 This freedom from liability is reaffirmed by the COP 21 decision that states, “[…] Article 
8 of the Agreement does not involve or provide any liability or compensation.”345 Nevertheless, it is a 
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strong political achievement that this concept was included into the Paris Agreement. Below, this 
research deals, in depth, with the connection of the concept loss and damages and natural disasters.346 
 
2.2.2.2. Compliance mechanisms under the UNFCCC regime 
The compliance mechanisms within the climate regime are soft and do not trigger any judicial 
consequences. The compliance mechanisms in the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement 
are in the nature of reports with subsequent reviews. The COP serves as the main body and reviewer, 
assisted by two supplementary bodies: (1) the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological 
Advice and (2) the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI).347 In relation to the Kyoto Protocol, 
the reports are reviewed by expert review teams before they are considered by the COP and its 
subsidiary bodies.348 If a State is not compliant with its obligations, there are, however, no punitive 
consequences, and it is rather advisory in its character, since the finding of non-compliance is made 
by a panel of experts.349 Of course, the UNFCCC also includes explicit provisions on dispute 
settlement in Article 14. However, the only compulsory procedures on this provision are negotiation 
and non-binding conciliation.350 
The Paris Agreement similarly includes this reporting mechanism. It uses even more softer legal 
language, however.351 It includes compliance into its transparency framework, which demands the use 
of means that are “non-intrusive, non-punitive manner, respectful of national sovereignty, and avoid 
placing undue burden on Parties.”352  
Thus, even if a party is found not to be compliant with its obligation, the consequences are soft and 
not punitive in their character. Given the importance of international climate law and the fact that 
GHG emissions continue to increase, this system based on the goodwill of states seems not to have 
any sharp teeth. As such, climate change jurisprudence might not be developed from the international 
climate law regime. Therefore, other international environmental instruments should be taken into 
consideration for possible legal actions.  
 
 
2.2.3. The law of the sea 
The oceans cover about 72% of Earth’s surface and thus should be of concern in a discussion of the 
adverse effects of climate change.353 In the Fifth Assessment Report, the IPCC indicated that sea level 
rise is taking place yearly at a pace of several millimetres, and for some region there is a projected a 
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sea level rise of nearly 1 meter until the year 2100.354 However, it is not only the rise in sea levels that 
call for concern with regard to the oceans. The acidification of the oceans is also considered by the 
IPCC. Since the beginning of the industrial era, the pH in the ocean has decreased by 0.1, thus the 
average pH could be lower now than it was for more than 50 million years.355 This increase in acidity 
has effects on the marine environment, such as on corals and shellfish.356 At the same time, the impact 
climate change has on the oceans has also been linked to extreme weather events such as cyclones or 
hurricanes.357 As such, the law of the sea seems to be an alternative tool for climate change 
implications on the oceans and thus also natural disasters. This section discusses first the historical 
background and moves on to substantial provisions that are of interest for this research.  
 
2.2.3.1. Historical background 
Principally, the law of the sea has existed as long as international law has; it is one of the oldest 
branches of international law.358 The earliest discussed aspect of this law is the question of sovereignty 
over the sea, which can be traced back to 1493, when Pope Alexander VI established the so called 
Papal Bull ‘Inter Caetera’, which drew an imaginary line down the Atlantic Ocean.359 Everything that 
was discovered west of that line belonged to Spain, whereas what was on the eastern side of that line 
was to benefit Portugal.360 Spain and Portugal also concluded a bilateral treaty among themselves that 
was in conformity with the Papal Bull.361 This engagement was supported by the other major forces, 
including England and the Netherlands, at that time.362  
In general there were two major doctrines: mare liberum and mare clausum.363 The doctrine of mare 
liberum can be described as the understanding of the free oceans, which means that no possession, 
thus any sovereign rights over the ocean, can be claimed, and as such the oceans were considered res 
communis.364 This notion reflects the view of the English Queen, Elizabeth I.365 Mare clausum on the 
other hand reflects the Spanish and Portuguese view.366 Thus, the notion is that the sea can be subject 
to possession and sovereignty.367  
From these primary views, the notion of territorial sea emerged.368 In the 18th century, it was argued 
that, indeed, the sea is occupied by no one; however, coastal States were able to make a territorial 
claims to extent to which weapons could reach.369 This was called the cannon shot rule.370 Later, 
during the 19th and early 20th centuries, State practice included a fixed extension limit for the strip of 
 
354  Stocker et al, above n 308, Chapter 13. 
355  ibid Chapter 3, 295 
356  ibid. 
357  IPCC, above n 2, 7-8, 13. 
358  Tullio Treves, 'Historical Development of the Law of the Sea' in Donald R Rothwell et al (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of The Law of The Sea (Oxford University Press, 2015) 1, 1; Dupuy and Vinuales, above n 272, 
93. 
359  Tommy T.B. Koh, 'The Origins of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea' (1987) 29 Malaya Law 
Review 1, 1; Treves, above n 358, 3. 
360  ibid. 
361  ibid. 
362  ibid. 
363  Koh, above n 358, 2; Treves, above n 358, 4. 
364  ibid.  
365  Koh, above n 358, 2. 
366  ibid. 
367  ibid. 
368  Treves, above n 358, 5. 
369  ibid. 
370  ibid; Koh, above n 358, 4. 
1. Part: Introduction and general principles 45 
sea that belonged to the sovereignty of a costal State.371 However, the different, mostly European 
States and Russia used different extension limits.372 Asian countries, on the other hand, still followed 
the principle of freedom of the sea.373  
After World War I, the idea became predominant to codify the law of the sea on an international 
level.374 However, the codification process at that time was without success, as the international 
community could not agree on the breadth of territorial waters, as there was no common state 
practice.375 It was not until after World War II, that the international community made a new attempt 
to codify the law of the sea into a convention. However, they again failed to adopt a single convention 
and instead they adopted four different conventions, dealing with specific matters of the law of the sea 
respectively.376 It took again several decades to adopt in the early 1980s the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC), as it is known today.377  
 
2.2.3.2. The LOSC as a legal instrument dealing with climate change 
The LOSC represents a legal framework by which it is possible to develop detailed provisions to deal 
with specific uses of the ocean.378 This legal framework embodies the codification and progressive 
development of the law of the sea.379 As such, the LOSC contains many provisions that are already 
considered customary international law.380 
The LOSC deals not only with the establishment of maritime zones but also includes elements of 
environmental protection.381 Part XII deals expressively with the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment, which declares the LOSC also as an environmental protection treaty. Part XII 
contains 11 sections that deal with separate issues with regard to the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment. The first article in Part XII, Article 192, includes the general obligation of States 
to protect and preserve the marine environment. This provision must, however, be read in conjunction 
with Article 193 that allows States to exploit their natural resources within their jurisdiction and in 
accordance with their policies and duties to protect and preserve the marine environment.382 Next to 
these positive obligations, the LOSC also includes provisions that require states to appropriately 
implement such measures. Article 194 requests that State take the measures necessary to prevent, 
reduce and control the pollution of the marine environment, but only within their respective 
capabilities.383 Article 212 deals expressively with pollution from or through the atmosphere. This 
provision requires states actively to adopt laws and regulations in order to prevent, reduce and control 
pollutants from or through the atmosphere that affecting the marine environment.384 As observed by 
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the IPCC, GHG emissions create significant impacts on the oceans and the marine environment.385 
Thus GHG emissions fall arguably within the scope of Part XII and its subsequent positive 
obligations.386 
It is not only for the positive obligations that the LOSC is attractive to apply in the context of IDL. 
Rather, it appeals also because of its functioning dispute settlement procedure, as this is lacking in the 
climate regime.387 Thus, it might be very attractive to bring claims under the LOSC instead under the 
less-effective dispute settlement regime of the UNFCCC and its related instruments. Substantial parts 
of the claims are considered in subsequent sections below, but at this point, it seems necessary to 
explain the dispute settlement regime of the LOSC.  
The LOSC introduces a unique dispute-resolution settlement regime that is enshrined in its Part XV. 
This part reflects a set of complex provisions and rules. Part XV starts with a set of general provisions, 
from which the first one reminds the contracting parties that, according to the UN Charter , they have 
to settle disputes by peaceful means.388 
Generally, with Part XV the LOSC establishes two procedures: (1) the non-compulsory dispute 
settlement regime and (2) the compulsory dispute settlement regime, which entails binding 
decisions.389 The main principle of the non-compulsory dispute settlement procedures is, according to 
Part XV Section 1, that the parties have the right to choose their own means of settling a dispute in 
peaceful means.390 If, however, the parties are unable to reach a settlement of their dispute and their 
bilateral agreement does not constitute anything otherwise, then the procedures embodied in Section 
2 are applicable; thus, the compulsory dispute settlement regime entails binding decisions.391  
The Montreux Formula, as enshrined in Article 287 LOSC, allows States to choose the procedures for 
compulsory dispute settlement.392 They may choose between (1) the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea (ITLOS), (2) the ICJ, (3) an arbitral tribunal according to Annex VII and (4) a special 
arbitral tribunal according to Annex VIII.393 On first sight, it seems that there are too many different 
options for the states to choose their proper body. However, during the negotiations of the LOSC, it 
became clear that this was a point at which the negotiating parties could not finally agree, and thus the 
Montreux Formula was created, and the rule that any State party, the moment it becomes a party to 
the convention, has the right to declare which procedure it will choose for the case of a dispute.394 
 This approach has been criticised within academia. It is argued that the different modus operandi lead 
to a fragmentation of the law of the sea.395 Other academics argue that there has not been a 
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fragmentation yet or that it is too early to tell.396 The question of whether there has been a 
fragmentation of the law of the sea is not an essential question for this research, however. The main 
goal here was to explain how the dispute settlement regime currently under the LOSC works, as it 
might represent an alternative to the devastating dispute-settlement regime under the UNFCCC 
regime.  
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Part 2: Obligation and Responsibility of the Not Affected 
States before and in the Aftermath of a Disaster 
The connection between climate change and the frequency of extreme weather events has been 
scientifically proven by the IPCC. Yet, the States that suffer the most devastating impact from extreme 
weather events are not the same that emit the largest share of CO2 into the atmosphere.397 This fact is 
more than unjust: Developing States are suffering from the actions taken by developed States. 
Disasters impose not only the obvious threat to human lives but are also costly, in particular the costs 
for early warning mechanisms and post-disaster reconstruction.  
This part of the research deals with this injustice and addresses whether there is an international legal 
obligation for developing States and emerging markets to financially assist disaster-prone developing 
States with regard to the adoption of early warning mechanisms and post-disaster reconstruction. The 
first part of this question is examined in the Chapter III. Chapter IV deals with the latter part of the 
question.  
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Chapter III:  Financing Early Warning Mechanisms 
Early warning systems play a significant role in risk mitigation and are one of the most important tools 
to effectively manage disasters. The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami would not have had such a fatal 
impact if appropriate early warning mechanism had been in place.398 Not only can early warning 
mechanisms protect and save lives, they can help to decrease overall material and economic losses.399 
For example, simply shuttering the windows of a house before a hurricane can reduce the material 
economic loss by around 50%.400 Furthermore, before a flood, by simply moving goods to the second 
floor and driving vehicles out of the flood zone, losses can be decreased significantly.401 However, 
especially in developing countries, access to early warning systems remains insufficient. They are 
mostly unable to give accurate information to people and supply the appropriate capacities, skills and 
resources.402 This shortfall has so far been reflected in international policy, as the access to as well as 
the availability of multi-hazard early warning mechanisms is targeted to be increased by 2030.403  
Thus, the UN defines early warning mechanisms or systems as follows:  
“The set of capacities needed to generate and disseminate timely and meaningful warning information 
to enable individuals, communities and organizations threatened by a hazard to prepare and to act 
appropriately and in sufficient time to reduce the possibility of harm or loss.”404 
Since this definition of ‘early warning mechanisms’ has a strong focus on a society’s or community’s 
capacity, it suits the definition of ‘disaster’ used in this research.405  
This chapter focuses, as the title suggests, on the question of how to provide the financial means to 
increase the availability and access to multi-hazard early warning mechanisms. Firstly, the promotion 
of early warning mechanisms within the UN system is analysed. Secondly, the connection between 
climate change and early warning systems is discussed. The third section of this chapter looks at the 
ILC’s work on the Draft Articles and how it deals with early warning mechanisms. Fourthly, this 
chapter examines the obligation of non-affected developed States and emerging markets with regard 
to the financial assistance of disaster-prone developing States. Finally, this chapter considers a possible 
application of human rights law and the responsibility to protect (R2P) in order to establish an 
obligation to financially assist disaster-prone developing States with regard to the establishment of 
early warning mechanisms.   
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1.The Promotion of Early Warning Mechanisms with UN Policies 
Within the UN system, several policies are in place to deal with disaster risk reduction, particularly 
with early warning as a method thereof.406 The most important policy instruments are the Yokohama 
Strategy, the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005 – 2015: Building Resilience of Nations and 
Communities to Disasters (the Hyogo Framework) and finally the Sendai Framework.407 In addition, 
early warning systems are anchored within the framework of sustainable development disaster 
reduction.408 Although these instruments provide only policy guidelines, they are nonetheless 
important for the understanding of the material at hand and represent the political will and the 
acknowledgment of the need for appropriate early warning mechanisms.  
This section first examines the more specific instruments: the Yokohama Strategy, the Hyogo 
Framework and then the Sendai Framework. A short section then examines the connection between 
these frameworks and the sustainable development instrument.  
 
 
1.1. Yokohama Strategy  
The decade 1990 – 2000 was declared as the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction.409 
The Yokohama Strategy is a product of this decade and the first World Conference on Natural Disaster 
Risk Reduction in 1994. The strategy has been endorsed by the UNGA in the same year.410 
The Yokohama Strategy embodies principles, strategy and a plan of action with regard to disaster risk 
reduction. Since early warning mechanisms are part of the broader concept of disaster risk reduction, 
the Yokohama Strategy also deals with early warning: early warning systems are expressly mentioned 
in the principles and in the plan of action. Principle 5 states that effective early warning mechanisms 
are key factors to disaster prevention and preparedness.411 The plan of action asks for the improvement 
of early warning systems both on the regional and on the international level.412 
After the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction ended in the beginning of the year 2000, 
the UNGA endorsed the idea of establishing an inter-agency task force and a UNISDR.413 In 2002, the 
UNGA agreed to review the Yokohama Strategy in order to identify any gaps and options for 
improvement.414 The report points out that there has been a steady improvement of the technologies 
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behind early warning systems. The policy and social components, however, were not able to develop 
at the same pace, therefore leaving a gap415 Additionally, this report also shows, in particular, the lack 
of preparedness and ability to appropriately react to early warnings, as well as the failure to recognise 
the crucial role of early warnings in sustainable development.416 This connection between sustainable 
development and early warning systems is explored in the respective section below. This UNGA 
review of the Yokohama Strategy was completed one month before the 2005 World Conference on 
Disaster Reduction in Hyogo, Japan.  
 
 
1.2. Hyogo Framework 
The Hyogo Framework is the product of the World Conference on Disaster Reduction in January 2005, 
coincidentally one month later after the devastating tsunami in the Indian Ocean in December 2004. 
It encompassed a framework of action for 2005 – 2015.417 The Hyogo Framework starts by stating 
that the Yokohama Strategy remains valid despite the adoption of the Hyogo Framework.418  
The Hyogo Framework has five main priorities: (1) prioritising disaster risk reduction on a national 
and local level; (2) identifying and assessing disaster risks and improving early warning thereof; (3) 
using knowledge and education to construct a culture of safety and resilience on all levels; (4) 
minimising the underlying risk factors for disasters; and finally, (5) strengthening disaster 
preparedness at all levels to ensure an effective response.419  
With regard to early warning systems, the second priority is of particular importance. The Hyogo 
Framework demands, first of all, the development of people-centred early warning mechanisms.420 In 
addition, the adoption of early warning systems alone is insufficient: they have to be understandable 
to the persons at risk, and the state should also encourage guidance on how to react to an early 
warning.421 Exactly this people-centred approach of early warning was identified by the UNGA as a 
gap while reviewing the impacts of the Yokohama Strategy.422 
Next to including policy measures for disaster risk reduction on political levels, the Hyogo Framework 
also provides provisions for financing disaster risk reduction, and as such also early warning.423 Firstly, 
States should take measures to provide financial and technical assistance to disaster-prone developing 
countries.424 Secondly, States should voluntarily financially contribute to the United Nations Trust 
Fund for Disaster Reduction.425 This trust fund was established in 2000 with UNGA resolution 
54/219.426 The fund is fed only with voluntary contributions.427 In 2016, the fund received 
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contributions of a total of USD 30,272,908.428 The highest donation was made by the Swedish 
Government with USD 8,364,725 (unearmarked). The Australian Government donated 
USD 1,442,125 (earmarked) and the Swiss Government USD 1,374,612 (combination of earmarked 
and unearmarked contributions).429 Not only are governments contributing, but also the private sector, 
including insurances.430  
Thirdly, the Hyogo Framework asks States to implement policies that both reduce insurance premiums 
and support the increase of the total insurance coverage, because insurance funding plays a significant 
role in the rebuilding phase.431  
Thus, the Hyogo Framework represents a policy framework on the international level that clearly 
supports the development of early warning mechanisms and the financial assistance thereof. Since it 
is, however, only a policy framework, it embodies no legal obligations and therefore depends on 
implementation into legislation on local, national, regional or international levels. The Hyogo 
Framework was in place from 2005 to 2015 and has been replaced in 2015 with the Sendai 
Framework.432  
  
1.3. Sendai Framework  
The Sendai Framework is the product of the Third United Nations World Conference on Disaster Risk 
Reduction held in Sendai, Japan, from 14 to 18 March 2015. 
The Sendai Framework identifies its goal, then introduces global targets from which it develops 
priorities of action and general guiding principles. Before the Sendai Framework addresses the content 
of its overall goal, it reviews the Hyogo Framework and stresses the importance of disaster risk 
reduction.433 It acknowledges the importance of the Hyogo Framework and particularly how it has 
raised the awareness for disaster risk reduction within the international community.434 The Sendai 
Framework stresses, however, the imminent danger of climate change and the subsequent increase in 
the frequency of natural disasters, as well as the financial challenges disaster impose especially for the 
developing states.435 In this regard, the Sendai Framework calls for support of developing States with 
financial and technological assistance in accordance with other international commitments.436 Such 
other international commitments may be found in the international climate law regime, as is detailed 
in the respective sections below.  
Contrary to the Hyogo Framework, the Sendai Framework introduces global targets before 
formulating its key priorities for action. The seven global targets read as follows: 
“a) Substantially reduce global disaster mortality by 2030, aiming to lower the average per 100,000 
global mortality rate in the decade 2020–2030 compared to the period 2005– 2015;  
(b) Substantially reduce the number of affected people globally by 2030, aiming to lower the average 
global figure per 100,000 in the decade 2020–2030 compared to the period 2005–2015;  
(c) Reduce direct disaster economic loss in relation to global gross domestic product (GDP) by 2030;  
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(d) Substantially reduce disaster damage to critical infrastructure and disruption of basic services, 
among them health and educational facilities, including through developing their resilience by 2030;  
(e) Substantially increase the number of countries with national and local disaster risk reduction 
strategies by 2020;  
(f) Substantially enhance international cooperation to developing countries through adequate and 
sustainable support to complement their national actions for implementation of the present Framework 
by 2030;  
g) Substantially increase the availability of and access to multi-hazard early warning systems and 
disaster risk information and assessments to people by 2030.”437 
The targets seem ambitious and are the first of their kind in this area of international law and policy. 
With regard to the present research with a focus on financing early warning mechanisms, especially 
the last two goals are from importance and clearly demand action on all political levels.  
The key priorities for the Sendai Framework are guided by the global targets, including (1) to 
understand disaster risk; (2) to strengthen disaster risk governance in order to manage disasters; (3) to 
increase investment in disaster risk reduction, for successful disaster resilience ; and (4) to enhance 
disaster preparedness and to ‘build back better’ not only in reconstruction but also in recovery and 
rehabilitation.438 
With regard to early warning, both the first and the fourth priority relevant. Within its first priority, 
the Sendai Framework makes a clear connection to early warning mechanisms: on a global level, there 
should be a better and more enhanced data and statistic sharing with regard to disaster risk, as well as, 
in general, a strengthening of disaster risk modelling, mapping, assessment monitoring of disaster risk 
and, finally, a strengthening of early warning systems.439 
The fourth priority takes up the call of the Hyogo Framework to maintain, on a national level, people-
centred multi-hazard early warning mechanisms.440 It further asks, also on the national level, for 
investment in these mechanisms and for them to be tailored to the specific needs of the users, as well 
as for the promotion of simple and low-cost early warning equipment.441 On the global and regional 
level, with the same level of priority, the Hyogo Framework calls upon states to promote and invest in 
early warning mechanisms and to share and exchange relevant data across all States.442  
Contrary to the Hyogo Framework, the Sendai Framework emphasises more strongly the need to 
finance and financially invest in early warning mechanisms. It urges the United Nations system as a 
whole to contribute adequately and in a more stable and predictable manner to the United Nations 
Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction.443 This is in fact not a surprise, since one of the targets of the 
Sendai Framework is to increase the availability of and access to early warning systems by 2030.444  
Nonetheless, the Sendai Framework is not legally binding; it does not pose any legal obligations on 
States. Yet, it has been endorsed by the UNGA. This endorsement helps the framework to gain weight, 
and as such it plays, as a policy instrument, a significant role in the international community.445  
 
437  ibid 6-7 [18]. 
438  ibid 8-9 [20]. 
439  ibid 10 [25(a)]. 
440  ibid 17 [33(b)]. 
441  ibid. 
442  ibid 19 [34(c)]. 
443  ibid 26 [48(g)]. 
444  ibid 7 [18(g)]. 
445  Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, GA Res 69/283, 69th sess, 92nd plenary mtg, 
Agenda Item 19 (c), UN Doc A/RES/69/283 (23 June 2015), para 2. 
2. Part: Obligation and Responsibility of the not affected States 54 
After providing its endorsement in June 2015, the UNGA moved one step further and issued a second 
resolution in the matter of the Sendai Framework and disaster risk reduction. The UNGA urges the 
effective implementation of the Sendai Framework. In addition, the UNGA also stresses that even if 
each single State is responsible for its own disaster risk reduction, it cannot be denied that this is a 
common concern and, as such, mirrors a shared responsibility between the various governments and 
stakeholders.446 In the same resolution, the UNGA also requested a report reviewing the requirement 
for the implementation of the Sendai Framework within the UN system.447  
The review was completed in July 2016 and examines the latest-developed instruments and policies 
within the UN with regard to sustainable development and climate change.448 With regard to the 
policies concerning sustainable development, the review stresses how they emphasise and consider 
disaster risk reduction.449 Especially the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, which was adopted in July 
2015, takes the Sendai Framework into consideration.450 At this policy’s heart is the question of 
financing sustainable development. It makes reference to early warning mechanisms and their 
financing, but only in the case of health and financial hazards, which are not within the main focus of 
this research.451 The review also mentions the connection to the Paris agreement and the ILC’s Draft 
Articles, both of which are discussed in depth below.452  
 
 
1.4. Early warning and sustainable development 
Sustainable development has been on the international agenda for many decades.453 This section aims 
to briefly connect sustainable development and early warning and explains why early warning is 
considered to be a part of sustainable development. 
In 1987, the Brundtland Report was adopted, which defines the concept of sustainable development 
as follows: “sustainable development seeks to meet the needs and aspirations of the present without 
compromising the ability to meet those in the future.” 454 
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During the World Conference in 1992 in Rio, not only were the Rio Declaration and the UNFCCC 
adopted, but also Agenda 21, which deals in particular with the question of sustainable development.455   
The link between sustainable development and disaster risk reduction has already been acknowledged 
within the Agenda 21.456 Twenty years later, the Rio + 20 summit took place, and its policy outcome 
The Future We Want acknowledges disaster risk reduction as a crucial part of sustainable 
development.457 This policy instrument clearly links the need to take disaster risk reduction measures 
into consideration during urban planning.458 It also recognises the particular vulnerable situation of 
Small Island Developing States with regard to natural disasters.459 Finally, it also devotes a complete 
section solely to disaster risk reduction.460 This section firstly cross-references the more specialised 
Hyogo Framework.461 The section then follows with an acknowledgement of the importance of early 
warning systems within disaster risk reduction and asks for more cooperation on all levels in this 
regard.462 
In the year 2015, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) was adopted.463 The 
2030 Agenda contains the sustainable development goals for 2015 – 2030.464 They constitute a set of 
total 17 goals that deal with different aspects of sustainable development, respectively: for example, 
poverty, hunger, health, education, inequality and equality, water management, energy, economic 
growth, climate change, sustainable use of the oceans and its resources, ecosystems and access to 
justice.465 Early warning mechanisms are elaborated within two sustainable development goals: (1) 
Goal 3, which aims to “ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all ages” 466; and (2) goal 13, 
which tackles climate change and its impacts.467 The third goal addresses early warning in relation to 
national and global health risks and is, as such, not relevant to this research.468 Goal 13, on the other 
hand, addresses early warning in relation to the adverse impacts to climate change, which includes 
extreme weather events.469  
Goal 13 firstly acknowledges that the UNFCCC and its related instrument are the main instruments 
governing climate change.470 It then moves on to call upon all States to strengthen their resilience and 
capacity to deal with the adverse impacts of climate change, including natural disasters.471 The goal 
also urges State to actively include measures to combat climate change in their domestic policies, 
strategies and planning.472 Such policies should also include measures to educate, raise awareness and 
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strengthen human and institutional capacity with respect to climate change mitigation, adaptation and 
particularly early warning mechanisms.473 The goal then goes on to repeat the financial USD 100 
billion target for climate finance, which will be discussed in detail in the respective section below.474 
Finally, the goal also mentions the importance of supporting developing States as well as Small Island 
Developeding States, given their particular vulnerability to the adverse effects of climate change.475 
Basically, Goal 13 of the 2015 sustainable development goals considers the need to support developing 
States and the importance of addressing the adverse effects of climate change appropriately. 
Nonetheless, the regime governing climate change and its adverse impacts is the UNFCCC and its 
related instruments. Additionally, the Agenda 2030 deals only briefly with early warning systems. 
Thus, the Agenda 2030 leaves room for the more specific policy instruments on disaster risk reduction, 
such as the Yokohama Strategy, Hyogo Framework and Sendai Framework. At the same time, all 
policy instruments related to sustainable development, like the Yokohama Strategy, Hyogo Framework 
and Sendai Framework, are not legally binding. As such, these instruments do not impose any legally 
enforceable obligations on States.  
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2.Early Warning and the Climate-Change-Law Regime 
The UNFCCC and its related instruments are the main governing legal body for climate-change-
related concerns. As explored above, this has inter alia been acknowledged within the 2030 Agenda 
and its sustainable development goals for 2015 – 2030. Climate change triggers the frequency of 
extreme weather events and thus also the frequency of potential disaster situations. Therefore, the 
climate change legal regime cannot be ignored and might even offer some answers for the question of 
the funding of early warning mechanisms.  
Indeed, the UNFCCC makes a reference to natural disasters. It urges its parties to give full 
consideration to disaster-prone States while implementing the UNFCCC.476 The Kyoto Protocol, 
however, does not remark on natural disasters. This lack of mention changed with the Paris Agreement, 
adopted in 2015. The Paris Agreement includes a significant change with the adoption of Article 8, 
which deals with the question of loss and damages related to climate change.477 In addition, a stronger 
focus on adaptation and climate finance is supported by the Paris Agreement.478 Particularly, this 
stronger emphasis on adaption and climate finance is relevant to the question of funding for early 
warning systems. Thus, this section gives special priority to the Paris Agreement.  
This section is divided into two major sections: The first takes a close look at climate finance and its 
possibilities and limitations with regard to the funding of early warning systems. The second 
investigates the newly introduced concept of ‘loss and damage’ and its opportunities.  
 
 
2.1. Climate finance 
This section aims to give an effective overview on climate finance and its mechanism. Firstly, the 
system is explained in general terms. Then, the section moves to the climate finance systems under 
the Paris Agreement, and as such explores the new modifications to it. Afterwards, the issue of using 
funding from the climate finance system for early warning mechanisms is addressed, followed by an 
introduction of the USD 100 billion target.  
 
 
2.1.1.  The system of climate finance in general 
The fact that climate change mitigation and adaptation measures are costly has not been ignored during 
the adoption of the UNFCCC regime. Indeed, the regime demands that developed States take the lead 
in combating climate change, of course in the light of the CBDRRC principle.479 This responsibility 
means assisting developing countries by financial means, within the developed countries’ capabilities 
to do so.480 Hence, climate finance represents financial help from developed to developing States in 
order to assist them with the cost of mitigation and adaptation measures.481 
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To fulfil the financial obligations under the UNFCCC regime, the UNFCCC introduces a financial 
mechanism.482 The mechanism is operated by one or more trusted and already-existing international 
entities.483 The UNFCCC has appointed the Global Environment Facility as the operator for the 
financial mechanism.484 At COP 17 in Durban, the Green Climate Fund was appointed as the second 
operating entity under Article 11 UNFCCC.485 Both entities are guided by the policies made by the 
parties to the UNFCCC, such as the programme priorities and eligibility criteria.486 
Later, two additional special funds were adopted by the COP: the special climate fund and the least-
developed countries fund.487 The special climate fund has the purpose of supporting adaptation, 
technology transfer and mitigation efforts in various sectors, such as in energy and forestry.488 The 
least-developed countries fund, on the other hand, supports primarily the national adaptation 
programmes of the least-developed countries.489 Both funds are administrated by the Global 
Environment Facility.490 Under the governance of the Kyoto Protocol, a third fund was also 
established: the Adaptation Fund.491  
 
 
2.1.2. Climate finance after the adoption of the Paris Agreement 
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Article 9 of the Paris Agreement gives full effect to the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC and the 
appointed international entities thereof: the Green Climate Fund and the Global Environment 
Facility.492 
Article 9 asks developed States to support financially both mitigation and adaptation measures.493 
Furthermore, the provision also encourages other States, thus developing States, to take action and 
offer support financially, on a voluntarily basis, of course.494 The provision does not include a financial 
mobilisation goal, although such a goal was included in the negotiation text.495 One of the main reasons 
this goal was not included stems from the politics of the US, for whom any financial obligation was a 
line they were unwilling to cross.496  
A financial mobilisation goal was envisaged at the COP in Copenhagen in the year 2009. There, the 
COP agreed, as enshrined in the Copenhagen Accord, to mobilise jointly from developed States USD 
100 billion annually by 2020.497 Although this reference cannot be found within the legal text of the 
Paris Agreement, it is reflected in the accompanying COP decision, which clearly states,  
“[…] developed countries intend to continue their existing collective mobilization through 2025 in the 
context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation; prior to 2025 the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall set new 
collective quantified goal from a floor of USD 100 billion per year, taking into account the need and 
priorities of developing countries.”498 
This decision raises the following questions: (1) Is climate finance used to fund early warning 
mechanisms in developing states? (2) Do developed States have a legal obligation to contribute to 
funds that support early warning mechanisms? These two questions are explored below, each in their 
own section. 
  
 
2.1.3. Using climate finance for early warning mechanism 
Funds governed under the UNFCCC financial mechanism have indeed been used to fund projects that 
include, among other things, also early warning mechanisms. In fact, funds have been used from both 
the Least Developed Countries Fund as well as the Special Climate Change Fund.499  
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For example, during its financial year 2016, the Global Environmental Facility funded a project in 
Afghanistan that aimed to help Afghan communities with resilience to climate-triggered disasters.500 
This project included, among other things, also the funding for the implementation of early warning 
systems.501 The Global Environmental Facility does not limit itself to supporting countries. Rather, it 
also supports regional projects, such as the Pacific Resilience Programme.502 This project aimed to 
support Pacific Island States to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change. This support included 
the investment in early warning systems.503 The total effective costs for this project was USD 44.1 
million.504 Support for early warning mechanisms has been given through the Least Developed 
Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund since 2005.505 As such, these two funds present 
an important tool for the funding of early warning mechanisms.  
Although there seems already to be an inflow of money to support the establishment of early warning 
mechanisms, an additional initiative was formed during the 2015 negotiations in Paris: the Climate 
Risk and Early Warning Systems Initiative.506 Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands have pledged to contribute more than USD 80 million to the initiative.507 Currently, 
as of 25 July 2017, the fund has received USD 16.51 million from Australia, France, Germany and 
Luxembourg.508 
Thus, the means exist to fund and support early warning mechanism globally. This fact, however, does 
not imply that there is also an obligation as such to actually contribute to the respective means, such 
as to the special funds. The question remains, whether there is an international legal obligation of 
States to financially contribute. This question is addressed in the next section below.  
 
 
2.1.4. The annual USD 100 billion target for climate finance 
The COP and the Kyoto Protocol are held every year in December. During this conference, a number 
of decisions are adopted, among which is the USD 100 billion target for climate finance.509 During the 
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Paris negotiations in 2015, it was discussed whether this USD 100 billion target should be included 
into the treaty text, and the target was then rejected, mainly because of the US.510 Thus, the question 
arises, whether the decisions adopted at the COP are legally binding decisions by themselves or simply 
political decisions with no legal impact.511  
In order that a State is legally bound to any international instrument, it must give its consent to be 
bound, which can be expressed in various ways, mostly by ratification.512 Thus, although the COP 
Decisions are adopted by the State parties to the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol, they do not 
individually give their consent to each decision. As such, States are not legally bound to the adopted 
decisions per se. As such, the adopted COP Decisions represent political decisions that are not legally 
enforceable.513 Hence, with regard to the USD 100 billion target for climate finance, it is not legally 
binding upon States per se, and thus enjoys the status of a merely political signal.  
 
 
2.2. Loss and damage 
The term ‘loss and damage’ addresses the adverse effects of climate change to which, in general, no 
adaptation is possible or exceed the possibilities of adaptation measures.514 The Paris Agreement 
expressively includes extreme weather events and slow-onset events among the possibilities that might 
result in loss and damage related to climate change.515 Hence, the Paris Agreement refers to exactly 
such events that may lead to a disaster situation.  
‘Loss and damage’ has been on the table of climate discussion, especially pushed by Small Island 
States, for many years.516 The major turnaround in this matter started with the Bali Action Plan at COP 
13 in the year 2007: The Bali Action Plan recognises the need to address disaster reduction strategies 
as well as loss and damage.517 Three years later, at the COP 16 in Cancun, the parties to the UNFCCC 
decided to establish a work programme on loss and damage in developing countries.518 The COP in 
Doha in 2012 dedicated a decision solely to ‘loss and damage’.519 In this decision, the COP principally 
recognised the urgent need for more comprehensive cooperation among the parties in the matter of 
loss and damage.520 The decision also addresses the need to enhance support, including funding for 
loss and damage.521 Most importantly, however, it decides to establish an international mechanism to 
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address loss and damage.522 The Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (Warsaw 
Mechanism) was adopted a year later at COP 19.523 The functions of the mechanism are to improve 
the knowledge of disaster risk management approaches, to advance the dialogue and coordination 
between all relevant stakeholders and, finally, to encourage further support through financing, 
technology and capacity building.524  
However, the first strong legal support for the Warsaw Mechanism was marked by the adoption of the 
Paris Agreement, in particular the introduction of Article 8 on loss and damage and the specific 
reference to the mechanism therein.525  
The connection between IDL and the climate-change-law regime cannot be ignored, furthermore. By 
introducing loss and damage into the Paris Agreement, this instrument became an important source of 
for IDL. Indeed, at the conference in Marrakech in 2016, the COP encouraged all State parties  
“to incorporate or continue to incorporate the consideration of extreme events and slow onset events, 
non-economic losses, displacement, migration and human mobility, and comprehensive risk 
management into relevant planning and action, as appropriate, and to encourage bilateral and 
multilateral entities to support such efforts.”526  
By doing so, this COP decision asks all State parties to improve or at least maintain their disaster 
management laws or policies and further encourages them to cooperate among themselves. Thus, this 
highlights the importance of the climate regime in IDL and clearly makes the Paris Agreement a legal 
source for IDL.  
However, Article 8, all relevant COP Decisions and the Warsaw Mechanism do not yet support any 
funding for early warning mechanisms. The Warsaw Mechanism pointed out in its first work plan its 
goal to improve the financial situation by strengthening the availability of finance for matters in 
relation to loss and damage.527 The work plan also includes a section on extreme weather events, thus 
events that may lead to disaster situations. This particular section, however, does not deal with any 
financial aspects. It rather includes the task to understand how to properly prepare, respond and build 
resilience against loss and damage related to extreme weather events.528 Furthermore, no specific 
solutions have yet been offered by the Warsaw Mechanism. This absence is unsurprising, considering 
the short time that has elapsed since the adoption of the Paris Agreement, at the time of this writing.  
Therefore, there are yet no solutions available under the current loss and damage framework. As such, 
it seems appropriate to look closer at the question of climate finance and adaption and whether the 
funding for early warning mechanisms may be subsumed under these aspects.  
The Paris Agreement, especially its provision on loss and damage, will be further examined under the 
question of reconstruction and the liability of States in the respective chapter below.   
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3.Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters 
The Draft Articles serve not only as guidelines for disaster situations. They also include provisions on 
disaster risk reduction, specifically on early warning mechanisms.529  
Article 2 extends the scope of the Draft Articles to not only the response situations but also to disaster 
risk reduction. Thus, they suggest the international community’s considerations on disaster risk 
reduction to be essential.530  
Disaster risk reduction is dealt with in only one provision: Article 9. This provision deals solely with 
the disaster risk reduction and states: 
“(1) Each state shall reduce the risk of disasters by taking appropriate measures, including through 
legislation and regulations, to prevent, mitigate, and prepare for disasters. 
(2) Disaster risk reduction measures include the conduct of risk assessments, the collection and 
dissemination of risk and past loss information, and the installation and operation of early warning 
systems.”531 
The wording of ‘each state’ in this provision stipulates, as confirmed by the ILC within its 
commentaries, that disaster prevention and, as such, also early warning mechanisms, within the scope 
of Article 9, belong to the domestic affairs of each State.532 Thus, all interactions between Sates in the 
area of disaster preparedness and prevention are not embodied under the scope of Article 9. According 
to the ILC, all such activities should be governed in the more general duty to cooperate of Article 7.533 
Furthermore, by including the wording ‘each state’ instead of ‘states’, the ILC tries to avoid any 
association with a possible collective obligation.534  
The general duty to cooperate is embodied in Article 7.535 This provision has a very general character 
and thus reflects only the general duty to cooperate as a general principle of international law.536 This 
general principle is also reflected within the UN Charter, which makes specific reference to the 
humanitarian context within which disaster situations can be placed.537 The ILC furthermore clearly 
notes that the duty to cooperate, as enshrined in Article 7, is only complementary.538 With regard to 
disaster risk reduction and prevention, the ILC cites the Sendai Framework and stresses again the 
primary responsibility of each State, but also stresses the possibility of complementary international 
cooperation in this regard.539 
The special rapporteur, on the other hand, supports the idea of including early warning mechanisms 
and their legal regulation not only in the domestic sphere but also in multilateral and bilateral 
agreements.540 Such an example is Article 7 AADMER. This provision also embodies a specific duty 
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to cooperate in the case of threats with trans-boundary effects.541 This example helped the special 
rapporteur to envisage a clearer formulation of the duty to cooperate. He expressly wanted to include 
disaster prevention measures, including early warning mechanisms, as part of international 
cooperation.542 This approach has, as explained above, not been supported by the ILC, and thus it has 
not been included into the final version of the articles.  
Hence, the Draft Articles, as adopted by the ILC are not as supportive and clear in language for the 
case of international cooperation with regard to early warning mechanisms as previously formulated 
by the special rapporteur. If they enter into force as the Draft Articles now appear, they will not 
constitute any specific legal obligation for cooperation, including financial support, in the case of 
disaster risk reduction and in particular early warning systems.   
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4.Obligation of Developed States to Finance Early Warning Systems 
Within the climate finance system, the means exist to distribute financial support with regard to 
disaster risk reduction measures including early warning systems. Although the means exist, the 
question remains whether there is a legal obligation for developed States to financially feed those 
means. Additionally, it remains unclear whether also emerging economies should be taken into 
consideration or whether still only the developed States should be the ones to be in the first row when 
tackling climate change.  
This section aims to answer these two questions. First a close look at the CBDRRC principle is taken. 
This examination is followed by an analysis of the principles of international environmental law as 
well as international human rights law and the R2P doctrine.  
 
 
4.1. Common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capacities principle and climate finance 
The Rio Declaration embodies the common but differentiated responsibilities principle within its 
Principle 7: 
“States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and 
integrity of the Earth's ecosystem.  In view of the different contributions to global environmental 
degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities.  The developed countries 
acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development 
in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and 
financial resources they command.”543 
The Rio Declaration, as such, clearly stresses the important role developed States have to play with 
regard to sustainable development, inter alia, because of their financial resources and obviously their 
past contributions to a common problem of humankind.  
Such a common problem of humankind is climate change and its adverse impacts. The common but 
differentiated responsibilities principle is, therefore, repeated in the UNFCCC, which is the main legal 
instrument of climate change law. The UNFCCC embodies the common but differentiated 
responsibilities in Article 3(1). Yet, in the climate change context, the principle referred to as the 
CBDRRC.544 It is repeated in the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement.545  
The principle deals with the issue of intra-generational equity in international climate change law.546 
The corresponding issue of inter-generational equity is embodied within the notion of ‘equity’ as used 
by Article. 3(1) UNFCCC.547 Intra-generational equity, as embodied in the CBDRRC principle, aims 
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to establish fairness into the common problem of humankind of climate change, to which not all States 
have contributed the same amount.548  
The CBDRRC principle can be split into two main components: Firstly, the common responsibility 
part and secondly the differentiated responsibility part. Climate change and its impact are a common 
responsibilities because the adverse effects are noticeable not only within the GHG-emitting State’s 
territory.549 Some States are facing issues arising out of other States environmental choices, such as 
amount of GHG emissions, which leaves no other option for all States to than to tackle the problem 
together, as a common concern.550 Hence, the component of common responsibility has its origins in 
the principle of cooperation.551  
Differentiated responsibility, on the other hand, springs from the fact that not every State contributes 
equally to climate change, as well as the differing capacities of States to take appropriate measures 
against climate change.552 Thus, the CBDRRC builds on the polluter pays principle, by adding past 
GHG emissions to the current emissions.553 As such, the CBDRRC principle requests, at least for the 
moment, different treatment among the States namely between developed, who emitted more GHG in 
the past, and developing States.554 As however, the core lies on the responsibility for emissions from 
the past, the CBDRRC principle will even this differential treatment out over time, when the current 
emissions of developing States also become emissions from their specific past.555  
This differing treatment of developed and developing countries is mirrored throughout the climate law 
regime: The UNFCCC introduces commitments only to the developed countries and names them in 
Annex 1.556 The Kyoto Protocol includes only GHG reduction targets for Annex 1 States.557 With 
regard to climate finance, this difference in treatment also applies: the UNFCCC makes a strong point 
that developed State parties have to take the lead and support developing States.558  
With the adoption of the Paris Agreement, this strict differentiation in the treatment of developed and 
developing States, as implemented in particular with the Kyoto Protocol, has softened.559 The main 
reason why the Paris Agreement lets the wall between developing and developed States crumble is 
because it introduces ‘nationally determined contributions’ that are not limited only to developed 
States, but rather also invite developing States to define their contributions.560 Yet, this invitation does 
not imply that developed States should not still take the lead. Contrary, the Paris Agreement stresses 
the fact that still developed States have to take the lead with regard to mitigation efforts.561 Also with 
regard to climate finance developed States still are in the position to take the lead.562 The developed 
States should not only take the lead with regard to mobilisation of financial resources, but also by 
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financially supporting developing States in their mitigation and adaptation measures.563 In this matter, 
the Paris Agreement furthermore asks for a fair balance between funding for mitigation and adaptation 
measures. At the same time, it also clarifies that country-specific measures should be funded and that 
particular attention should be rendered to the least-developed and small island developing States, 
which are in more need of adaptation measures.564 
Although there seems to be high acknowledgment within the Paris Agreement of financial flow from 
developed States to developing States in the matter of mitigation and adaptation measures, the 
language is weak and imprecise.565 The Paris Agreement points out only that there should be a flow 
of money from the developed States to developing States without making this a clear legal 
obligation.566  
In applying this observation to the question of financial support for early warning systems, one must 
note that there is no specific obligation under the climate law regime at the current stage. There is a 
general obligation to financially assist developing States with regard to adaptation measures, under 
which also early warning mechanisms fall. However, the legal language that is used remains very 
vague and weak so that no clear legal obligation to do so is available. Especially not with regard to the 
question of whether there is an obligation under the climate change regime to contribute a certain 
amount of money to the climate finance mechanism that could introduce the means to support early 
warning systems projects.  
 
 
4.2. Principles of international environmental law: Precautionary 
principle, polluter pay principle and no-harm rule 
The climate-change-law regime is not the only source of international law that could possibly 
introduce a legal obligation for the financial support of early warning mechanisms. Of particular 
interest are approaches from the general principles of international environmental law. In this context, 
the precautionary principle, the polluter pays principle and the no-harm rule are of relevance.567 This 
section firstly examines the precautionary principle and the no-harm rule. It turns to the precautionary 
principle in the light of the CBDRRC principle, in order to determine who should be under legal 
obligation to financially support early warning mechanisms.  
The precautionary principle and the no-harm rule are both important principles of international 
environmental law; they derive, however, from different sources: The precautionary principle is firmly 
anchored in the Rio Declaration and in the climate regime in the UNFCCC.568 The no-harm rule, by 
contrast, derives from the Trail Smelter arbitration and enjoys the status of customary international 
law.569   
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4.2.1. The precautionary principle and climate change litigation  
The precautionary principle, at its core, asks States to take appropriate steps to prevent potential 
environmental damage, even if there is a lack of exact scientific proof for the potential damage or 
adverse effects of a certain activity.570 Thus, it is not a surprise that the precautionary approach has 
been introduced into the climate law regime, as especially in the 1990s the science behind climate 
change was not as developed as it is today. Although the precautionary principle has been incorporated 
into the legal text, the international courts do not follow share the same understanding regarding 
whether it is a principle of customary international law.571 The World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
Dispute Settlement Body and the ICJ do not recognise the precautionary principle as a principle of 
customary international law, nor thus as a source of international law.572 In contrast, the ITLOS, 
ECtHR and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) acknowledge the importance of the precautionary 
principle and its movement towards a customary status.573 Yet, this division of understanding of the 
various courts is unsurprising, as the kinds of cases they hear differ, making the position of the ICJ in 
this regard more important.574 Thus, this research follows the opinion of the ICJ that the precautionary 
principle does not constitute a principle of customary international law. 
Nevertheless, the precautionary principle plays a significant role with regard to climate change 
litigation, specifically with mitigation efforts. There, it has been suggested in academia to use the 
principle, as it helps to overcome certain scientific uncertainness.575 The latter aspect is, as already 
explained above:, the essential core of the precautionary principle and has also been embodied in the 
UNFCCC.576 As, however, it is the position of this research that this principle does not constitute a 
principle of customary international law, and as the principle so far has been linked only to climate 
change mitigation efforts, such as GHG reductions, it will not be explored in more detail here – 
particularly, since early warning mechanisms represent adaptation measures and thus fall not under 
the umbrella of mitigation.  
 
 
4.2.2. The no-harm rule 
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The no-harm rule is a principle of customary rule and has already been addressed briefly above in the 
relevant chapter.577 The no-harm rule demands, at its core, that no State exercise its own sovereign 
rights in a way that would harm another State, including the environment of the other State.578 The 
Trail Smelter Arbitration was the first case of air pollution brought to an international tribunal.579 
Thus, since this case concerned the pollution through the air, noticeable in the territory of another 
State, this case is indicative of the central issue of this research: the emissions of GHG into the air, 
which causes climate change and thus global warming, leading to an increase of extreme weather 
events and, as such, the need for appropriate early warning systems. Hence, it is more than logical to 
apply the findings of the Trail Smelter Arbitration, and in particular the no-harm rule, to the issue at 
hand. 
The no-harm rule is not only applied after damage has occurred: The ILC also included the no-harm 
rule in its work on Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities.580 
These Draft Articles apply to “activities not prohibited by international law which involve a risk of 
causing significant transboundary harm through their physical consequences.”581  
The emission of GHGs is not prohibited under international law, as such. The UNFCCC regime solely 
aims to limit the total of emissions introduced to the atmosphere, by introducing either reduction 
targets, as within the Kyoto Protocol, or nationally determined contributions, as introduced with the 
Paris Agreement.582 Furthermore, also the second element of significant transboundary harm is 
fulfilled. The IPCC established the link between global warming, which is triggered by GHG 
emissions, and the increase in the frequency of extreme weather events such as cyclones or 
hurricanes.583 There is also no doubt that extreme weather events may lead, if not managed properly, 
to massive material damage, environmental damage and human losses. Extreme weather  falls within 
the ILC’s understanding of ‘harm’, which is considered to be personal, material or environmental.584 
Thus, the emission of GHGs falls within the scope of the Draft Articles on Prevention of 
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities: Firstly, the emissions are not prohibited under 
international law; secondly, GHG emissions have the potential to cause significant transboundary 
harm. 
Article 3, which mostly represents the no-harm rule, asks States to take action to prevent or minimise 
the risk of significant harm arising out of transboundary pollution: 
“The State of origin shall take all appropriate measures to prevent significant transboundary harm or 
at any event to minimize the risk thereof.”585 
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Thus, the question is whether an early warning mechanism could be considered an ‘appropriate 
measure’ according this provision. The World Bank has estimated in its 2017 study that the 
implementation of appropriate access to early warning mechanisms could save up to USD 100 billion 
a year and increase, as such, global consumption by the same sum.586 Not only would it increase global 
well-being, according to the global consumption, but also early warning mechanisms would obviously 
also help to save people’s assets, reducing the loss by about 20%; most importantly, such mechanisms 
could save lives.587 Since the understanding of ‘harm’ in this context is understood by the ILC as 
personal, material or environmental, there is no doubt that early warning mechanisms are excellent 
measures to prevent such harm. This argument is supported by the fact that because of the emissions 
of GHGs, the frequency of extreme weather events is increasing, so early warning systems are now 
needed more than ever before.  
As such, GHG-emitting States have to take preventive measures, according to the no-harm rule, as 
implemented in Article 3 of the Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from 
Hazardous Activities. An example of a preventive measure is financial support for the establishment 
of early warning systems in disaster-prone States, particularly in developing States.588 
 
 
4.2.3. The polluter pays principle and CBDRRC  
Thus, the question remains whether all current strong GHG-emitting States should have an obligation 
to prevent harm occurring in other States or whether this should apply only in the light of the CBDRRC 
principle to developed States. 
The climate regime introduced the CBDRRC on purpose and thus also the different treatment mirrored 
through it. Thus, the Kyoto Protocol includes only reduction targets that are listed in Annex 1 of the 
UNFCCC, which are considered to apply to developed States.589 Although the CBDRRC principle is 
repeated in the Paris Agreement, it does not include such a strict distinction between developed and 
developing States.590 Instead of reduction targets, the Paris Agreement introduces ‘nationally 
determined contributions’ for both developing and developed States.591 This new approach does not 
contradict the CBDRRC principle. Rather, it embraces the fact that the distribution of emissions has 
changed since the 1990s. As already explained above, the CBDRRC principle derives from the polluter 
pays principle, since it takes past GHG emissions, in particular, into account.592  
Currently, China is the largest emitter of CO2 globally.593 Since the adoption of the UNFCCC, most 
developed States have reduced their total CO2 emissions.594 Yet, since the Chinese population 
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represents around 19% of the global population, it seems ideal not only to look at the absolute 
emissions but also at the relative numbers, in particular emissions per capita.595 Given this 
consideration, the ranking differs. The largest per capita emitter is currently Canada, with 19 tonnes 
CO2 in 2015 per person.596  
Yet, the emissions per capita decreased in the developed States, while they increased in States with 
emerging economies, such as China or India.597 In China, the per capita emissions increased between 
1990 and 2015 by around 281%, while the population grew by about 19%.598 In India, the data looks 
somewhat similar: the per capita emissions increased about 147%, with a population growth of 51% 
between 1990 and 2015.599 The EU, on the other hand, decreased its per capita emissions by around 
25%, with a population growth of 6%.600 Not only did the per capita emissions decrease, but also the 
total emissions decreased by 21%.601 
Thus, since the emissions of emerging economies, such as China or India, are currently increasing, 
especially per capita, in the light of the CBDRRC principle, their past emissions should be counted as 
well. The Paris Agreement reflects this inclusion of past emissions, acknowledging the crucial role of 
emerging economies and their emissions, and thus it also demands action from those States by 
introducing the ‘nationally determined contributions’.  
Yet, this introduction of these contributions does not imply, that the CBDRRC principle and its model 
of past-emissions accountability are appropriate for all States. The Paris Agreement still acknowledges 
that certain States did not contribute and still are not contributing enough to the common problem of 
climate change, such as the least developed and small island developing States.602 Additionally, the 
agreement stresses that developed States still have to take the lead in combating climate change and 
its adverse effects: Article 3(4) points out that developed States have to take the lead with regard to 
emission reduction targets. The financ provisions are in this regard slightly more demanding. Article 
9(1) demands that developed States shall support developing States financially with regard to both 
mitigation and adaptation. Thus, although there is no clear between developed and developing States 
within the Paris Agreement, developed States are still obliged to take the lead in combating climate 
change its adverse effects. However, emerging economies such as China or India should also be 
considered when asking, who should pay for the damages caused by Climate Change. Since their 
emissions have been increasing over the last 20 years, they have produced a significant share of the 
global total of GHG emissions and, as such, they now fall under ‘past emissions’, which have to be 
taken into account, according to the CBDRRC principle.   
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5.IHRL and R2P 
International human rights law provides guidance on how to manage disaster situations.603 Hence, the 
question arises whether developed States also have an obligation under human rights law to finance 
early warning systems in other States. – or in other words, whether international human rights law 
applies extraterritorially in the case of early warning mechanisms. Additionally, the focus lies not only 
on the extraterritorial application of human rights law but also on the question of the R2P. These two 
notions will be addressed in the section below. It will be argued neither notion is yet applicable in this 
context. 
 
 
5.1. Extraterritorial application of human rights obligation 
Particularly within the European sphere of human rights law, there exists an extensive case law on the 
question of extraterritorial applicability of human rights obligations.604 The ECtHR uses the ‘effective 
control’ approach in order to determine whether human rights obligations apply in an extraterritorial 
fashion.605 The ECtHR stresses the exceptionality of such an approach and that it only accepts it if  
“the respondent State, through the effective control of the relevant territory and its inhabitants abroad 
as a consequence of military occupation or through the consent, invitation or a acquiescence of the 
government of that territory, exercise s all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by 
that government.”606 
The cases concerning the extraterritorial application of human rights obligation are mostly connected 
to armed conflict, such as Loizidou v. Turkey and Bankovic and others v. Belgium and others, where 
a State acted on the territory of another. In cases where a State acts on its own territory but the effects 
are noticed within the territory of another State, the extraterritorial application of human rights is more 
limited: in cases of extradition, there the extraterritorial application of human rights applies, 
particularly if the individual faces torture or inhumane or degrading treatment, such as, for example, 
by the death row phenomenon.607 The court reasoned this conclusion with the argument that the action 
of the respondent State imposed upon the individual any form of torture or inhumane or degrading 
treatment.608 In Ben El Mahi and Others v. Denmark, on the other hand, the ECtHR decided the case 
was inadmissible on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction.609 This case concerned the publication of 12 
cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed in private Danish newspaper. The applicants, Moroccan nationals 
and associations, complained that by not pursuing criminal charges against the publisher, Denmark 
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permitted the publication, and thus discriminated against Muslims.610 The ECtHR declared the case 
inadmissible, since there was no jurisdictional link between Denmark and Morocco.611  
By following the case law of the ECtHR, there would be no possibility to link the jurisdiction of, at 
least European, developed States to disaster-prone developing States, simply because developed States 
are not exercising any ‘effective control’ within the territory of the disaster-prone developing State, 
with regard to the management of natural disasters. As such, disaster-prone developing States are left 
completely responsible for the fulfilment of the human rights of their populations, including a possible 
right to early warning.612 The ILC also follows this reasoning, since it clearly States that each State is 
responsible by themselves for disaster risk reduction measures.613 
However, there exist ideas within the international law community that States should have an 
obligation to assist other States in fulfilling their human rights obligations.614 The Maastricht 
Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic and Social and Cultural 
Rights (Maastricht Principles) expressively proclaim that States shall assist other States to fulfil their 
human rights obligations in the area of economic, social and cultural rights.615 Principle 3 proclaims, 
“All Sates have obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights, including civil, cultural, 
economic, political and social rights, both within their territories and extraterritorially.”616 
The Maastricht Principle limit themselves not only to the ‘effective control’ criteria but rather also 
include into their understanding of extraterritorial application  
“situations over which State acts or omissions bring about foreseeable effects on the enjoyment of 
economic, social and cultural rights, whether within or outside its territory”.617  
If there is an extraterritorial application of human rights, the subsequent obligations, according to the 
principles, encompass also the duty to cooperate in order to achieve the universal enjoyment of human 
rights.618 This duty of cooperation also entails the duty to provide international assistance in order 
“[…] to contribute to the fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights in other States […].”619 
This international assistance, as in the concept of international cooperation, embodies in particular 
economic support in order to achieve full enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights.620 
Disaster situations, like after an extreme weather event, trigger human rights, especially economic, 
social and cultural rights: for example, the right to food or  right to an adequate standard of living.621 
Early warning mechanisms are part of disaster risk reduction strategies and thus have the aim of 
lessening the economic, social and cultural impacts of natural disasters.622 Global access to appropriate 
early warning mechanisms can increase human wellbeing, which is translated into an equivalent 
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increase of USD 100 billion in annual consumption.623 Most obviously, with access to appropriate 
early warnings, people can get out of danger, move their moveable assets and prepare for the coming 
event. At the same time, early warning mechanisms obviously also give the government time to 
prepare and thus to decrease the likeliness of any infringement of relevant economic, social and 
cultural rights. Hence, the link between the establishment and access of early warning mechanisms to 
the full enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights cannot be denied.  
Due to climate change, the frequency of extreme weather events is increasing.624 The danger of climate 
change has been on the table of international politics for many years; now, however, since the adoption 
of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, it should be clear that GHG emissions 
need to be reduced and that efforts should be to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change. Early 
warning clearly falls within the latter category, as extreme weather events are clearly an adverse effect 
of climate change. Thus, the developed States arguably should have knowledge that through their 
emissions of GHGs they trigger climate change and as such also trigger the frequency of extreme 
weather events. Therefore, the Maastricht Principles could be applicable, leaving room for the 
possibility of extraterritorial obligations. According to Principle 33, these extraterritorial obligations 
could entail the duty to support developing states financially in the matter of the realisation of 
economic, social and cultural rights. Thus, since early warning mechanisms would serve this purpose, 
it is arguable that developed States have, according to the Maastricht Principles, the extraterritorial 
obligation to financially support developing States in the case of the establishment of early warning 
mechanisms. 
However, the Maastricht Principles do not constitute any legally binding source of international law 
and are thus not enforceable. They rather represent the ideas and thoughts of academics and human 
rights advocates. Nevertheless, there is the possibility that, in the future, this line of thinking will 
become part of international law.  
Therefore, under currently binding international law, no extraterritorial obligation applies to developed 
States to financially support developing States with the establishment of early warning mechanisms. 
 
 
5.2. R2P and early warning 
When considering extraterritorial human rights obligations, the concept of R2P also becomes relevant. 
As in the last section, this section also argues briefly that this concept is not applicable in the case of 
financial support of early warning mechanisms. 
In his preliminary report, Special Rapporteur Valencia-Ospina made the connection between the 
protection of persons in the event of disasters in every stage of the disaster cycle and the R2P.625 He 
noted, 
“[…] the protection of persons may be located within contemporary reflection on an emerging 
principle entailing the responsibility to protect. The latter concept entails the responsibility to prevent, 
react and rebuild corresponding respectively, to the three phases of a disaster situation.”626 
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However, the secretariat of the ILC notes in its memorandum on the protection of persons in the event 
of disasters that the R2P doctrine does not apply in disaster situations.627 Thus, this claim will be 
briefly examined.  
After the horrors of Rwanda and the intervention in Kosovo during the 1990s, the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was appointed, which delivered a report 
in 2001 titled The Responsibility to Protect.628 The report, indeed, identifies three corner stones of the 
R2P doctrine: (1) the responsibility to prevent; (2) the responsibility to react; and (3) the responsibility 
to rebuild.629 Indeed, on first sight, these three cornerstones resemble the disaster cycle, with the 
respective stages of mitigation, an emergency phase and rebuilding.  
The report was published during the World Summit in 2005, where, among other things, R2P was 
discussed. The outcome of the summit was clear: the scope of application of the R2P doctrine is limited 
to the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.630  
Since the scope has been limited to the above-mentioned crimes, it is not applicable in the case of 
natural disasters and early warning systems. The applicability of the R2P doctrine in the aftermath of 
a disaster will be discussed in the relevant chapters below.631   
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6.Conclusion  
With the adoption of the Sendai Framework, the international community agreed to some very 
ambitious goals with regard to early warning mechanisms. However, it is also clear that there is a need 
for financing to achieve these goals.  
The means that financing for disaster risk reduction projects that include early warning is available, at 
least through the climate finance mechanism. However, the Paris Agreement does not yet offer under 
its new loss and damage approach an appropriate financial mechanism. This circumstance might 
change in the future, when the financial mechanism is elaborated by the COP. Nonetheless, the current 
general climate finance mechanism offers the financial means for distribution the money. There is, 
however, no legal obligation within the climate law regime to feed these means with a specific 
contributions of money. The USD 100 billion per year is a not legally binding target and, as such, is 
not enforceable.  
Additionally, also the Draft Articles do not offer a legal obligation. The Draft Articles emphasise the 
fact that disaster risk reduction belongs to the internal sovereignty of each State and, as such, 
constitutes a domestic affair. The articles refer only to a general duty of cooperation.  
This argument goes in line with the current status of IHRL. There is, so far, no extraterritorial 
application of any human rights obligation in the case of natural-disaster-related early warning 
mechanisms. The ECtHR, which provides an extensive amount of case law related to the 
extraterritorial application of human rights, uses the ‘effective control’ approach, and this mostly in 
cases associated with armed conflict. Since the establishment of early warning mechanism does not 
come in line with the fact that one State has ‘effective control’ over another State, the extraterritorial 
application of human rights obligations has to be denied in this matter.  
However, the Maastricht Principles, which deal with the extraterritorial obligations of States in the 
case of economic, social and cultural rights, would allow extraterritorial application. They limit 
themselves not only to ‘effective control’. The Maastricht Principles rather also include situations in 
which a State does not exercise effective control over the territory of another State, although the State 
may influence the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights in the other State through its acts 
or omissions. Particularly, if the adverse effects of the enjoyment of the human rights is foreseeable. 
Thus, the Maastricht Principles open up a scope for the application of extraterritorial human rights 
obligations in the case of the establishment of early warning systems. Nonetheless, those principles 
are not legally binding. Therefore, at the current stage, no extraterritorial application of human rights 
obligations exists in the matter of support for the establishment of early warning mechanisms.  
Furthermore, this section also looked briefly at the R2P doctrine. Particularly, as Special Rapporteur 
Valencia-Ospina considered the application of it in his preliminary report on the protection of persons 
in the event of disasters. However, the doctrine is not applicable, since the 2005 World Summit limited 
the scope of its application to genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing.  
However, the no-harm rule that represents customary international law and its implementation in 
Article 3 of the Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm form Hazardous Activities is a 
good basis for a legal obligation. The emissions of GHGs are not prohibited under international law. 
The international climate law regime solely introduces reduction targets, not a total ban. Furthermore, 
the emission of GHG is linked with global warming and thus the increase of the frequency of extreme 
weather events, which have devastating impacts. Those impacts can be sufficiently diminished with 
the establishment of appropriate early warning mechanisms. Since Article 3 asks for preventive 
measures and since early warning mechanisms would fulfil this request perfectly, it is absolutely 
possible to argue that GHG-emitting States have an legal obligation under the no-harm principle to 
financially support disaster-prone developing States.  
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Since the CBDRRC principle aims to enforce fairness in addressing the common concern of 
humankind for climate change, this obligation should apply only to developed States and emerging 
economies, since their total and per capita emissions are on the rise, while developed States are 
constantly reducing.  
The aim of this research is, however, not to point fingers at certain States and hold them liable. Rather, 
it should serve as a guideline for a group of States, in this case developed States and emerging 
economies such as India or China, to contribute to the means that will distribute the financial resources 
to the State parties in need.  
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Chapter IV:   Funding for the Reconstruction Phase 
In the light of the disaster cycle, once the emergency phase cools, the next phase starts: 
reconstruction.632 The reconstruction phase varies in its duration from weeks to years, since it depends 
completely on the scale of destruction and the countries’ capacities to bounce back effectively and 
efficiently. One of the major challenges a State faces in this regard is the question of appropriate 
funding, especially in cases where private insurance coverage is not easily accessible or not available 
at all, as is the case for most developing States. For example, in 2016 Asia suffered an estimated loss 
of USD 87 billion due to natural catastrophes, whereof roughly only 11.5% were insured.633 Thus, 
when appropriate private insurance coverage is lacking, it is up to the respective government to find 
appropriate funding for reconstruction. This chapter first explores the means available to governments 
of developing States where usually coverage is appropriate insurance missing to get enough funding 
for reconstruction in the aftermath of a calamitous event.  
In its second part, this chapter explores the connection to climate change in more depth, as the 
frequency of extreme weather events is triggered by climate change.634 In particular, it looks at the 
question of State responsibility – whether States could be held responsible for climate change 
damages, such as damages caused by extreme weather events. As this, however, includes many legal 
obstacles in order to make a legal sound argument, this chapter also suggests an alternative approach 
and argues that developed States and emerging economies have an obligation under international law 
to financially support disaster-prone developing States. This is then followed by an examination of 
sovereign risk transfer solutions and suggests, in the end, a pragmatic solution to fulfil this obligation.  
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1.Funding and Management of Reconstruction Projects after a 
Natural Disaster 
Compensation and funding for reconstruction in the relevant phase of the disaster cycle are usually 
either managed through insurance, tort litigation or financial help from other States or international 
organisations.635 This research focuses mainly on funding coming from the public sector and 
insurances, and as such excludes tort litigation form its scope. First, the question of private insurance 
is addressed, and then this chapter moves on to the question of help from international organisations 
and other States. The aim of this chapter is to provide an understanding of how the system works and 
why there are certain limitations and other pathways that need to be explored.  
 
 
1.1. Private insurance 
By insuring private property, such as a house or a business, the individual transfers an economic risk 
that might be triggered by an external factor such as extreme weather events, to an insurance company. 
Thus, insurance means nothing other than a transfer of risk.636  
In the context of reconstruction in the aftermath of a natural disaster, insurances play, as such, a 
significant role: Insurances seem to be the perfect pathway for covering the reconstruction costs after 
a calamitous event.637 This has also been recognised by the international community in the Sendai 
Framework, which asks States to promote domestic insurance mechanisms.638 However, reinsurances 
estimate that not even half of all damages caused by natural disasters are actually insured.639 Another 
factor that cannot be ignored is the distribution of this kind of insurance protecting the private 
individual. As already mentioned in 2016, only 11.5% of all damages in Asia were insured, while in 
Europe, 50% of all damages caused by natural hazards were insured, Australia had an insurance quote 
of 62% and New Zealand, similar to Europe, 53%.640 
At the same time, appropriate insurance coverage not only facilitates reconstruction and provides 
funding for it, but by doing so it also helps the affected State’s economy to recover more quickly. This 
effect can be illustrated with the following example addressing the earthquakes in Haiti in 2010 and 
in New Zealand in 2011.641   
Both earthquakes were similar in magnitude, the number in casualties and the following economic 
impact varied drastically, however: in Haiti the earthquake caused around 200,000 casualties, while 
in New Zealand, this number was around 185.642  The economic losses were estimated to be USD 8.5 
billion in Haiti, which was more than Haiti’s GDP at that point, and USD 31 billion in New Zealand, 
18.8% of its GDP of that time. Of those losses, not even 1% were insured in Haiti, while in contrast, 
around 80% were insured in New Zealand.643 Among the reasons New Zealand’s economy was better 
 
635  Farber, 'International Law and the Disaster Cycle', above n 79, 17. 
636  BusinessDictionary, insurance (18 March 2018) 
<http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/insurance.html>. 
637  Farber, 'International Law and the Disaster Cycle', above n 79, 17. 
638  World Conference on Disaster Reduction, UN Doc A/CONF.224/L.2 (7 April 2015), 14 [30 (b)]. 
639  Munich RE, Natural Catastrophes 2016 - Analyses, assessments positions, above n 132, 58. 
640  ibid. 
641  Swiss Re, Closing the protction gap - Disaster risk financing: Smart solutions for the pubic sector (Swiss 
Re, 2016) 5. 
642  ibid. 
643  ibid. 
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able to absorb the experienced losses was the high insurance coverage, which adds to the overall 
resilience of New Zealand to natural hazards.644 As such, private insurance play a significant role in 
capacity building and making States more resilient to natural hazards. Therefore, the aim of the Sendai 
Framework to improve access and availability of accurate insurance cover for damage caused by 
natural hazards has to be welcomed and supported.  
 
 
1.2. Managing the reconstruction phase: Funding and distribution  
If there is no insurance funding available, it falls to the government of the affected State to find options 
to make appropriate funding available. In these cases, the question is whether the government can 
contribute to funding for certain reconstruction projects, and secondly, whether the government is able 
quickly mobilise these funds.645 There are several options available for the government in order to get 
post-disaster funding. This section focuses mainly on ex post disaster finance options. Ex ante 
financing is discussed below in the section discussing sovereign risk transfer.646 
 
1.2.1. Ex post disaster finance 
The first option is to use State-owned funds through budget reallocation.647 Budget reallocation can 
be time consuming, and as such, the question is whether the particular State’s laws allow a speedy 
reallocation process in such circumstances.648  
The second option is, of course, donor assistance for both emergency relief and recovery.649 One of 
the major difficulties with this popular option is it offers no certainty of the amount of funds that will 
be received.650 As such, an overdependence on international assistance can heavily delay the provision 
of emergency funds in the emergency respond phase.651 This option is discussed below, specifically 
with regard to the establishment of a multi-donor trust fund and its management.  
The third option is to take external credit, for example from international financial institutions as the 
World Bank or the IMF.652 The negotiations of the term of the loan can, as well, be very time 
consuming. For example, the Cook Islands asked for a loan from the Asian Development Bank in the 
aftermath of several cyclones in 2005, and the approval of the funds took four months, delaying 
important reconstruction efforts.653 
 
644  ibid. 
645  Abhas Jha et al, Safer Homes, Stronger Communities - A Handbook for Reconstructing after Natural 
Disasters (The World Bank, 2010) 221-3. 
646  See below section: Sovereign Risk Transfer: Solution of the Future? on page 99. 
647  Jha et al, above n 645, 223. 
648  ibid. 
649  World Bank, Advancing Disaster Risk Financing & Insurance in the Pacific, Regional Summary Note & 
Options for Consideration (World Bank, 2015) 15-6. 
650  ibid 15. 
651  ibid 16. 
652  Jha et al, above n 645, 223; World Bank, Advancing Disaster Risk Financing & Insurance in the Pacific, 
Regional Summary Note & Options for Consideration, above n 649, 16-7. 
653  World Bank, Advancing Disaster Risk Financing & Insurance in the Pacific, Regional Summary Note & 
Options for Consideration, above n 649, 16-7. 
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The fourth option is again a domestic measure that includes tax measures, for example the increase of 
taxes make more funds available.654 Another option is to introduce tax concessions in order to 
encourage donations, as happened in Fiji in 2012 after cyclone Evan. In that case, Fiji applied a duty-
free status to all goods donated in kind.655 
Since there are several ways to get ex post disaster funding for the affected State, this funding needs 
to be managed. One great way that has been used with success is a flash appeal, which is a tool that 
helps the government to centrally control all incoming contributions.656 At the same time, it is 
important not only to centrally control all incoming contributions through a flash appeal, but also to 
avoid a fragmentation of contributions. Such fragmentation can be avoided through the establishment 
of a multi-donor trust fund.657 A high fragmentation rate would impact the affected government 
adversely with, for example, costly transaction fees.658  
 
 
1.2.2. Managing the reconstruction phase  
When it comes to recovery after a calamitous event and the heated emergency phase cools down, other 
questions arise on how to effectively manage financial contributions. With the reconstruction phase, 
the focus shifts from delivering emergency help to investing in a sustainable manner that also increases 
capacity and preparedness for future events.659   
In order to achieve a successful reconstruction, it is advisable for States that there are already plans in 
place, in which, for example, a governmental institution manages the reconstruction phase. There are 
different options in order to identify such a managing institution: (1) creating a new institution for this 
purpose, (2) using existing government ministries and (3) following a hybrid model of the first two 
options.660 The benefits for both the new institutional model as well as the hybrid are the efficiency of 
those management tools, since the government ministries should resume their usual business as soon 
as possible after the emergency situation, thus going back to normal.661 Thus, it seems, for purely 
practical reasons, reasonable to prefer one of those two options. However, the definite choice depends 
on the situation at hand and will not be discussed here in more detail. This section aims to raise 
awareness of the need to have such a political plan at hand in the case that a calamitous event strikes.  
When this plan is set up, the work that the management system faces varies according to the impact 
the calamitous event caused. The World Bank, and in particular its Global Facility for Disaster 
Reduction and Recovery, are experienced in assisting States lacking their own experience in dealing 
with such situations or simply lacking the capacity to do so.662   
 
654  ibid 17. 
655  ibid. 
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657  Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, Haiti Earthquake Reconstruction, Knowledge Notes 
from DRM Global Expert Team for the Government of Haiti (Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and 
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2.Obligation to Financially Support Reconstruction in Developing 
States 
The section above discussed the means that exist to assist in the recovery and reconstruction phase of 
a state that has been shaken by a calamitous event. As the shown above, disaster-prone developing 
states tend to lack sufficient insurance coverage, which could significantly improve economic recovery 
and ensure a financial flow for reconstruction activities. This chapter considers the question of whether 
the current status of international law encompasses an international obligation for developed states 
and emerging economies to financially support reconstruction projects in disaster-prone developing 
states. It starts by analysing possible obligations emerging from the climate-change-law regime and 
then moves on to the general principles of international environmental law and, in particular, the no-
harm rule.  
 
 
2.1. International climate-change-law regime: Loss and damage 
Due to climate change, the frequency of extreme weather events is increasing; as such, international 
climate change law becomes an integral part of IDL.663 This puts international climate change law into 
the position of being a good source for a potential obligation to financially support disaster-prone 
developing states with their reconstruction projects. The various provisions of the climate law regime 
applicable to the case of disasters have been discussed several times above, and therefore this section 
will limit itself on the analysis of the loss and damage provision found in the Paris Agreement.664  
The concept of loss and damage is legally embodied in Art. 8(1) of the Paris Agreement:  
‘(1) Parties recognize the importance of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage 
associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme weather events and slow 
onset events, and the role of sustainable development in reducing the risk of loss and damage. […]’665 
The Paris Agreement does now, however, offer a definition of the concept itself. Yet, in 2012 the SBI 
of the UNFCCC Regime published a report on various approaches to address loss and damage within 
the climate law system.666 In this report, the SBI defined ‘loss and damage’ as follows:  
“the actual/or potential manifestation of impacts associated with climate change in developing 
countries that negatively affect human and natural systems.”667  
Whereby the SBI understands the notion of ‘loss’ as the “negative impacts in relation to which 
reparation or restoration is impossible, such as loss of freshwater resources.”668 ‘Damage’ on the other 
hand was described by the SBI as the  
 
663  See chapter above: International climate change law on page 37.  
664  For the development of the concept see above chapter: Loss and damage on page 61.  
665  Paris Agreement Art 8(1). 
666  Subsidiary Body for Implementation, A literature review on the topics in the context of thematic area 2 of 
the work programme on loss and damage: a range of approaches to address loss and damage associated 
with the adverse effects of climate change, 37th sess, Agenda Item 10, UN Doc FCCC/SBI/2012/INF.14 
(15 November 2012). 
667  ibid 3 [2]; Maxine Burkett, 'Loss and damage' (2014) 4 Climate Law 119, 121. 
668  Subsidiary Body for Implementation, 37th sess, Agenda Item 10, UN Doc FCCC/SBI/2012/INF.14 (15 
November 2012), 3 [2]. 
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“negative impact in relation to which reparation or restoration is possible, such as windstorm damage 
to the roof of a building or restoration of a coastal mangrove forest as a result of coastal surges.”669   
After the adoption of the Paris Agreement, ‘loss and damage’ was described by scholars in broader 
terms as the “adverse effects of climate change which cannot be adapted to.”670 
Article 8 uses the example of extreme weather events and slow onset events, such as droughts, as 
examples of the area of application of the notion. Thus, there is no doubt that this provision is 
applicable in the context of this research. Both the SBI’s descriptions of ‘loss’ and ‘damage’ are 
applicable in the case of natural disasters, whereas ‘damage’ is the most obvious one with regard to 
reconstruction: such as damaged houses and infrastructure.  
The effectiveness of this provision, however, still needs to be determined. The wording of the 
provision states that the States “recognize the importance of averting, minimizing and addressing of 
loss and damage […].”671 This phrasing does not hint a strong legal obligation. In fact, during the 
negotiations in Paris, it was not even clear whether the notion of ‘loss and damage’ would make it into 
the agreement.672 The developed States were extremely reluctant about this concept, as they wanted 
to avoid any grounds for liability; on the other hand, the developing States were asking for 
compensational language in this provision.673 In order to be safe, the developed State parties included 
a clause in the accompanying COP decision to the Paris Agreement, which states, 
“[…] Article 8 of the Agreement does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or 
compensation;”674 
Since this clause has not been included into the Agreement itself, but in the COP decision and as such 
does not constitute binding law, it can be removed with another COP decision. Therefore, time will 
tell how the international community deals with the question of liability for loss and damage. As the 
provision stands currently, it does not give any plausible grounds for any liability for any climate 
change loss or damage, under which, in particular, the reconstruction after an extreme weather event 
falls.  
 
 
2.2. Customary international law: No-harm rule and polluter pays 
principle 
Since the UNFCCC regime is currently not yet developed enough to deal adequately with the question 
of financial support for reconstruction project, customary international law, in particular the no-harm 
rule, is another good source for a possible obligation. This rule of customary international law was 
already successful in establishing an argument with regard to financial support of early warning 
mechanisms in disaster-prone developing States.675 
This section will argue that the no-harm rule is also applicable to the question of financing 
reconstruction projects in the aftermath of disasters. Firstly, this section explains why reconstruction 
can be seen as a preventive measure. Secondly, the no-harm rule is explored, and a legal argument that 
 
669  ibid. 
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672  Obergassel et al, above n 329, 27-8. 
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674  Conference of the Parties, Agenda Item 4(b), UN Doc FCCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (12 December 2015), 
para 52. 
675  See Chapter: The no-harm rule above on page 68.  
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favours an international obligation to financially support disaster-prone developing States is presented. 
Thirdly, this section also briefly discusses, in line with the polluter pays principle, which States are 
addressed by such a possible obligation. 
2.2.1. Reconstruction and build back better as a preventive measure 
According to the disaster cycle, as described above in Figure 1, the phases following a destructive 
event are not linear. It is a cycle, and thus each phase includes elements that help to prepare for the 
next calamitous event.676 Thus, this preparation also includes the reconstruction phase. The Sendai 
Framework mirrors this model, as it includes ‘build back better’ as one of its main priorities for the 
years 2015 – 2030.677 It stresses the fact that the reconstruction phase is an essential opportunity to 
build back better.678  
The notion of building back better has been identified as follows: 
“The use of the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction phases after a disaster to increase the 
resilience of nations and communities through integrating disaster risk reduction measures into the 
restoration of physical infrastructure and societal systems, and into the revitalization of livelihoods, 
economies and the environment.”679 
Thus, the term ‘build back better’ is very straightforward: the reconstruction phase is a good 
opportunity to use new technologies and building methods to increase the resilience of buildings and, 
as such, of the whole community against a possible future disaster.  
Therefore, the reconstruction phase does not merely reconstruct the damage caused by the calamitous 
event. The phase is rather involves the implementation of new preventive measures by improving 
buildings as they are reconstructed, thus increasing the resilience of the affected community. As such, 
the reconstruction of the destroyed infrastructure and buildings is a preventive measure to lessen the 
future impacts on material damage or human lives and health.  
 
 
2.2.2. Reconstruction and the no-harm rule 
As seen above, reconstruction is a preventive measure and increases a resilience against future 
calamitous events, thus helping to lessen the future impacts of these kinds of events. Therefore, it is 
logical that there are several resonances between building back better and the financial support of early 
warning mechanisms.680 This research argues that the no-harm rule, in particular the Trail Smelter 
Arbitration and other judgements applying the no-harm rule, are applicable to the case of early warning 
mechanisms.681 The no-harm rule is not only applicable, as such, it also constitutes a legal obligation 
for developed States and emerging economies to financially support disaster-prone developing States. 
 
676  Explanations regarding the disaster cycle see Chapter: The Disaster Cycle and Historical Background above 
on page 15. 
677  World Conference on Disaster Reduction, UN Doc A/CONF.224/L.2 (7 April 2015), 8-9 [20]. 
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to disaster risk reduction 71st sess, Agenda Item 19(c), UN Doc A/71/644 (1 December 2016), 11. 
680  See Chapter: Financing Early Warning Mechanisms on page 49; Report of the International Law 
Commission, Fifty-third session, (23 April - 1 June and 2 July - 10 August 2001), GAOR, 56th sess, Supp 
No 10, UN Doc A/56/10(SUPP), 372, Art. 3.  
681  Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada) III RIAA 1905 - 82, 1965 ('Trail Smelter'); Corfu 
Channel Case (United Kingdom of Great Britan and Northern Ireland v. Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 
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Because of the similarities, this line of argumentation will also be considered for the question of 
financial support for reconstruction projects.  
As already discussed, the core of the no-harm rule is that no State has the right to do harm to another 
State while exploiting its own resources. The emitting State has to take preventive measures to inhibit 
harm to occur outside of its territory, thus in the territory of another State.682 As explored above in the 
relevant section dealing with early warning systems, the Draft Articles on Prevention of 
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities are applicable in the case of climate change and, in 
particular, the emissions of GHGs. Their emissions are not prohibited under international law. The 
UNFCCC regime simply reduces them but does not prohibit them.683 This instrument is an 
implementation of the no-harm rule and asks States to take preventive measures to lessen impacts from 
transboundary harm. As explored above, early warning systems and their financial support fall into 
the category of ‘preventive measures’.684 This category, however, is not only be limited to early 
warning systems: the same line of reasoning should be applicable to the question of financing 
reconstruction in the aftermath of natural disaster.  
The reconstruction phase is indeed a very important part of risk mitigation.685 In particular, when the 
reconstruction projects at stake aim to build back better and therefore increase the resilience of the 
affected community to disaster. As such, reconstruction is not a question only of compensating 
damage, but is much more about including preventive measures to lessen future impacts.  
Therefore, the same line of legal reasoning is as applicable to reconstruction as it is to early warning 
systems: GHG-emitting States have a legal obligation to prevent harm from happening in other States; 
this obligation can be met by financially supporting reconstruction projects that aim to build back 
better and thus aim for a more resilience community as a whole.  
 
 
2.2.3. Reconstruction and the polluter pays principle 
After having established that the no-harm rule implies the legal obligation of GHG-emitting States to 
take preventive measures in order to prevent transboundary harm, such as financially supporting 
reconstruction projects that aim to build back better, the question remains: which States are addressed? 
This question has already been answered above in the relevant section while discussing financial 
support for early warning systems.686 The exact same argument is applicable to the question of 
financial support of reconstruction projects, because the obligation to financially support both early 
warning systems and reconstruction projects derives from the same argument. 
The current CO2 data shows that China is, indeed, the world largest GHG emitter in total numbers, but 
by taking the relative numbers, per capita, Canada is currently the leader.687 China, on the other hand, 
with regard to the emissions per capita, is close to the EU.688 However, all developed States have 
decreased their total and relative GHG emissions, while emerging economies such as China or India 
 
682  See above Chapter: The no-harm rule on page 68.  
683  The Kyoto Protocol includes reduction targets and the Paris Agreement uses the instrument of nationally 
determined contributions in order to achieve global reduction of GHG emissions.  
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are still increasing.689 Thus, the point where CBDRRC principle also takes into account the past 
emissions of those States is reached. This is mirrored through the Paris Agreement, which does not, 
contrary to the Kyoto Protocol, include only reduction targets for developed States, but rather asks all 
States reducing their emissions.690 
Therefore, also with regard reconstruction projects, the answer must be that both developed and 
emerging economies are now in the position of such a legal obligation to financially support disaster-
prone developing States.   
 
689  ibid. 
690  See above chapter: The polluter pays principle and CBDRRC on page 70. 
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3. Failing Argument: State Responsibility for International Wrongful 
Acts in the Case of Climate Change Damage 
Other scholars dealing with the question of liability for climate change damage, such as after an 
extreme weather event, usually discuss this in the framework of State responsibility.691 This approach 
uses a different focus: it looks only at the damage ex post. As such, it is important for this research to 
distinguish itself from the State responsibility approach and explain the difficulties a State 
responsibility claim faces and why it is thus impractical.  
The term ‘responsibility’ is not only a legal concept: it can be found in moral, religious, ethical and 
social contexts.692 In many cases, ‘responsibility’ is used with a broad meaning, such as in Article 24 
of the UN Charter, which gives the responsibility to the UN Security Council to ensure peace and 
security.693 The concept of State responsibility in public international law, as we know it today, can 
be traced back to the Spanish Zone of Morocco Arbitration in the year 1925, where Judge Huber stated 
that responsibility is the corollary of any violation of an international right or obligation, and State 
responsibility entails reparation.694 This has been confirmed by the PCIJ, which furthermore stressed 
the applicability of State responsibility to all kinds of violations of international law.695 More famous 
applications of State responsibility, and in the context of this research, more important cases, are the 
Trail Smelter arbitration and the Corfu Channel Case.696  
This chapter focuses primarily on the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), adopted by the ILC in 2001.697 It discusses the development of this 
instrument and its legal status and moves then to the application to climate-change-related damage, 
such as the reconstruction in the aftermath of a natural disaster, and in particular why the application 
fails.  
 
 
3.1. Development and legal status of ARSIWA 
The law on State responsibility has been on the agenda of the ILC for many decades.698 It began its 
work on the topic already in 1956 with Garcia Amador, the appointed special rapporteur for the topic 
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at that time.699 Back then, the topic focused on State responsibility for injuries to aliens and their 
property.700 Garcia Amador submitted a total of six reports to the ILC between 1956 and 1961.701 His 
reports were not really discussed by the ILC at that time, because of the importance of other topics 
and because there was no consensus on a way forward with the topic.702 Amador was then replaced 
by Roberto Ago in 1963, who then suggested to focus the topic on the international responsibility of 
States.703 During his time as special rapporteur, Ago produced eight reports and a complete set of 
articles for the first part of the new instrument. This part dealt mainly with the origin of State 
responsibility.704 After Ago was elected to the ICJ, the ILC appointed Willem Riphagen as the new 
special rapporteur in 1979. He submitted several reports and concluded part two and three of the new 
instrument: the content and form of international responsibility and the settlement of disputes.705 
Riphagen was not re-elected to the ILC; thus, the ILC appointed Geanto Arangio-Ruiz as his 
successor.706 Arangio-Ruiz completed the first draft and, in 1996, and submitted it for a first reading 
to the ILC.707 He resigned in the same year, following some disagreements with the ILC.708 Thereafter, 
James Crawford was appointed as the new special rapporteur, who presented the ARSIWA as they 
stand today to the ILC in 2001.709 
After the adoption of the ARSIWA, several States opposed the idea that these articles should be 
adopted in the form of a treaty, such as the Czech Republic, the Nordic countries and the United 
Kingdom.710 The reasons were mainly that they were afraid negotiations would jeopardise the balance 
the ARSIWA demonstrated.711 They were also concerned because the ARSIWA was already part of 
public international law and regularly referred to by international courts or tribunals as well as various 
governments.712 Indeed, the provisions of the ARSIWA enjoy mostly the status of customary 
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international law713 and as such are a source of international law according to Art. 38 (b) and (c) of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute).714 
The following sections explore the applicability of the ARSIWA to climate change and its related 
damages, such as in the aftermath of a natural disaster. At the same time, the section aims to point out 
the difficulties such a claim faces and why the approach of seeing reconstruction as a preventive 
measure is more pragmatic.  
  
 
3.2.  State responsibility for climate change damage 
The ARSIWA is divided into four parts dealing with the international wrongful act of a State, the 
content of the international responsibility of a State, the implementation of international responsibility 
of a State, and general provisions, respectively.715 This section focuses mainly on the first and second 
part. It first examines whether the ARSIWA is applicable to the situation at hand and then explores 
other requirements needed to establish a responsibility under the ARSIWA. At the same time, this 
section aims to show the difficulties and as such support the argument to consider reconstruction as a 
preventive measure. 
 
 
3.2.1. Scope of application: Problem of self-contained regimes 
The ARSIWA is a set of secondary rules. As such, there is a need for a primary obligation that needs 
to be breached in a regime that does not contain any secondary rules already in order to trigger the 
ARSIWA.716  
According to Article 55, ARSIWA the articles are not applicable, if the breached primary obligation 
belongs to a self-contained regime, thus one that includes its own secondary rules. This understanding 
is rooted in the maxim lex specialis derogat legi generali.717 As such, the first step while examining 
the applicability of the ARSIWA to this research is determining whether international climate change 
law is a self-contained regime. 
 
713  Crawford, Brownlie's principles of public international law, above n 143, 540; Verheyen, above n 691, 226; 
for a comprehensive list of cases of international law bodies making references to the ARSIWA see: 
Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, Compilation of decisions of international courts, 
tribunals and other bodies, Report of the Secretary-General, 62nd sess, UN Doc A/62/62 (1 February 2007 
); Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, Compilation of decisions of international 
courts, tribunals and other bodies, Report of the Secretary-General, Addendum, 62nd sess, UN Doc 
A/62/62/Add.1 (17 April 2007 ); Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, Compilation of 
decisions of international courts, tribunals and other bodies, Report of the Secretary-General, 65th sess, 
Agenda Item 77, UN Doc A/65/76 (30 April 2010 ). 
714  Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 38 ('ICJ Statute').  
715  For a good and comprehensive overview on the ARSIWA see: Crawford, Brownlie's principles of public 
international law, above n 143, Part IX, 539- 603. 
716  ibid 540. 
717  Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-third session, (23 April - 1 June and 2 July - 10 August 
2001), GAOR, 56th sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/56/10(SUPP), 356-7. 
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The concept of self-contained regimes was invented by the ICJ.718 In its 1980 Teheran Hostages case, 
the ICJ formulated this concept.719 This case involved the application of diplomatic law and the 
possible legal consequences of a breach of a provision. The ICJ expressed, 
‘The rules of diplomatic law, in short, constitute a self-contained régime which, on the one hand, lays 
down the receiving State’s obligations regarding the facilities, privileges and immunities to be 
accorded to diplomatic missions and, on the other, foresees their possible abuse by members of the 
mission and specifies the means at the disposa1 of the receiving State to counter any such abuse.’720 
Thus, the involved State parties are not free to apply any legal consequences for a breach of an 
obligation, if the set of rules, which contain this primary obligation, also provide specific legal 
consequences for such a breach.721 This is, as mentioned above, reflected in Article 55 ARSIWA, 
which reflects a strong understanding of the concept of lex specialis. 
In the context of climate change law, there is an understanding that this is not a self-contained regime 
and thus the ARSIWA, as a set of secondary rules, is applicable.722 The main argument for this 
conclusion that the mechanism for non-compliance in international climate change law is not equipped 
to deal with the question of compensation of climate change damages.723 Because of this lack of 
secondary rule for this particular question, the ARSIWA is applicable.724 This line of argument is 
correct and thus does not need to be disputed. In the case of the application of customary international 
law (i.e. the no-harm rule), it is even more obvious that the ARSIWA are applicable, as they constitute 
customary international law by themselves.  
 
 
3.2.2. Attribution to the State 
An internationally wrongful act of a State consists in a conduct that is attributable to the State and 
constitutes a breach of international law.725 This section deals with the question of attribution, while 
the breach of an international obligation is discussed in the following section. 
The ARSIWA gives comprehensive guidance to what kind of conducts are attributable to a State.726 
In the case of climate change, it is obviously not the State or its government that are the main source 
for GHG emissions within the State’s territory. There are rather many different sources, such as 
industry or  the conduct of individuals and private houses, among other things. Thus, in this context, 
the question of attribution to the State enjoys certain significance.727  
With regard to GHG emissions produced by private individuals and entities, Article 8 ARSIWA is of 
particular interest.728 The provision deals with conduct directed or controlled by the State in 
 
718  For a complete discussion on self-contained regimes and climate change see: Verheyen, above n 691, 139 
– 43. 
719  United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran (United States of America v. Iran) (Judgment) 
[1980] ICJ Rep 3 ('Teheran Hostages'). 
720  ibid 40 [86]. 
721  Verheyen, above n 691, 139. 
722  for a extensive discussion see: ibid 142-3; Voigt, above n 691, 3-4. 
723  Voigt, above n 691, 4; Verheyen, above n 691, 143. 
724  ibid. 
725  Responsiblity of States for internationally wrofngful acts, 56/83, 56th sess, Agenda Item 162, UN Doc 
A/Res/56/83 (28 January 2002) Annex 1, Art. 2. 
726  ibid Art. 4 - 11. 
727  Verheyen, above n 691, 238-40; Voigt, above n 691, 9-15. 
728  See also: Verheyen, above n 691, 239. 
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question.729 The State is liable for the conduct of private individuals or entities if they acted under the 
instruction of the Stateor under its direction or control.730 In the case of GHG emissions, in particular, 
the control requirement is of interest: the private individuals and entities act under the jurisdiction of 
the State. The ILC uses an ‘effective control’ approach as adopted by the ICJ in its Nicaragua decision, 
in order to determine whether private entities or individuals acted under the control of the State.731 Of 
course, States have the power to introduce policies and legislation that limit the total GHG emissions 
in their territories, and as such they enjoy control over the allowances of total GHG emissions. This 
idea is affirmed in the 2015 Dutch Urgenda Case.732 This is the first case in which a domestic court 
compels the State to increase its GHG reductions.733 There the court concluded that GHG emissions 
within the territory of the Netherlands are attributable, as they fall within its jurisdiction.734  
Article 11 ARSIWA is also of relevance in establishing an attribution to the State.735 Article 11 sees 
an act as attributed to a State when the acknowledges and adopts the behaviour of the private individual 
or entity in question.736 However, this provision applies only in a subsidiary manner, thus only if no 
other provision is applicable.737 Therefore it is not necessary to discuss Article 11, as its application is 
precluded by the application of Article 8.  
Consequently, this phase of the argument faces not many difficulties. It is clear that the GHG emissions 
conducted within the territory of the respondent State are also attributable to that State. 
 
 
3.2.3. Breach of an international obligation 
As explained above, the ARSIWA is a set of secondary rules and thus, in order to be triggered, these 
rules require a breach of an international legal obligation. Scholars dealing with the question of State 
responsibility for climate change damages usually argue that the failure to sufficiently reduce GHG 
emissions is the issue. As such, for example failing to comply with the reduction targets in the Kyoto 
Protocol or the general obligations of the UNFCCC, but also customary international law (i.e. the no-
harm rule) are discussed in determining a breach.738  
Generally speaking, a breach is understood as an act or omission that is not in compliance with what 
an international obligation demands from a State.739 Such an obligation has obviously to be in force 
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for the State in question, thus legally binding for it.740 As not all States are party to the UNFCCC and 
its related instruments, it is necessary to also consider customary international law. This area of law 
is, because of its nature, binding to all States per se.  
This section firstly considers the arguments of academics under the UNFCCC regime and then turns 
to the no-harm rule. It also discusses the limitations and weaknesses of these arguments.  
 
3.2.3.1. International climate change law 
By following the approach of considering the financial cost of reconstruction as damages caused by 
the failure to reduce GHG emissions, it appears obvious to look on the reduction targets within the 
UNFCCC regime and, in particular, the Kyoto Protocol.741 Thus, the argument would be simple: the 
State in question failed to comply with the obligation established in the UNFCCC and in particular the 
Kyoto Protocol.742 
The problem of such an argument is, however, the fact that if a State reduces its GHG emissions and 
meets its reduction targets, then the case for liability falls apart. At the same time, not all developed 
States have ratified the Kyoto Protocol, such as the US or Australia; thus, they cannot be held liable, 
as they have no obligation to reach a certain reduction level.743 This reasoning also applies to 
developing States and, in particular, emerging economies such as China or India, as they are also not 
subject to the Kyoto Protocols reduction targets. This is, however, not favourable, since the GHG 
emissions are on the rise in the emerging economies.744 
 
3.2.3.2. Customary international law: No-harm rule 
The consideration of a breach of customary international law, which is by nature applicable to all 
States, is a possibility. The rule of customary international law to be considered is the no-harm rule, 
originating from the Trail Smelter Arbitration.745 In order to fulfil the no-harm rule, a State has to 
fulfil a standard of care, thus to fulfil due diligence.746 Due diligence applies as well to the State if the 
source of the questionable conduct is a private individual or entity.747 This attribution would therefore 
simplify the question of attribution.  
On the other hand, the definition of due diligence is quite vague.748 The ITLOS describes due diligence 
as “a variable concept”.749 Because of this vagueness and because of the fact that due diligence is an 
obligation of conduct and not a result, the applicable standards vary with each situation.750 Therefore, 
it is not possible to say how much reduction of GHG emissions is necessary to fulfil this duty of 
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care.751 As such, the extent of reductions rather depends on the particular State and its circumstances, 
so determining this extent happens on a case-by-case basis.752 Thus, this approach seems unfavourable 
when it comes to establishing a responsibility to compensate damage occurring from natural disasters. 
There is no time in the aftermath of a disaster available to look at each country and decide individually 
whether the standard of care has been met.  
However, by following the approach of seeing reconstruction as a preventive measure, as introduced 
above, it is possible to avoid such discussions and, in particular, the need to point fingers at certain 
States that do less: Climate change remains a common problem of humankind and therefore its 
consequences should be tackled together, but of course in the light of the CBDRRC principle. The 
Paris Agreement reflects the shared nature of this problem, as it appeals to all State parties to develop 
their own strategies on how much they would like to contribute to lessen the problem. This truly 
reflects the fact that it is a common problem of humankind and that it is no longer the developed States 
that contribute the most to climate change: emerging economies such as China and India are taking 
over.  
If the question of financial contribution to reconstruction is seen as a preventive measure and not as a 
legal consequence because of a breach of an international obligation, there is no need for questions 
such as, Is there a breach? How much GHG emissions is too much? Are developing States, including 
emerging economies, allowed to emit more than are developed States such as the European States? 
This is one of the reasons the doctrine of State responsibility is not the best path to choose in order to 
solve the matter at hand. Nonetheless, this section will explain the further limitations of this approach.  
3.2.4. Causation 
In order to hold a State liable for an internationally wrongful act and thus seek reparations, there needs 
to be a causal link between the conduct that is a breach of an international obligation and the damage 
suffered by the other State.753 The question of causation is, in the case of climate change, a difficult 
question to answer.  
Causation can be distinguished between general causation and specific causation.754 General causation 
considers a very general link between the emissions of GHGs and climate change damages, such as 
natural disasters and their consequences.755 Specific causation, by contrast, demands that a certain 
conduct causes a specific injury, for which responsibility is sought.756 In this latter case, the conduct 
must be conditio sine qua non to the injury.757 This specific understanding is, contrary to general 
causation, not very friendly towards climate change cases,758 because of the nature of climate change: 
there are too many contributors. Furthermore, the science behind climate change and global warming 
must accommodate uncertainty. Additionally, it is not possible to say that the particular emissions of 
a certain State explicitly causes a specific damage.759  
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As such, the question of causation goes hand in hand with the question of standard of proof: the proof 
of the causation chain. Climate change is not the only area about which there is uncertainty. A common 
problem also exists in the area of transboundary air pollution, in particular with regard to long-term 
harms.760 Different international tribunals and courts have dealt with this problem in different ways.761 
The ITLOS, for example, showed a willingness to consider the precautionary principle in situations 
where the complexity of the facts led to uncertainty and thus allowed a lower standard of proof with 
reference to the precautionary principle.762 The ICJ, on the other hand, demands scientific evidence in 
transboundary pollution cases in order to establish a causational link.763   
Taking these different approaches of the ICJ and ITLOS into consideration, it seems that it will be 
very difficult to establish a causation chain for climate change damage in front of an international law 
body without exact scientific proof.764 However, in domestic liability cases in the area of climate 
change, courts are more willing to accept causation. The most recent example is the above-mentioned 
Urgenda case. In this case, The Hague District Court acknowledges causation. It states very 
concretely,  
“[…] a sufficient causal link can be assumed to exist between the Dutch greenhouse gas emissions, 
global climate change and the effects (now and in the future) on the Dutch living climate.”765 
In this decision, the court not only recognises the causation between climate change and GHG 
emissions as such, but also acknowledges the role of past and future emissions as well as the fact that 
a general GHG reduction does not alter the finding: 
“The fact that current Dutch greenhouse gas emissions are limited on a global scale does not alter the 
fact that these emissions contribute to climate change. The court has taken into consideration in this 
respect as well that the Dutch greenhouse emissions have contributed to climate change and by their 
nature will also continue to contribute to climate change.”766 
Indeed, this ruling seems to be highly supportive of future climate change claims. Currently, there is 
a similar case pending in front of a Belgian national court.767 Thus, it is likely that such cases will 
accumulate and, if their findings regarding causation are similar, that these findings could constitute 
‘general principles of law recognised by civilised nations’ according to Art. 38(1)(c) of the ICJ 
Statute.768  
Because of the nature of climate change, global warming and its connected scientific uncertainty and 
the very conservative approach of the ICJ, with regard to causation it is a more solution-oriented 
approach to consider reconstruction as a preventive measure. It is arguable that for the preventive 
purposes, a more general causation chain would be sufficient, which would be met with the scientific 
data available, since the IPCC has confirmed the increased frequency of extreme weather events due 
to climate change. 
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3.2.5. Consequences of an internationally wrongful act 
If we follow the assumption that an international tribunal would accept causation in climate change 
damages cases, it would turn on the possible consequences. The legal consequences of an 
internationally wrongful act are (1) cessation of the act or reparation of the injury suffered, or both, or 
(2) countermeasures.769 The latter is only then applicable when efforts of cessation and reparation are 
unsuccessful and only “to induce that State to comply with its obligations under Part Two.”,770 where 
part two refers to cessation and reparation. This section will focus only on cessation and reparation in 
connection to natural disasters. 
With regard to cessation Article 30, ARSIWA demands the respondent State “to cease that act, if it is 
continuing” as well as “to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if 
circumstances require.”771 As such, cessation is by its nature unsuitable for climate change damages. 
It is impossible to cease GHG emissions, thus to reduce them significantly, within days or months. 
Additionally, the ‘escaping’ of GHGs into other territories, thus the transboundary effect, cannot be 
stopped.772 
To make full reparation for the injury caused, as embodied in Article 31, ARSIWA is an established 
principle of international law.773 The PCIJ stated in its Chorzow Factory case: 
“The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act - a principle which seems to be 
established by international practice and in particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals - is that 
reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the 
situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed. Restitution 
in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in 
kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by 
restitution in kind or payment in place of it - such are the principles which should serve to determine 
the amount of compensation due for an act contrary to international law.”774 
This judgment is reflected within the ARSIWA. Firstly, Article 31 demands full reparation. Secondly, 
the ARSIWA acknowledges restitution, compensation and satisfaction as possible forms for 
reparation.775 Restitution means restitution in kind; thus, a withdrawal of the illegal measure, for 
example by returning the unlawfully detained person.776 Compensation means the payment of money 
in the amount of the damage.777 Satisfaction, on the other hand, refers to means available where 
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restitution or compensation cannot make things good, for example a formal apology or the 
acknowledgment of the wrongdoing.778 
With regard to financing reconstruction in the aftermath of a natural disaster, both restitution and 
compensation seem to be possible. As mentioned above, restitution means restoration according to the 
situation ex ante. This definition would imply restoring something to the State it was in before the 
calamitous event hit the injured State. However, Article 35 ARSIWA also clearly states that restitution 
is not an option if it is out of all proportion compared to monetary compensation.779 If it would be 
argued that such an obligation to restore would not be proportionate and thus that compensation would 
be a better fit, the amount that would be awarded would certainly not exceed the value of the situation 
ex ante, since this situation determines the extent of restitution.  
This reasoning shows another limitation of the responsibility claim approach: the consequences would 
not include any means to build back better, as they do not restore a situation to its pre–calamitous-
event state. By taking the approach of seeing reconstruction as a preventive measure, this problem 
could be avoided and certainly improve resilience to natural hazards in developing States prone to 
natural disasters. 
 
 
3.2.6. Exemptions  
The ARSIWA deals with exemptions for liability in Articles 20 – 27. There are six exemptions 
available: consent, self-defence, countermeasures, force majeure, distress, necessity and compliance 
with peremptory norms.780  
With regard to environmental damage cases, the ICJ discussed, in particular, the exemption of 
necessity in its Gabcikovo case.781 In this case, Hungary insisted it acted with regard to ecological 
necessity and, as such, would benefit from being exempted for any wrongdoing.782 The ICJ states 
clearly that this ground for exemption constitutes customary international law, but applies only in 
exceptional cases.783 The court also refers to the ARSIWA for the conditions under which this 
exemption might be applicable.784 Article 25 ARSIWA deals with this exemption and imposes very 
strict requirements under which it can be successfully invoked: 
“1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act not 
in conformity with an international obligation of that State unless the act: 
(a) is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril; 
and  
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(b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards which the obligation 
exists, or of the international community as a whole.  
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding wrongfulness if:  
(a) the international obligation in question excludes the possibility of invoking necessity; or 
 (b) the State has contributed to the situation of necessity.”785 
It is difficult, however, to translate this judgement and, in particular, this exemption to the case of 
climate change damages.786 It is obvious that the requirements are nearly impossible to meet in the 
case of GHG emissions and related climate change damages. It is even questionable how a State could 
use one of the exemptions as a reason with regards to climate change damage, as none of the reasons 
would clearly apply.787 
 
 
3.2.7. Responsibility for a group of states or the international community  
Another issue to address, at least briefly, is that not only one State emits GHG into the atmosphere. In 
this regard, the ARSIWA acknowledges that under certain circumstances, there is not only one State 
to blame. This accommodation of multiple responsibility is reflected within the chapter concerning 
the invocation of State responsibility.788 Article 42 ARSIWA clearly stipulates that the injured State 
may invoke responsibility to a single State, a group of States or the international community as a 
whole. If, however, the injured State invokes it to a group of States, the group of States have to be 
responsible for the same wrongful act.789 As such, it is not applicable to situations where several States 
individual conducts contribute to inseparable harm, for example climate change damage.790 To this 
point, it remains unclear in international law how to deal with this kind of situation, where States 
independently contribute to a particular harm.791 
Again, this discussion could be avoided by considering post-disaster reconstruction as a preventive 
measure. As an obligation, it would apply, in the light of the above-discussed CBDRRC principle, to 
a group of States, namely developed States and emerging economies. 
3.3. Conclusion for climate-change-related reconstruction measures 
This research argues that the approach of considering reconstruction as a measure to prevent future 
harm is more suitable and more rewarding for the injured State than invoking State responsibility. This 
conclusion derives from many considerations. 
Already, the establishment of a breach of an international legal obligation demonstrates certain 
difficulties. The emission of GHGs is not an illegal act per se; it becomes illegal, according to the no-
harm rule, when the GHGs leave the ‘territorial atmosphere’ of the ‘polluting’ State and cause harm 
in another State. However, in order to clearly establish an infringement of the no-harm rule, a failure 
to meet the required standard of due diligence must also be established. This requirement raises the 
 
785  Responsiblity of States for internationally wrofngful acts, 56/83, 56th sess, Agenda Item 162, UN Doc 
A/Res/56/83 (28 January 2002) Annex 1, Art. 25. 
786  Verheyen, above n 691, 241. 
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788  Responsiblity of States for internationally wrofngful acts, 56/83, 56th sess, Agenda Item 162, UN Doc 
A/Res/56/83 (28 January 2002) Annex 1, Art. 42 -48. 
789  ibid Art. 47. 
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question of how much emissions are allowed. With regard to the recent development in international 
climate change law, the adoption of the Paris Agreement, where a shift from binding reduction targets 
to nationally determined contributions has been introduced, there is no clear-cut answer to this 
question.  
Secondly, the strict causal link between the conduct of the State (releasing GHG emissions into the 
atmosphere) and the harm suffered (damage caused by calamitous events such as extreme weather 
events) is difficult to prove. It is questionable whether a general causational link is alone sufficient in 
a State responsibility claim, where what is required is the conduct of the specific respondent State. It 
is in the nature of climate change that it is rather a problem of accumulation of all emissions that causes 
global warming and its adverse effects. Domestic courts, however, acknowledge a general causal chain 
to be sufficient. If more domestic courts follow this reasoning, this acknowledgment may become a 
principle of international law, as established by civilised nations, according to Article 38(1)(c) ICJ 
Statute. The question of causation accompanies the question of standard of proof. On this matter, there 
is no coherence within the jurisprudence of the various international courts and tribunals. The ITLOS, 
for example, takes the precautionary principle into consideration and lowers the standard of proof in 
cases of scientific uncertainty. The ICJ, on the other hand, rejects this argument. Therefore, a State 
responsibility claim for climate change damages might depend on the tribunal to which it is taken.  
Additionally, also with regard to the question of whether there would be a responsibility, the legal 
consequences of restitution or compensation would refer only to the status as it was before the 
calamitous event. Thus, it would not include any financial help to build back better in order to make 
the communities more resilient to extreme weather events. Finally, another issue is the facts that such 
claims would be needed to be addressed to each polluting State individually, as the ARSIWA requires 
that in order to for States to be held jointly responsible, they must have committed the same 
wrongdoing. However, as already mentioned, it is in the nature of climate change and global warming 
that it is a problem of accumulation of various individual and different contributions of different States.  
In pursuing the approach of considering reconstruction as a preventive measure, most of these 
obstacles vanish. First of all, no breach of an obligation needs to be argued for, as contributing 
financially to the post-disaster reconstruction phase is the obligation. Furthermore, no strict 
causational chain is necessary; general causation, which is without any doubt met, when considering 
the latest IPCC reports, is sufficient.  
The problem with establishing the value of the damage, and whether it should take into consideration 
building back better is unimportant, because by seeing reconstruction as a preventive measure it should 
aim to build back better and as such make the communities more resilient against natural hazards. This 
approach also deals better with the fact many States are together to blame. Climate change is a common 
problem of humankind and, as such, should also be tackled as a common problem of humankind. 
Under the argument that there is an international obligation to prevent future harm and that one 
appropriate measure is to financially assist reconstruction projects aiming to build back better, climate 
change and its adverse effects can be faced together.   
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4.Sovereign Risk Transfer: Solution of the Future? 
The sections above have argued that reconstruction has to be considered as a preventive measure, 
which improves a community’s resilience to natural hazards. Reconstruction costs should not be seen 
as damages caused by the calamitous event, but rather as investments in resilience. Therefore, the 
focus has now to turn on the question of ex ante financing. This will be discussed in this chapter with 
a particular focus on sovereign risk transfer.  
Insurances, and in particular reinsurances, play a significant role in the speedy recovery of a 
community affected by a natural disaster. Therefore, it is no surprise that the insurance market, 
specifically, is reacting and producing new insurance products, which could offer a solution to the 
question of financing reconstruction. Such products include, for example, macro insurance, which 
comprises risk transfer for governments; a pool scheme; a country-wide insurance solution for 
countries with uniform risk; and micro insurance, which is another term for private insurance.792 The 
last option is discussed above in the respective section. This section focuses on the first: macro 
insurance or, in other words, sovereign risk transfer.  
This section explains the mechanism for sovereign risk transfer with two major examples: Mexico, on 
the one hand, and Caribbean and the Pacific small islands, on the other hand.  
 
 
4.1. Mexico as the pioneer in sovereign risk transfer 
There is more than just one option for how to transfer a sovereign risk. One of the first and most 
important schemes developed is the Fondo Nacional de Desastres Naturales (FONDEN) in Mexico 
in 1996.793  
In the aftermath of a calamitous event that leads to a disaster, it is FONDEN’s purpose to ensure the 
immediately availability of financial resources needed for the emergency phase and post-disaster 
phase.794 These resources are made available, obviously, without triggering the time-consuming 
process of federal budget allocation.795 In particular, FONDEN finances (1) emergency assistance to 
the affected persons; (2) post-disaster reconstruction and rehabilitation of public buildings, which 
includes to a certain extent also the restoration of the environment; and (3) reconstruction and 
rehabilitation of low-income households.796 
Since its establishment in 1996, FONDEN has evolved.797 The most important change happened in 
2006, when a new domestic law was passed that required the Mexican Government to commit a fixed 
percentage of its annual budget to FONDEN, which is at the moment minimum 0.4%, in other words 
approximately USD 800 million per annum.798  
Fondo Nacional de Desastres Naturales is organised into two main core programs: FONDEN Program 
for Prevention and FONDEN Program for Reconstruction. Both programs embody trust funds, which 
 
792  Swiss Re, Closing the protction gap - Disaster risk financing: Smart solutions for the pubic sector, above 
n 641, 10. 
793  World Bank and Government of Mexico, FONDEN, Mexico's Natural Disaster Fund - A Review (World 
Bank, 2012) 5. 
794  ibid. 
795  ibid. 
796  ibid 10. 
797  For a comprehensive summary of changes see: ibid 5-7. 
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are managed by Mexico’s national development Bank, BANOBRAS.799 The prevention program has 
its own preventative trust, which is used for ex ante risk management.800 The FONDEN Trust on the 
other hand, which is embodied in the Program for Reconstruction, encompasses subaccounts for (a) 
emergency relief and (b) for reconstruction for each disaster.801 The FONDEN Trust also has the 
authority to pay premiums and vice versa to receive loss payments from either insurances or 
catastrophe bonds (cat bonds) in the aftermath of a covered event.802 Just recently, in 2017, the World 
Bank issued new cat bonds with coverage of USD 360 million for earthquakes and tropical cyclones 
for Mexico.803 One of these cat bonds was triggered in the aftermath of the devastating earthquakes 
just a month after the establishment of the cat bonds in September 2017.804 Next to the cat bond, 
FONDEN also transfers some of its financial risks to an insurance company through indemnity-based 
excess-of-loss insurance. In 2011, this insurance policy covered USD 1.4 billion.805 
 
 
4.2. Parametric insurances in the Pacific Caribbean and Africa 
For developing States in the Caribbean Pacific and Africa, parametric insurance, also known as index 
insurance, is the most commonly chosen form of sovereign risk transfer.806 The advantage of 
parametric insurance is that the pay-outs of the insured coverage come faster than they do with the 
classic indemnity insurance.807 Indemnity insurance covers the actual loss suffered. Therefore this 
specific loss needs to be defined after the damaging event has occurred, and as such, the pay-out 
process is slow.808 Parametric insurance, on the other hand, uses another trigger for the pay-out 
mechanism: it uses, as the name suggests, parametric triggers.809 Such parameters include data on 
rainfall in the event of a flooding.810 Pay-outs are based on such parameters and ex ante determined 
sums; as such, there is no need for individual ex post loss assessment, as is the case with classic 
indemnity insurance.811   
In 2012, forty-one member States of the African Union signed the African Risk Capacity (ARC) 
treaty.812 The ARC’s main objective is  
 
799  ibid 12. 
800  ibid 11. 
801  ibid 12. 
802  ibid 14. 
803  World Bank, World Bank Bonds to Provide $360 Million in Catastrophe Protection for Mexico (29 
September 2017) <http://treasury.worldbank.org/cmd/htm/World-Bank-Bonds-Provide-360-Million-in-
Catastrophe-Protection-for-Mexico.html>. 
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806  Swiss Re, Closing the protction gap - Disaster risk financing: Smart solutions for the pubic sector, above 
n 641, 11.  
807   Daniel J Clarke and Stefan Decron, Dull Disasters? How Planning Ahead Will Make a Difference (Oxford 
University Press, 2016) 63.  
808  ibid 62. 
809   ibid 63. 
810  ibid. 
811  ibid. 
812  Agreement for the Establishment of the African Risk Capacity (ARC) Agency, opened for signature 23 
November 2012,  ('ARC Treaty'). 
2. Part: Obligation and Responsibility of the not affected States  101 
“[…] to assist the Member States to reduce the risk of loss and damage caused by Extreme Weather 
Events and Natural Disasters affecting Africa’s populations by providing targeted responses to 
disasters in a more timely, cost-effective, objective and transparent manner.”813 
As such, the ARC works not only as a financial support agency, but also has the aim to assist its State 
parties to adopt domestic disaster preparedness plans.814 The main focus lies on droughts, and other 
events shall be added over time.815 In fact, epidemics and outbreaks have just been recently added in 
2017.816 In its function as a financial support agency, it also has the mandate to establish and operate 
an African Risk Capacity Insurance Company Limited (ARC Ltd), which has the aim to interact with 
insurances, reinsurances, derivate interactions and other options for risk transfer in order to ensure an 
effective management of disaster funding.817 The ARC Ltd was established a year later, in 2013.818 
The ARC Ltd transferred the risk of more than USD 192 million to a group of 18 reinsurers, among 
them Swiss Re.819 The first pay-out happened in early 2014, whereby the Governments of Mauritania, 
Niger and Senegal received more than USD 26 million. In particular, those funds were made available 
before the humanitarian aid appeal was made under the UN umbrella.820 This fast pay-out happened 
because the insurance purchased by the respective governments is a parametric insurance.821 
The Caribbean the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) is the financial institution 
that enables Caribbean Islands to purchase insurance cover.822 The CCRIF was established in 2007 
with the support of the World Bank and other State donors such as Japan.823 The CCRIF transfers 
some of its risk with the use of cat bonds of approximately USD 30 million in the size.824 The risks 
covered are tropical cyclones and earthquakes, and the pay-outs are triggered by a parametrically 
modelled loss.825 Because of this parametric approach, the pay-outs are fast, so the pay-outs from this 
instrument were the first ones reach Haiti in the aftermath of the devastating earthquake in 2010.826 
A similar system is in place for Pacific Island States. In 2013, the World Bank launched jointly with 
the Secretariat of the Pacific Community and the financial support of the Japanese government the 
Pacific Catastrophe Insurance Pilot.827 Again with support of the World Bank, the Pacific Catastrophe 
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Risk Assessment & Financing Imitative Facility (PCRAFI Facility) was established in 2016 and is 
based in the Cook Islands.828 The PCRAFI Facility is supported by a multi-donor trust fund and 
received USD 6 million during its first year of operation.829 At the same time, the PCRAFI Facility 
transferred USD 38 million to the reinsurance market, where again Swiss Re and Munich Re are 
among the reinsurers.830 The insurance that can be purchased by Pacific Island States is also a 
parametric insurance, with policy coverage of approximately USD 40 million.831 Additionally, this 
parametric programme is globally the first to include tsunamis in the covered risks.832 
 
 
4.3. Benefits and risks of parametric sovereign risk transfer 
The strongest benefit, which has already been mentioned several times, is the fast pay-out after the 
threshold is met in order to trigger the pay-out. The main reason for the strength of this benefit is that 
parametric risk transfer solutions do not require time-consuming individual loss assessment, contrary 
to classic indemnity insurance. 
However, there are also risks, in particular the so-called basis risk. Because a certain index or 
parameter is used in order to determine whether a pay-out is made, this pay-out might not mirror the 
actual damage felt in the area concerned.833 This lack of correspondence was the case for Jamaica in 
2009, when Hurricane Dean hit, but the insurance index was not triggered, and consequently no pay-
out was made.834 The same happened also in the Pacific with the Solomon Islands: there, the losses 
after the Santa Cruz earthquake were not high enough to reach the threshold of the policy, and the 
2014 flash foods were not covered in this policy.835 These experiences of Jamaica and the Solomon 
Islands show that there is no a single risk-transfer solution. It is rather important to tailor such solutions 
exactly to the needs of a particular country.836 
Nonetheless, the quick availability of the pay-out for the country in need is a big benefit, in particular 
because the pay-out is received before any external donations. At the same time, States that have such 
a scheme in place are less dependent on quick international donations, and as such, the States are able 
to get back on their feet in far less time.837 Therefore, appropriate insurance can reduce long-term 
losses and development setbacks and, as such, also save lives and livelihoods.838  
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5. Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the financial problems that disaster-prone developing States face during the 
reconstruction phase. Since availability of private insurance is limited in those States, it is important 
that the affected States have an effective plan in place to makes it easier to bounce back after such a 
devastating event. In this regard, Mexico is a pioneer with its national fund for disaster preparedness 
and rehabilitation: FONDEN. In order to protect itself against the financial risk, the Mexican 
government transfers some of its financial risks to the international capital markets and reinsurance 
markets. Similar, but not identical, approaches are currently under development in the Caribbean, 
Africa and the Pacific islands.  
Although there are certain means available for disaster-prone developing States not to be too reliant 
on external donations in the case of reconstruction, the question of liability remains. Scholars dealing 
with the question of climate change damage, such as the damage caused by an extreme weather event 
as a cyclone, usually argue for State responsibility under the ARSIWA. This approach, however, 
suffers from difficulties. First of all, no single State alone emits GHG into the atmosphere; it is rather 
a large group of States or even all States together. However, at the same time, not all States have not 
been and are still not emitting the same amount of GHGs. This difference in emissions then leads to 
the question of how much GHGs is a State allowed to emit, thus where the thresholds of responsibility 
lies.  
Secondly, causation also imposes difficulties in making a sound legal argument. Strict causation, 
which is often described with the conditio sine qua non formula, is hard to meet in the case of 
reconstruction costs caused by climate-change-related extreme weather events and the emissions of 
GHGs into the atmosphere. It is a fact that climate change and its consequences are still accompanied 
with uncertainty. This uncertainty cannot be ignored, while establishing a causational link between 
the emitting of GHGs, climate change and the extreme weather event that is responsible for the 
reconstruction phase.  
On the other hand, by acknowledging that no disaster is  a one-off event but rather a part of a circle 
and that, as such, every phase in the disaster cycle contributes to more resilience for the next event, 
such difficulties are less prominent. Within the reconstruction phase, it is acknowledged that it has the 
goal to ‘build back better’, with the ultimate aim of making the community more resilient for future 
events. Therefore, reconstruction that aims to build back better is indeed a preventive measure.  
By recognising reconstruction as a preventive measure, a similar approach to the question of financial 
support of early warning systems can be asked possible. In this regard, the no-harm rule is applicable, 
and thus, it is possible to argue that developed States and emerging economies have an obligation 
under customary international law to financially support disaster-prone developing States with regard 
to post-disaster – and in the light of the disaster cycle – pre-disaster reconstruction.  
A highly pragmatic option for this required financial support would be to commit funds to the 
respective insurance facility that offers insurance to the concerned governments: ARC Ltd. in Africa, 
CCRIF in the Caribbean and the PCRAFI Facility in the Pacific. For example, the PCRAFI Facility 
receives funds from the PCRAFI Multi-Donor Trust Fund with the donors Germany, Japan, United 
Kingdom and the US.839 This list of donors should be extended to developed States and emerging 
economies, in order to tackle climate change commonly as a common concern of humankind.  
 
 
839  World Bank, New Insurance Facility to Boost Natural Disaster Resilience in Pacific Island Countries, 
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Part 3: The Responsibility of the Affected State before, 
during and in the Aftermath of a Disaster 
Having established what the financial obligations of developed States and emerging economies 
towards disaster-prone developing States are, the study now turns the perspective. This part starts with 
a vertical perspective, with the relationship between the victims of a natural disaster and the affected 
State, regarding two major topics in IDL: the access to humanitarian assistance and the provision of 
early warning.  
The first chapter deals with the question of what the duties of the affected State towards the victims 
are in the emergency relief phase and partially beyond of the disaster cycle. Yet, since there are many 
topics to consider in this phase, this part limits itself mostly to the provision of humanitarian assistance: 
hence, whether the affected State has an obligation to provide humanitarian assistance and whether its 
own capacities are exceeded if it has to seek international assistance. However, a brief examination of 
the issue of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and their rights is also provided. 
The second chapter in this part deals, on the other hand, with the pre-disastrous event phase of the 
disaster cycle: thus the risk-mitigation phase. Contrary to Chapter III, this chapter offers a vertical 
perspective. As such, it examines whether the affected State has an obligation to provide early warning.  
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Chapter V:  The Responsibility of the Affected State During 
and in the Aftermath of a Disaster 
The 2017 hurricane season lead to unprecedented damages in the Caribbean. It started with Hurricane 
Irma in early September, the most powerful hurricane recorded, with a maximum wind speed of 296 
km/h. Irma impacted many Caribbean Islands and was then followed by Hurricane Jose, and a few 
days later Hurricane Maria, which developed from a category 1 to a category 5 hurricane within 18 
hours.840 Hurricane Maria devastated Dominica, in particular, a small Caribbean Island. It impacted 
the entire population of the island, and 92% of the inhabitants were in need for humanitarian aid.841 
On 29 September 2017, a flash appeal for Dominica was launched.842 This flash appeal requested USD 
31.1 million in order to provide live-saving assistance to the affected population.843 The flash appeal 
also identified the most urgent needs that needed to be addressed: food, water, electricity, building 
repair materials and tarpaulins.844 As such, most of the flash appeal will be dedicated to food security 
and access to water.845 
This chapter deals with this very scenario: the event has passed, and the State is overwhelmed and 
incapable of coping with the situation itself; thus it is a disaster in the sense defined by this research.846 
Positioned in the emergency relief phase, according to the disaster cycle, as described above in Figure 
1,847 this chapter’s focus differs from that of the previous chapters. This chapter, as well as Chapter 
VI, examines the duties and obligations of the affected State and what the rights of the affected 
individuals are.   
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1.Responsibilities and Duties of the State During the Disaster 
The first part of this chapter analyses the duties of the affected State during a disaster situation. The 
main focus lies on the protection of the affected population. Therefore, first, the obligation to protect 
the victims themselves is examined, and then the first section of the chapter continues by examining 
the possible duty to seek international assistance, along with whether and under which conditions this 
duty applies. This analysis affords a very close look at the Draft Articles, in particular Articles 10, 11 
and 13. General international human rights law is also taken into consideration while developing the 
legal arguments.  
 
 
1.1. Obligation to protect people affected by the natural disaster 
Victims of natural disasters are vulnerable and thus need protection. This section looks on both the 
human rights obligations of the affected State towards the victims and the possible obligation to ensure 
the provision of humanitarian assistance.848 The obligation of States to provide humanitarian 
assistance to the suffering population is not only discussed in the case of natural disasters but also in 
situations for armed conflict.849 
Human rights apply, by their nature, universally and at any time. Especially in a disaster situation, 
during the emergency phase, certain human rights are at risk.850 The Draft Articles reflect this 
application in Article 5, which reminds all involved parties that the affected persons still enjoy the 
protection of international human rights law in the case of disasters.851  
This section aims to examine those rights and pursues the goal of acknowledging human rights as a 
management tool for the government, in particular, with regard to the content of humanitarian 
assistance, which has been defined above.852 According to the Bruges Resolution, humanitarian 
assistance includes, among other things:  
“[…] foodstuffs, drinking water, medical supplies and equipment, means of shelter, clothing, bedding, 
vehicles, and all other goods indispensable for the survival and the fulfillment of the essential needs 
of the victims of disasters […].”853 
Because of this list, this section discusses in particular the right to life, the right to adequate food, right 
to adequate housing the right to health and right to safe drinking water and sanitation. These rights 
have also been stressed by the ILC as the most important ones during a disaster situation.854  
Most of these rights happen to be economic and social rights, and thus the main source is the ICESCR. 
Therefore, it is necessary to address the concept of ‘progressive realisation’ according to Article 2(1) 
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ICESCR before examining the substantive rights individually. Article 2(1) ICESCR reads itself as 
follows: 
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through 
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its 
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized 
in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures.”855 
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) discusses this provision in 
depth in its General Comment 3.856 The progressive realisation of the rights enshrined in the ICESCR 
allows States to fulfil the obligations step by step and takes as such consideration of the various 
economic and social structures of the various States.857 However, this does not mean that States have 
complete autonomy in deciding what and when they want to achieve the specific social, economic and 
cultural rights. The CESCR highlights that although the rights enshrined in the ICESCR can be 
addressed progressively, this gradual process does not mean that there are no certain core obligations 
that represent a minimum standard to be guaranteed at all times.858 Since the ICESCR allows this 
progressive realisation, it does not allow any derogation of its rights. Thus, the core obligations have 
to be fulfilled at all times and cannot be derogated from at all. In addition, as is in particular relevant 
to the right of adequate food and housing and right to health, discussed below, the CESCR stated in 
the same general comment,  
“[…] a State party in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, 
of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education 
is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant.”859 
Although the CESCR does not define the term ‘significant number’, this number will most likely be 
determined in the disaster situation, according to the definition of this research.860 Yet, the respective 
rights are detailed below. First, the right to life will be examined, which is, obviously, not an economic, 
social or cultural right. Afterwards, attention is given to the right to food, housing, health and, finally, 
water and sanitation.  
 
 
1.1.1. Right to life 
The right to life is, in the context of natural disasters and humanitarian assistance, the most crucial and 
fundamental right. The UNGA acknowledged this relationship in its resolution 43/101 (8 December 
1988): 
“[…] the abandonment of the victims of natural disasters and similar emergency situations without 
humanitarian assistance constitutes a threat to human life and an offence to human dignity.”861 
The right to life is enshrined in various treaties on an international and regional level: Article 6 ICCPR, 
Article 2 ECHR, Article 4 ACHR and Article 4 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
855  ICESCR Article 2(1). 
856  CESCR, Report of the fifth session, UN ESCOR, Supp No 3, UN Doc E/1991/23(SUPP)-E/C.12/1990/8 
Annex III ('General Comment No 3 (1990)'). 
857  ibid para 9. 
858  ibid para 10. 
859  ibid. 
860  see for similar argumentation: Kuijt, above n 172, 170-2. 
861  Humanitarian assistance to victims of natural disasters and similar emergency situations, GA Res 43/131, 
UN GAOR, 75th plenary mtg, UN Doc A/RES/43/131 (8 December 1988), Preamble para 8. 
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(ACHPR). It is not an absolute right, and thus limitations are possible: The ICCPR, ACHR and 
ACHPR guarantee not to be “arbitrarily deprived of life”.862 This guarantee, however, does not mean 
that the right to life allows derogation. In fact, there are no derogations available in the time of 
emergencies for the right to life, which is mirrored in the treaty text of nearly all human rights 
instruments.863 According to the HRC, this rule also applies to natural catastrophes.864 The only human 
rights instrument that does not contain a derogation clause at all is the ACHPR. This was interpreted 
in the way that the African human rights regime does not allow any limitations of rights based on 
public emergencies.865 This reasoning, therefore, also applies to the right to life.  
Although in times of emergencies no derogation from the right to life is possible, it is important to 
assess what kind of obligation the right to life imposes on the affected State, in particular during a 
natural disaster. The right to life does not only impose negative obligations, thus not to intervene into 
the protected sphere, but rather also includes positive obligations, like adopting positive measures.866  
In the context of natural disasters, an example, of a positive measure would be the provision of 
humanitarian assistance to the affected population, if needed, after a calamitous event leads to a 
disaster situation.867 The access to humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of such an event is often 
lifesaving, as it addresses basic human needs that are necessary for survival. The crucial role of 
humanitarian assistance has been reaffirmed by the UNGA in the above-mentioned quote, indicating 
that the abandonment of people gravely affected by a calamitous event and the failure to provide them 
with humanitarian assistance imposes a threat to human life.868 
 
 
1.1.2. Right to adequate standard of living 
The right to adequate standard of living encompasses four components: (1) adequate standard of living 
itself, (2) the right to adequate food, (3) right to clothing and housing and (4) to the continuous 
improvement of living conditions:  
“1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard 
of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the 
continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure 
the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international 
cooperation based on free consent.”869 
This section will focus on the right to adequate food as well as the right to adequate housing. In the 
intermediate aftermath of a calamitous event, these two aspects of the right to adequate standard of 
living are of great importance. 
 
862  Wording of: ICCPR Art. 6(1); see also: Nigel S Rodley, 'Integrity of the Person' in Daniel Moeckli et al 
(eds), International Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2014) 174, 184. 
863  ICCPR Art. 4(2); ECHR Art. 15(2); ACHR Art. 27(2). 
864  Human Rights Committee, 1950th mtg, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (31 August 2001), [5]. 
865  Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria (African Commission on Human and People's Rights, Case No 105/93, 
128/94, 130/94, 152/96, 31 October 1998) [67]. 
866  Report of the Human Rights Committee, Supp No 40, UN Doc A/37/40(SUPP) (22 September 1982) Annex 
V, 93 [5] ('General comments under article 40, paragraph 4 of the Covenant'); Budayeva and Others v. 
Russia [2008] II Eur Court HR 267, 288-9 [128] - [129] ('Budayeva v. Russia'). 
867  See also: Kuijt, above n 172, 187-91. 
868  Humanitarian assistance to victims of natural disasters and similar emergency situations, GA Res 43/131, 
UN GAOR, 75th plenary mtg, UN Doc A/RES/43/131 (8 December 1988), Preamble para 8. 
869  ICESCR Art. 11(1). 
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1.1.2.1. The right to adequate food 
The right to adequate food is protected not only in the ICESCR; it is also protected on a regional level 
in the Americas and in Africa, where the right to adequate food has been acknowledged to be implicit 
within the ACHPR.870 
The CESCR details in its General Comment 12 the right to adequate food, according to Article 11 
ICESCR.871  
First of all, the right to adequate food requires, as the wording itself suggests, a certain minimum 
standard. This emphasis on adequacy underlines the fact that the specific circumstances determine 
whether the accessible diet is appropriate.872 Next, to be appropriate, the food also has to be available. 
Both requirements imply the core content:  
“The availability of food in a quantity and quality sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs of individuals, 
free from adverse substances, and acceptable within a given culture; the accessibility of such food in 
ways that are sustainable and that do not interfere with the enjoyment of other human rights.”873 
With regard to accessibility, the CESCR stresses the distinction between economic and physical 
accessibility.874 In particular, with regard to physical accessibility, the specific needs of the victims of 
natural disasters have been addressed, and thus stressed as a case to which States should give special 
attention.875 
The CESCR clarifies that this human right should not be interpreted in a narrow or restrictive sense, 
as it will be realised progressively over time.876 Despite the progressive realisation, States still have to 
meet the core obligation, which is enshrined in section 2 of this provision: the fundamental right to be 
free from hunger.877 This means, therefore, in the context of natural disasters that the affected State 
has an obligation to ensure the physical accessibility of food.878 This accessibility can be achieved by 
the provision of humanitarian assistance, which certainly also includes foodstuffs if needed.879 
 
1.1.2.2. The right to adequate housing 
Like the right to adequate food, also the right to adequate housing is not only enshrined in the ICESCR, 
but enjoys also regional protection.880 On a global level, it is not only the ICESCR that offers 
 
870  Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights "Protocol of San Salvador", opened for signature 17 November 1988, OAS Treaty Series 
No 69 (entered into force 16 November 1999) Art. 12 ('Protocol of San Salvador'); SERAC v Nigeria 
(African Commission on Human and People's Rights, Case No 155/96, 27 October 2001) [64] - [65]. 
871  CESCR, General Comment 12, 20th sess, UN Doc E/C.12/1999/5 (12 May 1999). 
872  ibid 3 [7]. 
873  ibid 3 [8]. 
874  ibid 4 [13]. 
875  ibid. 
876  ibid 3 [6]. 
877  ibid. 
878  see also: Inter-Agency Standing Committee, above n 78, 32-3 [B.2.1]; see for a comprehensive discussion: 
Jansen-Wilhelm, above n 106, 183-5. 
879  See also above chapter: The concept of humanitarian assistance on page 25.  
880  European Social Charter, opened for signature 3 May 1996, 2151 UNTS 277 (entered into force 1 July 
1999) Article 31 ('European Social Charter'); the right to housing is recognised implicit within the African 
System: SERAC v Nigeria (African Commission on Human and People's Rights, Case No 155/96, 27 
October 2001) [60]; for the Inter-American System the right to adequate housing has only been referred to 
in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man: American Declaration of the Rights and 
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protection of the right to adequate housing; this right is also embodied in other human rights treaties: 
namely the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and CRPD.881  
Within the regime of the ICESCR, the CESCR confirms that this right means more than solely “having 
a roof over one’s head.”882 On the contrary, the right to adequate housing means “the right to live 
somewhere in security, peace and dignity.883 The term ‘adequate’ in this context bears the meaning of 
adequacy in space, privacy, security lighting and ventilation, basic infrastructure and location, with 
regard to work and basic facilities.884 Yet, the CESCR has not explicitly formulated any specific core 
obligations with regard to the right to adequate housing.885 This, however, does not mean that there 
are no minimum standards applicable in the case of natural disasters.886 The CESCR has explained 
that regardless of their specific level of development, States have immediate duties arising from the 
right to adequate housing.887 These immediate duties arise because  
“many of the measures required to promote the right to housing would only require the abstention by 
the Government from certain practices and a commitment to facilitating ‘self-help’ by affected 
groups.”888 
The CESCR states further that if these duties for some reason exceed the particular State’s maximum 
resources, then the State has an obligation to request international cooperation as soon as possible.889 
The CESCR description of how those duties look is very vague. Firstly, it stresses that States have to 
prioritise vulnerable groups that live in unfavourable conditions.890 Secondly, each State must 
effectively monitor and “to ascertain the full extent of homelessness and inadequate housing within 
its jurisdiction.”891 Hence, means that States have to include in their reports information about these 
groups “that are vulnerable and disadvantaged with regard to housing.”892 At the same time, the 
CESCR identifies the victims of natural disasters as belonging to a disadvantaged group with regard 
to the right of adequate housing.893 
 
Duties of Man, OAS Res XXX, adopted by ninth international conference of American States, Article XI. 
881  CEDAW Article 14(2); CERD Article 5(e)(iii); CRC Article 27(3); CRPD Article 28. 
882  CESCR, Report on the Sixth Session, UN ESCOR, Supp No 3, UN Doc E/1992/23(SUPP)-E/C.12/1991/4 
Annex II, para 7 ('General comment No. 4:  The right to adequate housing (art. 11 (1) of the Covenant)'). 
883  ibid. 
884  ibid. 
885  see in this regard with a special and comprehensive discussion on this topic: Jansen-Wilhelm, above n 
106,175-80. 
886  ibid 177. 
887  CESCR, Report on the Sixth Session, UN ESCOR, Supp No 3, UN Doc E/1992/23(SUPP)-E/C.12/1991/4 
Annex II, para 10 ('General comment No. 4:  The right to adequate housing (art. 11 (1) of the Covenant)'); 
Jansen-Wilhelm, above n 106, 177. 
888  CESCR, Report on the Sixth Session, UN ESCOR, Supp No 3, UN Doc E/1992/23(SUPP)-E/C.12/1991/4 
Annex II, para 10 ('General comment No. 4:  The right to adequate housing (art. 11 (1) of the Covenant)'). 
889  ibid. 
890  ibid para 11; Jansen-Wilhelm, above n 106, 177. 
891  CESCR, Report on the Sixth Session, UN ESCOR, Supp No 3, UN Doc E/1992/23(SUPP)-E/C.12/1991/4 
Annex II, para 13 ('General comment No. 4:  The right to adequate housing (art. 11 (1) of the Covenant)'); 
Jansen-Wilhelm, above n 106, 177-8. 
892  CESCR, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Report of the Fifth Session, Supp No 3, UN 
Doc E/1991/23 Annex III, para 13 ('General Comment No. 3 (1990): the nature of States parties' obligations 
(art, 2, para. 1 of the Covenant)'); Jansen-Wilhelm, above n 106, 177-8. 
893  CESCR, Report on the Sixth Session, UN ESCOR, Supp No 3, UN Doc E/1992/23(SUPP)-E/C.12/1991/4 
Annex II, para 8(e) ('General comment No. 4:  The right to adequate housing (art. 11 (1) of the Covenant)'). 
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Those obligations of States are more important as soon as the emergency situation cools and the 
reconstruction phase begins. The State has therefore to assess how many people are left homeless 
because of calamitous event that lead to the natural disaster.894 If the affected State, however, is unable 
to do so or fears being unable to do so, it has to seek international assistance in order to fulfil these 
duties.895  
Yet, that does not mean that there are no standards available for the disaster phase, thus the emergency 
response phase. In particular, the IASC Operational Guidelines offer guidance for States with regard 
to emergency shelter and the standard thereof.896 The IASC Operational Guidelines principally repeat 
what the right to housing means:  
“The right to shelter should be respected and protected. It should be understood as the right to have an 
accommodation allowing persons to live there in security, peace and dignity.”897 
The IASC Operational Guidelines also discuss further protection standards, such as that all affected 
individuals living in a camp are allowed to move freely in and out of a camp, that there should be no 
armed personnel at a campsite and, furthermore, that there should be specific space where children 
and women feel safe and secure.898  
As such, the ICESCR does not present clear obligations to States with regard to the establishment of 
emergency shelters. However, such an obligation would most likely be implicit from the right to life, 
as emergency shelters are necessary for the primary survival of victims of a natural disaster. This 
implication is mirrored within the recognition of the right to shelter as embodied in the IASC 
Operational Guidelines.  
 
 
1.1.3. Right to health 
Next to securing the availability of food and shelter during a disaster situation, the right to health also 
imposes certain obligations upon the affected State. The right to health enjoys very broad cover and is 
not only rooted in global human rights instruments but is, like the other examined rights, anchored 
regionally in the Americas, Africa and Europe.899 On an international level, the right to health is 
predominantly anchored in Art. 12 ICESCR:  
“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”900 
The CESCR stresses very firmly, that the right to health does not mean the right ‘to be healthy’.901 
Instead, the right to health embodies 
“a wide range of socio-economic factors that promote conditions in which people can lead a healthy 
life, and extends to the underlying determinants of health, such as food and nutrition, housing, access 
 
894  for a similar assessment see: Jansen-Wilhelm, above n 179 
895  see also: ibid 178.178 
896  Inter-Agency Standing Committee, above n  78, 34 [B.23]. 
897  ibid.  
898  ibid.  
899  Protocol of San Salvador Art. 10; ACHPR Art. 16; European Social Charter Art. 11; CEDAW Art. 12; 
CERD Art. 5(e)(iv); CRC Art. 24; CRPD Art. 25. 
900  ICESCR Art. 12(1). 
901  CESCR, General Comment No. 14, The right to the highest attainable standard of health (article 12 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), 22nd sess, Agenda Item 3, UN Doc 
E/C.12/2000/4 (11 august 2000), 3 [8]. 
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to safe and potable water and adequate sanitation, safe and healthy working conditions, and a healthy 
environment.”902 
Consequently, Article 12 ICESCR covers three human rights important during a disaster: (1) the right 
to health, (2) the right to water and (3) the right to adequate sanitation. This section focuses only on 
the right to health. The other two aspects are discussed in the next section.  
The right to the highest attainable standard of health is an economic, social and cultural right, and as 
such it does not allow for derogation, since the ICESCR does not contain a derogation clause. This, 
however, does not mean that there are no limitations possible.903 At the same time, because it is an 
economic, social and cultural right, it can be realised progressively over time.904 This, however, is not 
applicable to the minimum core obligations, which each State has to fulfil. Thus, if they are not met, 
in any circumstances, it would lead to a violation of that particular right.  
With regard to the core obligations of the right to health, the CESCR firstly explains the core obligation 
in a very general way: States are obliged to fulfil the right without discrimination of any kind and to 
take deliberate, concrete and targeted steps towards the realisation of the right.905 Next to this general 
description, it also provides a list of core obligations which inter alia also includes the access to health 
facilities, services and goods, which have to be distributed equitably and to which access has to be 
given without discrimination of any kind.906 
As those are the core obligations, this means for the case of natural disasters, that the affected State 
has the obligation under Article 12 ICESCR to provide access to health care facilities, services and 
goods without any discrimination. In particular, if a significant number of individuals do not have 
access to essential primary healthcare, this lack of access would constitute a violation of one of the 
core obligations of the ICESCR.907 At the same time, it is not only the immediate care of the injured 
individuals that is necessary in a disaster. Such situations are a perfect breeding ground for infectious 
diseases, such as cholera, and there needs to be assistance in place in order to avoid the situation 
moving from a natural disaster to a health disaster.908 For example, after Hurricane Matthew hit Haiti 
in October 2016, a significant increase in cholera cases was recorded. In response, the Haitian Health 
Ministry, supported by the World Health Organisation (WHO), Pan American Health Organization 
(PAHO) and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), started a vaccination campaign against 
cholera in the most endangered areas and put more health care facilities for cholera cases into place.909  
The ICESCR itself deals with the question of “prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, 
occupational and other diseases.”910 Those responsibilities have been considered by the CESCR as 
 
902  ibid 2 [4]. 
903  General limitations clause in ICESCR Art. 4. 
904  ibid Art. 2(1). 
905  CESCR, General Comment No. 14, The right to the highest attainable standard of health (article 12 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), 22nd sess, Agenda Item 3, UN Doc 
E/C.12/2000/4 (11 august 2000), 9 [30]. 
906  ibid 12-3 [43(a), (e)]. 
907  CESCR, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Report of the Fifth Session, Supp No 3, UN 
Doc E/1991/23 Annex III, 85-6 [10] ('General Comment No. 3 (1990): the nature of States parties' 
obligations (art, 2, para. 1 of the Covenant)'); Inter-Agency Standing Committee, above n 78, 35-7 [B.2.5]; 
Kuijt, above n 172, 203.  
908  Kuijt, above n 172, 202; Jansen-Wilhelm, above n 106, 191-2. 
909  PAHO, Haiti’s Ministry of Health organizing a vaccination campaign against cholera in areas affected by 
Hurricane Matthew, supported by PAHO-WHO, UNICEF and other partners (23 October 2017) 
<http://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12682&Itemid=1926&lang=
en>. 
910  ICESCR Art. 12(2)(c). 
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obligations of the same priority as core obligations.911 Thus, as they enjoy the same priority, in 
particular the prevention of epidemics and the spread of infectious diseases have to be taken into 
account by the affected State when dealing with the emergency relief phase and beyond. 
 
1.1.4. The right to safe drinking water and sanitation 
Next to food, a human being also needs water for survival. However, the right to safe drinking water 
is not enshrined in a separate provision in one of the major international or regional human rights 
treaties. Nonetheless, certain specialised human rights instruments contain explicit references to access 
to drinking water: The CRC urges States to take appropriate measures to ensure the provision of clean 
drinking water in order to combat diseases and malnutrition.912 Moreover, the CEDAW makes a 
reference to access to water with regard to adequate living conditions.913 Similarly, the CRPD obliges 
States to ensure equal access for persons with disabilities to clean water services, with regard to the 
right to adequate standard of living.914  
On a reginal level, the African continent ensures the best protection with regard to the right to water.915 
The Additional Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of Women in Africa demands that States make 
take steps to provide women access to safe drinking water.916 Similarly, the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child asks its State parties to ensure the provision of safe drinking water to 
children.917 On the European level, the ECHR does not make any reference to the right to safe drinking 
water and sanitation. However, the European Charter on Water Resources, adopted by the Committee 
of Ministers of the Council of Europe in 2001, recognises that “everyone has the right to sufficient 
quantity of water for his or her basic needs.”918 Thus, on the European level, the right to water does 
not enjoy a strong connection to the ECHR. In the Americas the Additional Protocol to the American 
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San 
Salvador) does not make any reference to water or sanitation at all.  
Although on the global level, the ICESCR does not make any explicit reference to the right to water 
and sanitation; rather, the CESCR still embodies this right in the notion of Articles 11 and 12 ICESCR: 
the right to adequate standard of living and the right to health.919 It explains that the right to water  
“[…] entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for 
personal and domestic uses. An adequate amount of safe water is necessary to prevent death from 
dehydration, to reduce the risk of water-related disease and to provide for consumption, cooking, 
personal and domestic hygienic requirements.”920 
 
911  CESCR, General Comment No. 14, The right to the highest attainable standard of health (article 12 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), 22nd sess, Agenda Item 3, UN Doc 
E/C.12/2000/4 (11 august 2000), 13 [44(c)]. 
912  CRC Art. 24(2)(c). 
913  CEDAW Art. 14(2)(h). 
914  CRPD Art. 28(2)(a). 
915  Kuijt, above n 172, 209. 
916  Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, opened 
for signature 7 November 2003,  (entered into force 25 November 2005) Art. 15(a). 
917  African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, opened for signature 1 July 1990,  (entered into 
force 29 November 1999) Art. 14(2)(c) ('African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child'). 
918  Council of Europe (Committee of Ministers), European Charter On Water Resources, Recomondation 
Rec(2001)14, (17 October 2001), Art. 5. 
919  CESCR, General Comment No. 15 (2002), the right o water (arts. 11 and 12 of the International Covenant 
on Economic, social and Cultural Rights), 29th sess, UN Doc E/C.12/2002/11 (20 January 2003), 2 [3]; see 
also: Kuijt, above n 172, 209. 
920  CESCR, General Comment No. 15 (2002), the right o water (arts. 11 and 12 of the International Covenant 
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The CESCR also indicates, that the right has to be seen not only as a part of the right to an adequate 
standard of living and the right to health, but rather in conjunction with all rights enshrined in the 
International Bill of Human Rights, which encompasses the UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR. This 
consideration has to happen in particular in connection with the right to life and human dignity.921 This 
implicit approach of the CESCR has affected several discussions in academia.922  
The UNGA adopted a resolution with regard to the right to water and sanitation, declaring that it  
“recognizes the right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation as a human right that is essential 
for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights.”923 
In doing so, the UNGA clearly positions itself next to the CESCR and understands the right to water 
and sanitation as a freestanding right.924 
The crucial part water plays in a natural disaster and the emergency response phase has been 
highlighted in the context of the right to water. In such situations, priority should be given to the 
provision of water to the affected population.925 This is clearly in line with the identified core 
obligations of the right to water, which inter alia demand States to “ensure access to the minimum 
essential amount of water, that is sufficient and safe for personal and domestic use to prevent 
disease.”926 This shows that the affected State has an obligation in the case of a natural disaster to 
ensure access to drinking water.927 The provision of safe drinking water could be achieved through the 
provision of humanitarian assistance, which, according to the Bruges Resolution also includes water.  
 
 
1.2. Obligation to ensure the provision of humanitarian Assistance 
The section above examined obligations deriving from human rights law that is of particular relevance 
during disaster situations. This section furthers this examination by investigating the possible 
obligation of the affected State to ensure the provision of humanitarian assistance to the victims of the 
natural disaster. 
First, this section analyses human rights treaties as a basis for such an obligation, and then it moves 
on to customary international law.  
 
 
on Economic, social and Cultural Rights), 29th sess, UN Doc E/C.12/2002/11 (20 January 2003), 2 [2]. 
921  ibid 2 [3]. 
922  See for example: Stephen Tully, 'A human right to access water? A critique of General Comment No. 15' 
(2005) 23(1) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 35; Malcolm Langford, 'Ambition that Overleaps 
Itself? A response to Stephen Tully's critique of the General Comment on the right to water' (2006) 24(3) 
ibid.433; Takele Soboka Bulto, 'The emergence of the human right to water in international human rights 
law: Invention or discovery' (2011) 12 Melbourne Journal of International Law 290; Kuijt, above n 172, 
210. 
923  The human right to water and sanitation, GA Res 64/292, 64th sess, Agenda Item 48, UN Doc 
A/RES/64/292 (3 August 2010), para 1. 
924  See also: Bulto, above n 922, 314. 
925  CESCR, General Comment No. 15 (2002), the right o water (arts. 11 and 12 of the International Covenant 
on Economic, social and Cultural Rights), 29th sess, UN Doc E/C.12/2002/11 (20 January 2003), 12 [34]; 
Inter-Agency Standing Committee, above n 78, 35-7 [B.2.5]. 
926  CESCR, General Comment No. 15 (2002), the right o water (arts. 11 and 12 of the International Covenant 
on Economic, social and Cultural Rights), 29th sess, UN Doc E/C.12/2002/11 (20 January 2003), 12 [37]. 
927  see also: Jansen-Wilhelm, above n 106, 186-8. 
3. Part: The Responsibility of the affected State before, during and in the aftermath 115 
 
1.2.1. Access to humanitarian assistance in human rights treaties 
The major global human rights treaties do not contain any specific reference to humanitarian 
assistance. Yet, some specific human rights treaties do, as for example the CRPD or CRC and, on a 
regional level in Africa, the Kampala Convention as well as the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child.928 As such, this paragraph focuses on these four instruments. The first section 
discusses the two instruments from the UN regime, and the second section focuses on the African 
human rights system. The third section deals with the question of whether customary international law 
provides such an obligation. 
  
1.2.1.1. Access to humanitarian assistance within the UN human rights system 
Both the CRPD and the CRC belong within the UN human rights system and are, as such, not restricted 
solely to a regional application. The two instruments do not recognise a distinct human right to 
humanitarian assistance per se, yet they acknowledge the importance of humanitarian assistance for 
the full enjoyment of other human rights:929  The CRPD asks States to  
“ensure the protection and safety of persons with disabilities in situations of risk, including […] 
humanitarian emergencies and the occurrence of natural disaster.”930  
In other words, this provision asks State to protect and ensure the safety of disabled individuals during 
natural disasters and humanitarian emergencies. This provision  obviously covers disaster situations 
as defined by this research. Yet, this provision does not stipulate at all that there is a distinct human 
right to receive humanitarian assistance. The focus of this provision lies on the protection and safety 
of individuals with disabilities, as a particularly vulnerable group. Thus, this provision rather reminds 
the affected State that it has obligations of protection towards its citizen, deriving for example from 
the right to life, right to food or right to health.931 
The CRC is a little more specific with regard to the connection of humanitarian assistance and the 
enjoyment of human rights. It declares,  
“States Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure that a child who is seeking refugee status or 
who is considered a refugee […] shall, […] receive appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance 
in the enjoyment of applicable rights set forth in the present Convention and in other international 
human rights or humanitarian instruments to which the said States are Parties.”932 
The language here is again clear that there is no distinct human right to receive humanitarian assistance 
for refugee children or children that seek refugee status. However, humanitarian assistance is 
considered to be necessary for the enjoyment of other human rights within the CRC, as well as within 
other international instruments to which the affected State is a party.933  
Consequently, although human rights instruments within the UN system acknowledge the importance 
of humanitarian assistance with regard to the enjoyment of other human rights, they do not contain a 
distinct right to receive humanitarian assistance.  
 
928  CRPD Art. 11; CRC Art. 22; Kampala Convention Arts. 5(1), 7(5)(g), 9(2)(b) and (m); African Charter on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child Art. 23. 
929  See also: Kuijt, above n 172, 175. 
930  CRPD Art. 11. 
931 See also: Kuijt, above n 172, 175. 
932  CRC Art. 22 (1). 
933 See also: Kuijt, above n 172, 175. 
3. Part: The Responsibility of the affected State before, during and in the aftermath 116 
 
1.2.1.2. Access to humanitarian assistance within the African human rights system 
Africa is the only regional system that contains human rights provisions with regard to humanitarian 
assistance and offers, as such, broader protection than other regional human rights system.934  
The African Charter on the Welfare of the Child adopted a provision similar to that of the CRC. Like 
the CRC, it recognises that refugee children, or children who are seeking refugee status, are entitled 
to humanitarian assistance for the enjoyment of the rights within the charter as well as for the 
enjoyment of rights embodied in other international instruments to which the affected State is a 
party.935 Yet, at one point, the African Charter on the Welfare of the Child goes further than does the 
CRC. It recognises this important connection between humanitarian assistance and the enjoyment of 
human rights not only for refugee children and children who seek refugee status, but also mutatis 
mutandis to children internally displaced through natural disasters.936  
Consequently, the legal protection offered to children that are victims of natural disasters within the 
African system is broader than within the CRC. In order for the CRC provision to be applicable, a 
child must at least seek refugee status, which is ultimately linked to the fact that the child has crossed 
an international recognised border.937 However, in the event of a natural disaster, this fact is not often 
the case, which makes it important also to recognise this to cases where the victims stay within the 
State and become IDPs.938 This importance is reflected by the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child, which allows the application of the provision mutatis mutandis to children who 
are victims of natural disasters and have become internally displaced. At the same time, both 
instruments connect humanitarian assistance and human rights not only within their own guaranteed 
rights; rather, they also recognise the importance of other international instruments in this regard, as 
for example the ICCPR, ICESCR or ACHPR.939   
Access to humanitarian assistance on the African continent is not only discussed with regard to 
children. The Kampala Convention, which deals with IDPs in general, includes provisions with regard 
to humanitarian assistance. The Kampala Convention is not a human rights treaty per se, but it still 
imposes duties on the States with regard to the protection of IDPs, in particular with regard to 
humanitarian assistance. The Kampala Convention reminds the Sates that it is their obligation to 
provide protection and humanitarian assistance to IDPs to the fullest practicable extent and with the 
least possible delay.940 Although the language used in the Kampala Convention is strong and 
affirmative of the obligations of State to provide humanitarian assistance to IDPs, it does not contain 
a human right to access to humanitarian assistance.941  
Consequently, although the African continent provides, in comparison, broader protection for victims 
of natural disasters than do other regional or international systems, African human rights treaty law 
does not contain a distinct right to receive humanitarian assistance.  
 
1.2.1.3. Customary international law 
 
934  For a comprehensive overview see: ibid 176-7. 
935  African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child Art. 23(1). 
936  ibid Art. 23(4). 
937  Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered 
into force 22 April 1994) Art. 1(A)(2) ('Refugee Convention'). 
938  This chapter deals with IDPs in depth below.  
939  See also: Kuijt, above n 172, 176. 
940  Kampala Convention Arts. 5(1), 9(2)(b). 
941  See also: Kuijt, above n 172, 177. 
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Neither global nor regional human rights treaties protect a distinct human right to receive humanitarian 
assistance. Since treaty law is not the only source of international law, however, and since customary 
international law also represents a source, the question is whether the latter embodies a human right 
to receive humanitarian assistance.942 According to the jurisprudence of the ICJ, in order for a rule of 
international law to be considered customary international law, it must fulfil two criteria: the rule must 
reflect opinion juris as well as State Practice.943 
Insufficient evidence presently exists that there is currently a customary norm emerging with the 
content of a human right to receive humanitarian assistance.944 Although there are soft-law instruments 
available that clearly suggest the existence of a human right to receive humanitarian assistance, this 
soft-law has not been backed up by State practice and their believe that such conduct would be 
necessary to adhere to an international rule, which is a component of opinio juris sive necessitas.945  
Examples of such soft-law instruments include the 1993 San Remo Principles, the Mohonk Criteria 
and the Bruges Resolution. All three declare that there is a right to request humanitarian assistance.946 
In particular, the Bruges Resolution deals with the victims of natural disaster. The resolution states,  
“II. Right to humanitarian assistance 
1. Leaving the victims of disaster without humanitarian assistance constitutes a threat to human life 
and an offence to human dignity and therefore a violation of fundamental human rights. 
2. The victims of disaster are entitled to request and receive humanitarian assistance. Assistance may 
be sought on behalf of the victims, by the members of the group, by local and regional authorities, the 
government of the affected State, and national or international organizations.”947 
The first of the above two paragraphs resembles UNGA Resolution 43/131, which also states that 
leaving the victims of natural disasters without aid poses a threat to human life.948 The second 
paragraph clearly indicates the rights of the victims of a natural disaster to seek humanitarian 
assistance. However, neither the UNGA or the UN Security Council have moved directly in this 
direction and declared in any of their resolutions the explicit right to receive humanitarian 
assistance.949 This addition would be important, as the ICJ considers resolutions from UN organs, in 
particular from the UNGA, to be indicators of an eventual opinio juris.950 Yet, their silence indicates 
that there is also no State practice with regard to the right to receive humanitarian assistance.951 
 
942  The ICJ recognises customary international law as a source of international law: ICJ Statute Article 
38(1)(b). 
943   Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) 
(Judgment) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 108-9 [207] ('Nicaragua Case'); North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal 
Republic of Germany v Denmark) (Merits) [1969] ICJ Rep 3, 43 [74] ('North Sea Continental Shelf Cases'); 
Crawford, Brownlie's principles of public international law, above n 143, 24-7. 
944  Kuijt, above n 172, 177-181. 
945  See for a comprehensive discussion: ibid.172, 177-181;  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Judgment) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 108-9 [207] ('Nicaragua 
Case'). 
946  International Institute of Humanitarian Law, above n 184, Principle 2; Ebersole, above n 199, 196; Institute 
of International Law, Bruges sess, (2 September 2003), Principle II(1) - (2). 
947  Institute of International Law, Bruges sess, (2 September 2003), Principle II(1) - (2). 
948  Humanitarian assistance to victims of natural disasters and similar emergency situations, GA Res 43/131, 
UN GAOR, 75th plenary mtg, UN Doc A/RES/43/131 (8 December 1988), Preamble para 8. 
949  Kuijt, above n 172, 177.  
950  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, 254-5 [70]. 
951  Kuijt, above n 172, 181. 
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Consequently, the existence of a human right to receive humanitarian assistance within customary 
international law has to be denied.952 
 
 
1.2.2. Humanitarian assistance as the means to fulfil human rights obligations 
As has been shown, under current international treaty law as well as customary international law, no 
distinct human right to receive humanitarian assistance exists; nonetheless, it is important to examine 
further the link between the fulfilment of human rights obligations and humanitarian assistance.  
This research uses the approach of the Bruges Resolution in order to define humanitarian assistance.953 
The Bruges Resolution defines humanitarian assistance as 
“[…] all acts, activities and the human and material resources for the provision of goods and services 
of an exclusively humanitarian character, indispensable for the survival and the fulfilment of the 
essential needs of the victims of disasters.”954 
Aside from adopting an abstract definition of humanitarian assistance, the resolution also gives a non-
exhaustive list of possible goods and services.955 Such possible services and goods include, among 
other things, food, drinking water, medical supplies and medical services.956 A comparison of this non-
exhaustive list to the identified human rights obligations that a State must satisfy during a natural 
disaster demonstrates a strong resemblance.957  
As identified above, the affected State has to assure its citizens, even during public emergencies, of 
the core content of the right to adequate food according to Article 11 ICESCR, which lies in the 
fundamental right to be free from hunger. Thus, in order to fulfil this human rights obligation, a State 
is obliged to provide food during a natural disaster, in order for the victims of such a disaster enjoy 
their fundamental right to be free from hunger. The provision of food is one of the core aspects of 
humanitarian assistance. Hence, through the provision of foodstuffs, as part of the provision of 
humanitarian assistance, the affected State fulfils its core obligations under Article 11 ICESCR.  
A similar argument is valid with regard to the right to health. In this regard, the affected State also has 
at least to guarantee the fulfilment of core obligations. According to the CESCR, one of the core 
obligations under the right to health, as enshrined in Article 12 ICESCR, is access to health facilities, 
services and goods, without discrimination. Additionally, the  has an obligation to ensure that no 
infectious diseases break out because of the disaster situation. As such, neglecting emergency medical 
attention to victims of a natural disaster after a calamitous event hit would be a violation of the 
individual’s right to health. Additionally, the affected State has also the precautionary obligation to do 
its best to prevent the outbreak of infectious diseases. At the same time, neglecting emergency medical 
assistance to the victims of a natural disaster would most likely also be a violation of the right to life.  
The same approach is appropriate for the right to water and sanitation. As examined above, this right 
is an integral part of the Articles 11 and 12 ICESCR. Additionally, water is necessary for the survival, 
and the need for water in emergency situations in the aftermath of a calamitous event has been 
highlighted by the CESCR. Thus, also with regard to the right to water by providing humanitarian 
 
952  ibid. 
953  See above Chapter: The concept of humanitarian assistance on page 25.  
954  Institute of International Law, Bruges sess, (2 September 2003), pt I para 1. 
955  ibid pt I para 1(a)(b). 
956  ibid. 
957  See above the chapter: Obligation to protect people affected by the natural disaster on page 106.  
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assistance, which also includes safe drinking water, the affected State is fulfilling its human rights 
obligations under the ICESCR as well as under the ICCPR.  
Similarly, the right to housing is at stake during a disaster situation. However, since the CESCR has 
not defined explicit core obligations in this regard and has mentioned only obligations of immediate 
effect, concerning the monitoring and establishing of the number of homeless people, the right to 
emergency shelter falls more likely into the provision of the right to life. Emergency shelters are 
necessary for survival, and the right to life demonstrates the heart of all survival rights. This aspect of 
the right to life can be fulfilled by the provision of humanitarian assistance, as this, according to the 
Bruges Resolution, also includes emergency shelter.  
As such, humanitarian assistance and the access to it, is not a distinct human right. However, the 
provision of humanitarian assistance during the time of natural disasters to the affected persons 
represents the means for the affected State to fulfil its minimum core human rights obligations of 
survival rights.958 Thus, humanitarian assistance is the means for the affected State to fulfil its human 
rights obligations under the ICCPR and ICESCR, as well as other regional instruments; neglect 
constitutes a breach of the relevant human rights. 
 
1.2.3. Protection of persons in the event of disasters: Article 10 
As mentioned above, the Draft Articles also address the duties of the State affected by a natural 
disaster. These duties are enshrined in Article 10: 
“(1) The affected State has the duty to ensure the protection of persons and provision of disaster relief 
assistance in its territory, or in territory under its jurisdiction or control. 
(2) The affected State has the primary role in the direction, control, coordination and supervision of 
such relief assistance.”959 
The first paragraph embodies the two main priorities of this provision: firstly, the obligation of the 
affected State to protect the victims of a natural disaster, and secondly, the obligation to provide 
humanitarian assistance. The second paragraph elaborates upon the second obligation,  explaining 
what the obligation to provide humanitarian assistance entails.  
This first paragraph is premised on the concept of sovereignty.960 The ILC refers to the separate 
opinion of Judge Alvarez in the Corfu Chanel Case, where he stated that sovereignty not only gives 
States rights but also imposes obligations on them.961 One of these obligations is to protect their 
populations. In particular, in relation to natural disasters, the UNGA has reaffirmed this duty to protect 
 
958  See also: Kuijt, above n 172, 218-220. 
959  Report of the International Law Commission - Sixty-eight session (2 May - 10 June and 4 July - 12 August 
2016), GAOR, 71st sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/71/10, 15, Art. 10. 
960  ibid 51. 
961  Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom of Great Britan and Northern Ireland v. Albania) (Merits) [1949] 
ICJ Rep 4, 43 (Judge Alvarez); Report of the International Law Commission - Sixty-eight session (2 May - 
10 June and 4 July - 12 August 2016), GAOR, 71st sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/71/10, 51-2.  
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on several occasions.962 Not only has the UNGA acknowledged this duty. Soft-law instruments such 
the Bruges Resolution or the IFRC Guidelines confirm this duty.963  
Although Article 10 stresses the fact that the affected State has the obligation to protect the victims 
and to provide disaster relief assistance, it does not constitute a distinct human right to receive 
humanitarian assistance. As already mentioned, this provision derives not from human rights 
obligations but from the general public international umbrella and its concept of State sovereignty. 
Thus, both the protection of the victims and the provision of humanitarian assistance derive from the 
concept of State sovereignty. However, as argued in the sections above, humanitarian assistance is a 
tool by which to fulfil the respective human rights at stake and is, hence, strongly connected to the 
fulfilment of other human rights obligations. Therefore, Article 10 does not constitute an independent 
human right to receive humanitarian assistance, but it imposes an obligation on the affected State to 
be in charge of the provision of such assistance in the case of natural disasters. Thus, it serves as a 
reminder that the affected State has a primary obligation to protect victims and to provide necessary 
humanitarian assistance. 
This provision is crucial within the framework of international law. International law already 
recognises, in the case of non-international armed conflict, the primary obligation of the affected State 
to be in charge of the provision of emergency relief.964 As such, it seems unjust that such an obligation 
has not been formulated yet in hard law for humanitarian emergencies in times of military peace, such 
as during natural disasters. If the Draft Articles are adopted into the form of an international treaty, 
this gap will be filled.  
 
  
1.3. Obligation to seek international assistance 
The paragraphs above have concluded that humanitarian assistance is a tool for the affected State to 
fulfil its human rights obligations. The question remains, however, of whether the affected State has 
to seek international assistance if it is unable to provide relief by itself.  
This section focuses on this question and considers the principle of State sovereignty and its 
accompanying consent requirement. With regard to legal scope, this section focuses mainly on the 
relevant provisions found in the Draft Articles. Of relevance are both Article 11 and Article 13. The 
first provision deals with the situation, namely when the natural disaster exceeds the affected State’s 
response capacity. The latter provision considers State sovereignty, in particular the requirement of 
consent.  
 
962 Humanitarian assistance to victims of natural disasters and similar emergency situations, GA Res 43/131, 
UN GAOR, 75th plenary mtg, UN Doc A/RES/43/131 (8 December 1988), para 2; Humanitarian assistance 
to victims of natural disasters and similar emergency situations, GA Res 45/100, UN GAOR, 68th plenary 
mtg, UN Doc A/RES/45/100 (14 December 1990), Preamble para 3, para 2; Strengthening of the 
coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations, GA Res 46/182, 78th plenary 
mtg, UN Doc A/RES/46/182 Annex 1, para 4; International cooperation on humanitarian assitance in the 
field of natural disasters, from relief to development, GA Res 63/141, 63rd sess, Agenda Item 659(a), UN 
Doc A/RES/63/141 (11 December 2008), Preamble para 4; International cooperation on humanitarian 
assistance in the field of natural disasters, from relief to development, GA Res 64/251, 64th sess, Agenda 
Item 70(a), UN Doc A/RES/64/251 (22 January 2010), Preamble para 5. 
963  Institute of International Law, Bruges sess, (2 September 2003), Principle III; IFRC, 30IC/07/R4 annex, (26 
- 30 November 2007), Principle 3.  
964  ICRC, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949 (Martinus Nijhoff, 1987) 1477. 
3. Part: The Responsibility of the affected State before, during and in the aftermath 121 
Article 11 has the headline: “Duty of the affected State to seek external assistance”965 and reads as 
follows: 
“To the extent that a disaster manifestly exceeds its national response capacity, the affected State has 
the duty to seek assistance from, as appropriate, other States, the United Nations and other potential 
assisting actors.”966 
In the commentary on this provision, the ILC stresses the complementary nature of this provision. This 
provision is a specification of the duty to cooperate, embodied in Article 7, and the obligation to protect 
the victims and provide humanitarian assistance, as enshrined in Article 10.967  
The duty to cooperate is elaborated by this provision in the sense that not only do third States have the 
obligation to do so; the affected State also has to seek help and thus cooperate with other actors.968 
The obligation to protect and provide humanitarian assistance is reaffirmed in Article 11, as it stresses 
again the fact that the affected State has to do its utmost to provide assistance to the victims and has a 
primary responsibility to do so.969 Yet, the general obligation to protect the victims and provide 
humanitarian assistance in Article 10 is based on the concept of State sovereignty. With Article 11, 
however, the ILC places the basis in human rights law: humanitarian assistance is a means fulfilling 
international human rights obligations, including seeking international assistance, if the country’s own 
resources are overwhelmed by the natural disaster.970  
Yet, the terminology used in this provision is vague, offering certain flexibility as to when this 
provision has to be applied. This ambiguity was intended by the ILC in order to craft this provision so 
as to ensure exactly this flexibility.971 This flexibility is, in particular, expressed in the phrase ‘to the 
extent that’, which refers to the fact that natural disasters are complex situations and as such cannot 
be described in absolute terms.972 For example, the affected State can be overwhelmed with one aspect 
of the relief operations but not in other areas.973 Thus, the complete first part of the first sentence of 
Article 11 applies to the situation “in which a disaster appears likely to manifestly exceed an affected 
State’s national response capacity.”974 This flexible approach is used in order to ensure the adequate 
and effective response needed by the victims, which is in line with the human rights law that is the 
foundation of this provision.975 
Not only do the Draft Articles include such an obligation to seek international assistance, but also 
other soft-law instruments include this obligation:976 for example, the IDRL Guidelines, the Oslo 
Guidelines and the Bruges Resolution, whereby the latter states,977  
 
965  Report of the International Law Commission - Sixty-eight session (2 May - 10 June and 4 July - 12 August 
2016), GAOR, 71st sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/71/10, 15, Art. 11. 
966  ibid. 
967  ibid 53. 
968  ibid. 
969  ibid. 
970  ibid 53-5; Valencia-Ospina, Special Rapporteur, Fourth report on the protection of persons in the event of 
disasters, 63rd sess, UN Doc A/CN.4/643 (11 May 2011), 13-6. 
971 Report of the International Law Commission - Sixty-eight session (2 May - 10 June and 4 July - 12 August 
2016), GAOR, 71st sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/71/10, 53. 
972  ibid. 
973  ibid. 
974  ibid. 
975  ibid. 
976  Special Rapporteur Valencia-Ospina used the existence of soft-law instruments to argue for this duty: 
Valencia-Ospina, Special Rapporteur, Fourth report on the protection of persons in the event of disasters, 
63rd sess, UN Doc A/CN.4/643 (11 May 2011), 13-5. 
977  IFRC, 30IC/07/R4 annex, (26 - 30 November 2007), Guideline 3(2); Oslo Guidelines - Guidelines on the 
use of foreign military and civil defence assets in disaster relief from OCHA, 18 [58] 
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“Whenever the affected State is unable to provide sufficient humanitarian assistance to the victims 
placed under its jurisdiction or de facto control, it shall seek assistance from competent international 
organizations and/or from third States.”978 
Indeed, if the Draft Articles are adopted as a treaty, that treaty will be the first binding instrument that 
acknowledges an obligation to seek international help if it is overwhelmed in peacetime.  
On the other hand, Article 13 of the Draft Articles deals with the affected State’s external sovereignty, 
and in particular the consent requirement with regard to international assistance:  
“(1) the provision of external assistance requires the consent of the affected State. 
(2) Consent to external assistance shall not be withheld arbitrarily. 
(3) When an offer of external assistance is made in accordance with the present draft articles, the 
affected State shall, whenever possible, make known its decision regarding the offer in a timely 
manner.”979 
The first paragraph clearly mirrors the principle of State sovereignty and  derivative principle of non-
intervention. By giving its consent to international humanitarian assistance on its territory, the affected 
State allows activities on its territory that otherwise would be qualified as violations of the principle 
of non-intervention.980 At the same time, this consent regime would, if not limited, give the affected 
State extraordinary power, as the State could freely choose to whom to give consent. With this 
awareness, Article 13 encompasses a qualified consent regime.981 The second paragraph imposes a 
limitation on the affected State. Yes, the State has the ability to refuse a third-party offer, but this 
refusal must not be arbitrary. Determining whether a certain withhold of consent is arbitrary is done 
on a case-by-case basis.  
Yet, the ILC put together three circumstances under which there is certainly no arbitrariness.982 The 
first ground to refuse an offer for assistance without it being considered to be arbitrary would be the 
case where the affected State’s national capacity to respond has not been exceeded.983 The second 
situation is where the affected State has accepted sufficient external assistance from another third party 
and as such is not dependent on the offer in question.984 The third circumstance in which a withhold 
of consent is considered to be justified is where the offer itself is not made in accordance with the 
Draft Articles.985 Consequently, if there is no other offer available, and the offer in question is made 
in accordance with the Draft Articles, the ILC sees no grounds for justification of a withhold of 
consent.986 
The reason to include the limitation on the affected State’s sovereignty springs from the dual nature 
of sovereignty, imparting both rights and duties.987 As such, this limitation reflects the principle that 
 
<https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/Oslo%20Guidelines%20ENGLISH%20(November%2020
07).pdf>. 
978  Institute of International Law, Bruges sess, (2 September 2003), Principle III (3). 
979  Report of the International Law Commission - Sixty-eight session (2 May - 10 June and 4 July - 12 August 
2016), GAOR, 71st sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/71/10, 16, Art. 13. 
980  Valencia-Ospina, Special Rapporteur, Fourth report on the protection of persons in the event of disasters, 
63rd sess, UN Doc A/CN.4/643 (11 May 2011), 16 [52]. 
981  Report of the International Law Commission - Sixty-eight session (2 May - 10 June and 4 July - 12 August 
2016), GAOR, 71st sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/71/10, 59. 
982  ibid 61-2. 
983  ibid 61. 
984  ibid. 
985  ibid 61-2. 
986  ibid 62. 
987  ibid 59. 
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the affected State has the primary R2P the victims and provide humanitarian assistance according to 
Article 10(1).988 Additionally, this kind of limitation has been acknowledged in soft-law instruments, 
such as the Guiding Principles.989 These principles not only include the requirement of non-
arbitrariness, but also explain that arbitrariness occurs ‘when the authorities concerned are unable or 
unwilling to provide the required humanitarian assistance.’990  
Consequently, the affected State has an obligation to seek international assistance, if the response to 
the natural disaster exceeds its national capacity. This obligation derives from international human 
rights law and customary international law. Humanitarian assistance is the tool for the affected State 
to fulfil its human rights obligations. Yet, at the same time, the affected State is also privileged by the 
consent system, such that it has the power to decide whether it wants to accept the offer of a certain 
third-party. At the same time, this power is not limitless and is safeguarded by the requirement that 
such a withholding of consent cannot be arbitrary. This limitation is based on the affected State’s 
internal sovereignty, which imposes the primary R2P the victims and to provide humanitarian 
assistance to those in need.  
 
 
1.4. The failure to provide humanitarian assistance: legal enforcement 
Since the affected State has an obligation to seek international assistance if its own capacities are 
exceeded, the question of enforcement, which gives necessary force to the obligation, remains. This 
section of the present chapter focuses on this question: what are the possibilities to enforce the 
provision of humanitarian assistance if the affected State is unable to provide humanitarian assistance 
by itself and is unwilling to accept international help? 
This scenario has happened in the past. In 2008, cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar. The government was 
obviously overwhelmed and unable to provide proper relief assistance. Thus, several international 
actors offered their help, but the government did not allow their entry into its territory. This 
disallowance sparked discussion within the international community about whether the doctrine of 
R2P is applicable in this kind of situation and whether there should be forceful interference in order 
to provide relief to the victims of the cyclone. However, such forceful interference was not 
necessitated, as after a month the government opened its boarders to humanitarian actors.991 
Thus, this example already lists one possibility that comes into mind: the R2P doctrine. Other 
possibilities are enforcement through the human rights system and finally through general public 
international law, in particular the ARSIWA.992 This section discusses all three possibilities and 
considers the latter in the particular context of the Draft Articles.  
 
 
1.4.1. The R2P doctrine in the case of natural disasters 
 
988  ibid 59, 15 Article 10. 
989  Report of the Represenative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted pursant to 
Comission resolution 1997/39, 54th sess, Agenda Item 9(d), UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (11 February 
1998) Annex 1 ('Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement'). 
990  ibid Principle 25 (2); Institute of International Law, Bruges sess, (2 September 2003), Principle VIII. 
991 For a good and comprehensive overview on the events in Myanmar in 2008 see: Renshaw, above n 155, 
165-184. 
992  See also for humanitarian assistance in peace as well as war time: Kuijt, above n 172, 413-519, 414. 
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The concept of R2P has already been discussed above.993 The concept applies as a justification for 
armed intervention into another state in order to provide, for example, humanitarian relief. The 2005 
World Summit identified four cases where R2P would be applicable: genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity.994 In the case of armed conflicts, when the civilian population 
is not adequately supplied with humanitarian relief goods, the R2P Doctrine, thus the use of force, is 
discussed within the international community.995 Hence, the doctrine could also be applicable in the 
case of natural disasters, where the affected population is not provided with adequate humanitarian 
assistance by the state.  
In this scenario, the application of R2P could be based on an argument from crimes against 
humanity.996 One legal definition of crimes against humanity is found in Article 7 of the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute). The provision lists acts including murder, 
extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment or other deprivations of liberty against 
fundamental international law, torture, rape and sexual violence, persecution, enforced disappearance, 
crimes of apartheid and other inhumane acts.997 These acts have to be “committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the 
attack.998 
Thus, the question is whether the non-provision of humanitarian aid in the time of natural disasters 
can be mirrored by those two elements of a crime against humanity. There is obviously not an absolute 
answer to this question, and has to be determined individually in each case. In the aftermath of Cyclone 
Nargis in Myanmar, scholars argued that the affected government would indeed fulfil the criteria of 
having committed a crime against humanity by not letting humanitarian actors help the victims and, 
as such, these scholars would have supported the invocation of the R2P.999  
However, the international community at that point opposed the idea and was highly afraid that an 
intervention on the grounds of R2P would worsen the situation.1000 Nearly 10 years later, Myanmar is 
again the ground zero of a humanitarian crisis: the Rohingya crisis. Several hundred thousand 
Rohingya are fleeing Myanmar to Bangladesh to seek shelter, after violence against the minority 
population broke out August 2017. The victims tell horrific stories of human rights violations, killings 
and burnings of villages.1001 Amnesty International has even argued that these acts constitute crimes 
against humanity.1002 Yet, despite the severity of this humanitarian crisis and the alleged seriousness 
 
993   See above Chapter: R2P and early warning on page 74.  
994   2005 World Summit Outcome, GA Res 60/1, 60th sess, Agenda Item 46 and 120, UN Doc A/RES/60/1 (24 
October 2005 ), para 138. 
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996 Roberta Cohen, 'The Burma Cyclone and the Responsibility to Protect' (2009) 1 Global Responsibility to 
Protect 253; Stuart Ford, 'Is the Failure to Respond Appropriately to a Natural Disaster a Crime Against 
Humanity? The Responsibility to Protect and Individual Crime Responsibility in the Aftermath of Cyclone 
Nargis' (2010) 38(2) Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 227; Ashley McLachlan-Bent and 
Johm Langmore, 'A Crime against Humanity? Implications and Prospects of the Responsibility to Protect 
in the Wake of Cyclone Nargis' (2011) 3 Global Responsibility to Protect 37. 
997  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 3 (entered 
into force 1 July 2002) Article 7 ('Rome Statute'); Ford, above n 996, 236-7. 
998   Rome Statute Article 7(1). 
999  Cohen, above n 996, 255; agreeing on crimes against humanity: Ford, above n 996, 261; McLachlan-Bent 
and Langmore, above n 996, 59.  
1000  For a comprehensive overview on the grounds see: Renshaw, above n 155, 173-9. 
1001  For an overview of the events see: BBC, Myanmar Rohingya: What you need to know about the crisis (13 
November 2017) <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41566561>. 
1002  Amnesty International, Myanmar: Crimes against humanity terrorize and drive Rohingya out (13 
November 2017) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/10/myanmar-new-evidence-of-
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of the crimes, this did not spark any discussion of R2P in the international community. Not only does 
the international community seem so far unwilling to accept the invocation of the R2P doctrine in 
these cases, but also the ILC stated that it does not find the R2P doctrine to be applicable in the cases 
of natural disasters.1003 
Hence, it does not seem – even if there might be legal grounds to invoke R2P and even if intervention 
could be justified – that R2P will be enforced by States. This assessment of the States is accurate, in 
particular, with regard to the UN Charter, where the use of force is generally speaking prohibited, with 
the general exception of self-defence and UN Security Council authorisation.1004 Nevertheless, the use 
of force remains ultima ratio, as firstly attempts must be made to settle a dispute in a peaceful 
manner.1005 
Yet, the stand taken by many other scholars, in particular in favour of the R2P doctrine, as mentioned 
above, is understandable. Why should a State be able to hide behind its shield of sovereignty and let 
hundreds of thousands suffer? This seems unethical. Although the current understanding of State 
sovereignty no longer resembles the absolute notion of the Westphalian concept,1006 it remains an 
important cornerstone of our current public international legal system.1007 As such, the concept and its 
importance cannot be ignored and have to be applied. Thus, the provision of relief to the victims of a 
natural disasters remains a domestic matter, and the consent of the affected State is needed in order to 
provide relief assistance, as reflected in the Draft Articles. This need for consent cannot be and should 
not be overridden by an intervention of Western States, who think the particular State is unable to 
handle the situation properly. Such an intervention, even if well intentioned, would undermine the 
cornerstone of State sovereignty. Thus, the international community was right to oppose to the R2P in 
the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis.  
Yet, this justification does not imply that a State and, in particular its government, can do with victims 
of natural disasters as it wishes. Human rights still apply, and if the behaviour of certain government 
officials leads to a crime against humanity, international criminal law could be still an option, although 
this option will not be explored in this research.1008 
 
 
1.4.2. Enforcement through the human rights system 
Another option to give force to the obligation to seek international assistance is the enforcement of 
human rights through the human rights system, specifically by recognising the firm connection 
between the provision of humanitarian assistance in humanitarian emergencies and the fulfilment of 
human rights obligations. Possible scenarios include both interstate and, more obviously, individual-
state complaints.1009 Yet, as discussed above, the distinct human right to receive humanitarian 
assistance does not exist. Thus, complaints within the human rights law system are bound to the alleged 
non-fulfilment of the underlying human rights. Such as, foremost is the right to life, followed by other 
 
1003  ILC, UN Doc A/CN.4/590 (11 December 2007 ), 147-8 [250]; a more affirmative opinion: Valencia-Ospina, 
Special Rapporteur, Preliminary report on the protection of persons in the event of disasters, 60th sess, UN 
Doc A/CN.4/598 (5 May 2008), 19-20 [55]. 
1004  UN Charter Articles 2(4), 51, 42; Crawford, Brownlie's principles of public international law, above n 143, 
746-768. 
1005  See generally: UN Charter Articles 41 and 42. 
1006  See above Chapter: State sovereignty and humanitarian assistance on page 23. 
1007  The UN is based on the sovereign equality of States: UN Charter Article 2(1); Crawford, Brownlie's 
principles of public international law, above n 143, 447-55. 
1008  For a comprehensive overview on the question see: Ford, above n 996, 269-76. 
1009  On this topic see also: Kuijt, above n 172, 475 – 86. 
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survival rights, such as the right to food, right to housing, right to health and the right to water and 
sanitation.1010  
Both the ICCPR and ICESCR enjoy high ratification numbers, and even more States have ratified the 
two human rights instruments that make reference to humanitarian assistance: the CRC and CRPD.1011 
However, the individual complaint mechanisms and the interstate mechanisms are not embodied in 
the main treaty texts, with exception of the ICCPR, which includes a possibility for interstate 
complaints.1012 Thus, optional protocols for the respective instruments have been adopted.1013 Yet, 
although the ratification numbers for the treaty itself are high, the respective optional protocols do not 
enjoy the same wide range of ratification.1014 At the same there has been so far no interstate complaints 
within the UN human rights system, showing that States are unwilling to pursue this path under the 
current system. This fact and the low ratification rate of the respective optional protocols that would 
allow individual complaints mechanisms show that it seems very unlikely that the UN human rights 
system is the right forum in which to enforce the provision of humanitarian assistance through human 
rights.  
This looks very different at the regional level. In Europe, the ECtHR has the competence to hear both 
interstate and individual complaints. It gets the competence directly from Articles 33 and 34 
ECHR.1015 While in the Americas, the IACtHR gets the competence to hear individual complaints 
from the ACHR and a possible interstate complaint competence if the States have declared acceptance 
of the jurisdiction of the court.1016 On the African continent, the African Court on Human and People’s 
Rights (ACtHPR) was established through the relevant protocol of the ACHPR in 1998, which entered 
into force in 2004.1017 According to the protocol, the ACtHPR has the power to decide and to give 
advisory opinions on matters relating to the ACHPR and other human rights instruments to which a 
State in question is a party.1018 The court can be accessed by the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, individuals and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as well as other State 
parties.1019 However, in order for the ACtHPR to have jurisdiction over a particular State with regard 
to complaints lodged by individuals or NGOs, this State has not only to ratify the protocol but also to 
 
1010  See also: ibid 476. 
1011  The current ratification statuses: the ICCPR has 169 State parties, the ICESCR has166 State parties, the 
CRC has 196 State parties and the CRPD has 175 State parties; OHCHR, Status of Ratification, Interactive 
Dashboard (15 November 2017) <http://indicators.ohchr.org/>. 
1012  ICCPR Art. 41. 
1013  Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 
December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976); Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 10 December 2003, 2922 UNTS 
(entered into force 5 May 2013); Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a 
communications procedure, opened for signature 19 December 2011,  (entered into force 14 April 2014); 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 13 
December 2006, 2518 UNTS 283 (entered into force 3 May 2008). 
1014  The current ratification statues for the optional protocols are: The Optional Protocol to the ICCPR has still 
the most State parties with a total number of 116 ratifications, the optional protocol to the ICESCR has a 
total of 22 State parties, the respective optional protocol to the CRC has 36 ratifications and the optional 
protocol to the CRPD has a total of 91 State parties: OHCHR, above n 1011.  
1015  Article 33 ECHR states: “Any High Contracting Party may refer to the Court any alleged breach of the 
provisions of the Convention and the Protocols thereto by another High Contracting Party.” 
1016  ACHR Articles 44 and 45. 
1017  Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of the African Court 
on Human and Peoples' Rights, opened for signature 10 June 1998,  (entered into force 25 January 2004) 
('Protocol establishing the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights'). 
1018  ibid Article 3 and 4. 
1019  ibid Article 5. 
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leave a declaration acknowledging the ACtHPR’s jurisdiction.1020 So far, only eight States have lodged 
such a declaration.1021 This limited number of signatories makes the ACtHPR the one regional court 
with the least influence over States with regard to individual complaints. The African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights has only the ability to make non-binding recommendations, which is why 
the ACtHPR would be an important tool to enforce human rights standards on a legally binding 
basis.1022 At the same time, the ACtHPR is also the youngest court among the three regional human 
rights courts and, as such, time should be given in order for the ACtHPR to grow.  
Thus, with regard to the enforcement of humanitarian assistance within the human rights system on a 
regional level, the IACtHR and the ECtHR seem the fora to choose. The ECtHR has one case in which 
it dealt with the availability of humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of a bombing of a Turkish 
village.1023 Although the ECtHR did not have to examine the lack of basic humanitarian assistance, it 
still concluded under its observations of Article 3 ECHR the right to be free from torture, inhumane 
and degrading treatment:  
“In addition to the apparent lack of the slightest concern for human life on the part of the pilots who 
bombed the villages and their superiors who ordered the bombings and then tried to cover up their act 
by refusing to hand over the flight logs, the Court is further struck by the national authorities’ failure 
to offer even the minimum humanitarian assistance to the applicants in the aftermath of the 
bombing.”1024 
However, the ECtHR has not decided on a specific case yet, where the explicit denial of humanitarian 
assistance led to a violation of a human right governed by the ECHR.1025 
Since, however, human rights proceedings tend to take a very long time, the question of using 
provisional measures is predominant in the case of providing humanitarian assistance to the victims 
of a natural disaster. Both the IACtHR and the ECtHR use the model and doctrine of the ICJ with 
regard to provisional measures, and as such, all three systems have parallels.1026  
The ECtHR has the power to grant interim measures according to Rule 39 of its Rules of the Court.1027 
The ECtHR has extensive case law dealing with the question of granting interim measures.1028 The 
court is generally very reluctant to grant these measures and grants them only on exceptional 
occasions.1029 At the same time, if no interim measures would be granted, the applicant would need to 
 
1020  ibid Art. 34(6). 
1021  African Union, List of Countries which have signed, ratified/acceeded to the Protocol to the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and People's Rights 
(20 November 2017) <https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7778-sl-
protocol_to_the_african_charter_on_human_and_peoplesrights_on_the_estab.pdf>; African Court on 
Human and Peoples' Rights, Republic of Tunesia signs African Court Declaration to Allow NGOs and 
Individuals to Access the Human and Peoples' Rights Court directely (20 November 2017) 
<http://en.african-court.org/index.php/news/press-releases/item/145-republic-of-tunisia-signs-african-
court-declaration-to-allow-ngos-and-individuals-to-access-the-human-and-peoples-rights-court-directly>. 
1022  ACHPR Articles 52, 53, 58(2). 
1023  Benzer and others v. Turkey European Court of Human Rights, App No. 23502/06 12 November 2013). 
1024  ibid [211]; Kuijt, above n 172, 480.  
1025  For further remarks see: Kuijt, above n 172, 480. 
1026  Jo M Pasqualucci, The practice and procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Cambridge 
University Press, 2nd ed, 2012) 254. 
1027  Rules of the Court, opened for signature 14 November 2016,  (entered into force 14 November 2016) 
('ECtHR Rules of the Court'). 
1028  For a comprehensive overview on interim measures in front of the European Court of Human Rights see: 
Yves Haeck and Clara Burbano Herrera, 'Interim measures in the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights' (2003) 21(4) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 625. 
1029  Conka and others v Belgium (Admissibility) (European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, Application No 
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face irreparable damage, imminent or impending.1030 Furthermore, there must be no further domestic 
remedies available with a suspensive effect.1031 With regard to the standard of proof, the applicant 
needs to show the danger to her or his person in a prima facie manner.1032 Contrary to the ECtHR, the 
IACtHR has the competence to grant provisional measures from the convention and, thus, the ACHR, 
directly.1033 These measures shall only be granted in “cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when 
necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons […].”1034 As such, the requirements are comparable 
to the criteria the ECtHR uses. This is also valid for the standard of proof, where a prima facie situation 
is also required. The IACtHR accepts prima facie violation if the situation is of extreme gravity and 
urgency, requiring measures to protect persons from irreparable damage.1035 
On the question of enforcing humanitarian assistance with regard to the violation of underpinning 
human rights, the invoking of provisional measures at either the IACtHR or ECtHR is an option. If in 
one of the governed regions, a State that is affected by a natural disaster is obviously overwhelmed by 
the natural disaster and is withholding international assistance, provisional measures could be filed 
against that particular State by either a representing NGO on behalf of the victims or the by the victims 
themselves. The requirements, in order to grant the provisional measure, thus the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance, will also be met; however, these decisions will be made on a case-by-case 
basis, and no general assumption can be made. It is rather the aim of this research to point out the 
possibilities that could be used in order to help the victims of a natural disaster under the current 
regime of international law. Yet, given the fact that the ECtHR and IACtHR govern only a relatively 
small proportion of the world, and considering the fact that, in particular, the States in South East Asia 
and in the Pacific are disaster-prone States, these possibilities are not helpful. Nor is it helpful that this 
region does not have a high ratification rate for the relevant optional protocols to the ICCPR and 
ICESCR, which would give certain judicial power to the respective governing bodies. Thus, this shows 
that the current system is lacking certain enforcement mechanisms with regard to the enforcement of 
the underlying human rights in the context of humanitarian assistance.  
 
 
1.4.3. Draft Articles: Enforcement 
As established above in the context of receiving humanitarian assistance as well as the obligation of 
the affected State to seek international assistance, in particular the Draft Articles are conclusive, in 
particular Articles 10, 11 and 13. This section deals with the question of what happens if a future 
signatory to this instrument does not obey its rules and what the legal consequences and means are for 
the enforcement. 
The Draft Articles do not contain any provisions on the dispute resolution; thus, no secondary 
obligations are embodied in the text as it currently stands. The articles therefore do not represent a 
self-contained regime, so customary international law applies.1036 However, first it has to be 
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1033  ACHR Article 63(2). 
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1035  Kawas Fernández v. Honduras (Provisional Measures) (Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 29 
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determined whom the articles address. Secondly, it must be determined how the ARSIWA, if 
applicable, sharpens this legal instrument. 
 
1.4.3.1. Draft Articles: Who is addressed?  
Article 1 defines the scope of the Draft Articles as follows: 
“The present draft articles apply to the protection of persons in the event of disasters.”1037 
Therefore, the main focus of the Draft Articles lies on the protection of persons, which are threatened 
by natural disasters in their lives, wellbeing and property, as is also mirrored in the explanations of the 
scope ratione personae.1038 Yet, ILC clarifies in its commentary that the Draft Articles cover ratione 
materiae the rights as well as the obligations of States affected by a disaster with respect to the 
protection of the persons within their territory or in a territory that is under their jurisdiction.1039 As 
such, the main focus of the Draft Articles is to protect the persons affected by a disaster, through the 
determination of rights and obligations of the affected State. Thus, the Draft Articles address States 
and not individuals directly. This is also in line with the logic, used above, that Article 10 of the Draft 
Articles does not constitute a human right to receive humanitarian assistance.1040 
 
1.4.3.2. ARSIWA as secondary rules for the Draft Articles 
As established above, the ARSIWA constitutes a set of secondary rules for non-self-contained 
regimes, thus regimes that lack their own set of this kind of rules.1041 If the Draft Articles are adopted 
as a treaty as they now stand, they will constitute one of the regimes that are not self-contained. As 
such, they would constitute an area of international law where the ARSIWA would be applicable. 
Thus, the question arises whether the ARSIWA would be a tool for enforcement of the provision of 
humanitarian assistance if the affected State withholdings its consent arbitrarily, while the disaster 
exceeds its own response capacity. 
This described passiveness of a State would most likely constitute the needed breach according to the 
Articles 10 and 11 of the Draft Articles. Such a breach would constitute a breach of a primary 
obligation, which is needed in order to trigger the measures of State responsibility as indicated in the 
ARSIWA.1042 Therefore, this section focuses on the possible measures for the enforcement of 
humanitarian assistance that the ARSIWA offers.1043  
The ARSIWA offers a range of options; not all, however, are useful in the context of the enforcement 
of the acceptance of international humanitarian assistance.1044 Hence, for example, full reparation, 
according to Article 31 ARSIWA, is not useful for the purpose of enforcing international humanitarian 
 
application: Problem of self-contained regimes on page 89.  
1037  Report of the International Law Commission - Sixty-eight session (2 May - 10 June and 4 July - 12 August 
2016), GAOR, 71st sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/71/10, 14. 
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1040  see above Chapter: Protection of persons in the event of disasters: Article 10 on page 119. 
1041  See above Chapter: Failing Argument: State Responsibility for International Wrongful Acts in the Case of 
Climate Change Damage on page 87. 
1042  Responsiblity of States for internationally wrofngful acts, 56/83, 56th sess, Agenda Item 162, UN Doc 
A/Res/56/83 (28 January 2002) Annex 1, Articles 1 and 2. 
1043  for a similar question but in the context of reconstruction costs see above Chapter: Consequences of an 
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1044  For a comprehensive overview please see above Chapter: Consequences of an internationally wrongful act 
on page 95.  
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assistance, if the affected State withholds its consent arbitrarily while being obviously overwhelmed 
by the disaster situation. Cessation and non-repetition, on the basis of Article 30 ARSIWA, on the 
other hand, make sense in such circumstances. These measures would mean that the affected Stated 
would have to stop the arbitrary withholding of its consent of international assistance and at the same 
time not to repeat this behaviour during another disaster. Cessation and non-repetition have to be 
invoked in front of a judicial body, and if the nature of the claim requires the exhaustion of local 
remedies, they need to be exhausted before addressing an international legal body such as the ICJ.1045  
The other option, which does not include a judicial process, is countermeasures according to Article 
49 and following ARSIWA. The ARSIWA do not contain a specific definition of countermeasures, 
but in general they are understood as 
“non-compliance by one state with an international obligation owed towards another state, adopted in 
response to a prior breach of international law by that other state and aimed at inducing it to comply 
with its obligations of cessation and reparation.”1046 
In order to be justified, the countermeasures firstly need to be taken only against the responsible State 
for the internationally wrongful act in order to induce the State to comply with its international 
obligation.1047 Secondly, the countermeasures are limited to the time during which the State is 
violating international law.1048 Thirdly, the injured State is not allowed to use its countermeasures to 
infringe the prohibition of the use of force, fundamental human rights, obligations of a humanitarian 
character that prohibit reprisals or other peremptory rules of general international law.1049 In particular, 
the prohibition of force in a disaster situation is favourable. As already discussed above with regard to 
the R2P, the use of force is not in favour of the already suffering population that is affected by the 
disaster. Fourthly, the countermeasures need also to fulfil the criteria of proportionality.1050 
Countermeasures should not be confused with the concept of retorsion, which is an unfriendly act 
without being inconsistent with any obligation under international law.1051 Because of their nature as 
lawful self-help measures, they fall not within the scope of the ARSIWA.1052 Retorsion is considered 
to be a freedom of States, so they are largely not regulated in international law.1053 
Obviously, both retorsion and countermeasures are possible options for the State that wants to enforce 
the acceptance of international assistance. The same is valid for the options under the VCLT, where 
Article 60 provides the options of termination or suspension for both multilateral and bilateral treaties. 
The VCLT, however, is not in favour of enforcing the acceptance of international humanitarian 
assistance for the victims of a disaster. However, within the framework of ARSIWA, only 
countermeasures are within the scope of its application.  
Another option outside of the scope of ARSIWA is the invocation of diplomatic protection.1054 This 
option requires that a national of a State is injured by another State that is breaching minimum 
standards of conduct. Such a breach could occur, for example, if citizens of a foreign State are among 
the victims of a disaster and the affected State is completely overwhelmed with the situation but refuses 
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international humanitarian assistance, which would be necessary for the survival of the victims. 
However, by nature of this concept, if the claim were successful, this would only mean that the affected 
State has to guarantee a minimum standard for the foreign nationals and not its own citizens.1055 This 
would not reflect the same purpose as, for example, cessation or the unilateral means of retorsion or 
countermeasures, all of which would aim in this situation to protect all victims of the particular 
disaster, regardless of their nationality.  
 
 
1055  Report of the International Law Commission, fifty-eigth session (1 May - 9 June and 3 July - 11 August 
2006), GAOR, 61st sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/61/10, 16 Article 1. 
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2.Responsibilities and Duties of the State in the Aftermath 
This second section of Chapter V deals with the question of what the duties of the affected States are 
towards the victims of a natural disaster when the emergency situation is cooling down. This part 
focuses on the question of protecting IDPs, as many victims might end up displaced in the aftermath 
of a natural disaster. The first section lays out the concept of being internally displaced, while the 
second discusses the applicable hard and soft-law instruments, and the third finally examines the 
question of protecting IDPs in the aftermath of a natural disaster.  
 
 
2.1. IDPs: Basic concept  
Before examining the legal instruments that are available for the protection of IDPs, it is necessary to 
explain what exactly the concept of an IDP, and thus of internal displacement, means. This 
understanding is important in the determination of the applicable law, especially with regard to the 
question of whether IDPs enjoy the same protection as refugees, as granted by the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, since IDPs and refugees have much in common.  
The term IDP is defined by the UN in its Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (Guiding 
Principles) as 
“persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes of places 
of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid effects of armed conflict, situations 
of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have 
not crossed an internationally recognized State border.”1056 
To begin with, this definition from the UN makes clear that the 1951 Refugee Convention is not 
applicable to IDPs. The first and most obvious reason for this exclusion is that IDPs do not cross any 
internationally recognised borders and thus stay internal to a particular State. The 1951 Refugee 
Convention requires that a person crosses a border in order to qualify as a refugee.1057 Secondly, the 
motives behind the act of leaving differ. The Guiding Principles state that the persons in question 
leave their homes because of avoiding the effects of armed conflicts, situations of generalised violence, 
human rights violations and, for this research most importantly, natural disasters. The 1951 Refugee 
Convention, on the other hand, names five specific grounds for persecution because of which a person 
who leaves a country can be considered a refugee: race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion.1058 Consequently, the IDPs do not enjoy the same 
protection as persons who are granted refugee status.1059 Therefore, it is necessary to determine what 
kind of protection IDPs enjoy and where it is regulated. Both aspects are discussed below.  
 
 
 
1056  Report of the Represenative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted pursant to 
Comission resolution 1997/39, 54th sess, Agenda Item 9(d), UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (11 February 
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2.2. Regulating hard and soft-law instruments 
It is important to note that the specific law governing IDPs is covered only with a hard-law instrument 
on the African continent.1060 The main global instrument, by contrast, is a soft-law instrument: the 
Guiding Principles.1061 Because the Guiding Principles were established in a timely manner before 
the Kampala Convention was adopted, the Guiding Principles are discussed first. Afterwards, this 
section moves on to the Kampala Convention and other specific human rights instruments that make 
reference to IDPs. 
 
2.2.1. Global protection: The guiding principles on internal displacement 
Internally displaced persons become a part of the international agenda during the 1990s when the Cold 
War was over, and several civil wars were emerging.1062 Within a decade, the estimated number of 
internally displaced persons increased, between 1982 to 1992, by about 20 times: from around 1 
million persons to 20–25 million persons.1063  
That there was a protection gap became clear when humanitarian actors tried to help these affected 
persons in need, but there were no clear rules on this issue.1064 In order to untangle this issue, the 
Human Rights Commission requested the secretary-general to appoint a special representative who 
should examine the at that time the current legal framework applicable to IDPs.1065 Francis Deng was 
appointed and submitted his first report in 1993.1066 In this report, Deng examines the causes of 
displacement and the effects of internal displacement on the full enjoyment of human rights.1067 The 
report also contains a comprehensive examination of the rights of IDPs.1068 The report ends with the 
conclusion that there was no clear statement on the rights of IDPs. Additionally, also the fact that 
international standards for both human rights and humanitarian law do not apply during all 
circumstances, e.g. humanitarian law that is only applicable for displacement caused by an armed 
conflict, or human rights that can be limited under certain circumstances.1069 Deng also points out that 
there is a need for clear guidelines and that such guidelines would solely be a clarification of existing 
 
1060  The only regional legal instruments for the protection of IDPs is the Kampala Convention. 
1061  Report of the Represenative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted pursant to 
Comission resolution 1997/39, 54th sess, Agenda Item 9(d), UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (11 February 
1998) Annex 1 ('Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement'). 
1062  Roberta Cohen, 'The guiding principles on internal displacement: An innovation in international standard 
setting' (2004) 10(4) Global Governance 459, 459. 
1063  ibid 460. citing: Roberta Cohen and Francis M Deng, Masses in flight: the global crisis of internal 
displacement (Brookings Institution Press, 1998) 3, 32. 
1064  Cohen, 'The guiding principles on internal displacement: An innovation in international standard setting', 
above n 1062, 461. 
1065  Commission on Human Rights, Internally displaced persons, 1992/73, 55 mtg, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/RES/1992/73 (5 March 1992), para 2. 
1066  Commission on Human Rights, Further promotion and encouragement of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, including the question of the programme and methods of work of the commission, 49th sess, 
Annex 1 ('Comperhensive study prepared by Mr. Francis M. Deng, Representative of the Secretary-General 
on the human rights issue related to internally displaced persons, pursuant to Commission on Human Rights 
resolution 1992/73'). 
1067  ibid 5-11, 11-19. 
1068  ibid 21-7. 
1069  ibid 26. 
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human rights obligations, which are in particular at stake for IDPs.1070 It was, however, not until 1998 
that the Guiding Principles were introduced by Deng to the UN.1071 
The Guiding Principles were never adopted into a treaty and thus stayed a soft-law instrument. This 
decision was made intentionally.1072 There were three main reason: Firstly, there was not enough 
government support for the adoption of a treaty, since the matter was very sensitive. Secondly, time 
was another issue, since the adoption of a new treaty may take decades, and given the dramatic 
circumstances, the international community was in need of an immediate solution. Thirdly, there was 
no need to formulate new rights, because the protection for IDPs was basically already there and just 
needed to be brought together and tailored to the needs of IDPs.1073 After the submission of the Guiding 
Principles to the UN, they slowly started to enjoy acceptance from governments, NGOs and UN 
agencies.1074 Yet, it took until the 2005 World Summit for the Guiding Principles to receive 
affirmation that they constitute “an important international framework for the protection of internally 
displaced persons” and that the States “resolve to take effective measures to increase the protection of 
internally displaced persons.”1075  
The substantive content of the Guiding Principles will be explored in relation to the case of IDPs in 
the context of natural disasters in the respective section below. First, however, the Kampala 
Convention, as the first regional binding instrument with regard to IDPs, is addressed.  
 
2.2.2. Regional protection: Kampala Convention 
The Kampala Convention was adopted in 2009 in Kampala, Uganda, under the umbrella of the African 
Union.1076 It is the first regional instrument that specifically deals with the protection of IDP.1077 That 
Africa takes over a pioneering role with regard to the protection of IDPs is not surprising. It was 
estimated in 2012 that Africa is the home to around 40% of all worldwide IDPs.1078 In 2016, the Sub-
Saharan region was again the place where about 38% of conflict and violence related IDPs was 
found.1079 With regard to displacement caused by natural disasters, on the other hand, South East Asia 
is the most affected region world-wide.1080  
 
1070 ibid. 
1071  see: Report of the Represenative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted pursant to 
Comission resolution 1997/39, 54th sess, Agenda Item 9(d), UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (11 February 
1998) Annex 1 ('Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement'); see for a comperhensive discussion on the 
evolution of the Guiding Principles: Walter Kälin, 'The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and 
the search for a universal framework of protection for internally displaced persons' in Vincent Chetail and 
Bauloz Céline (eds), Research Handbook on International Law and Migration (Edward Elgar, 2014) 612, 
613-7. 
1072  Cohen, 'The guiding principles on internal displacement: An innovation in international standard setting', 
above n 1062, 464-5. 
1073  ibid. 
1074  ibid 467. 
1075  2005 World Summit Outcome, GA Res 60/1, 60th sess, Agenda Item 46 and 120, UN Doc A/RES/60/1 (24 
October 2005 ), para 132; Kälin, above n 1071, 612.  
1076  Moetsi Duchatellier and Catherine Phuong, 'The African contribution to the protection of internally 
displaced persons: A commentary on the 2009 Kampala Convention' in Vincent Chetail and Céline Bauloz 
(eds)ibid. 650, 650. 
1077  ibid. 
1078  ibid. 
1079  Internal Displacement Monitoring Center and Norwegian Refugee Council, Global Report on Internal 
Displacement 2017 (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 2017) 12. 
1080  ibid 33. 
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In 2006, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region took place. The outcome of this 
conference was the adoption of the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes 
Region (Great Lakes Pact).1081 As the name of the instruments suggests, its purpose is, firstly, to 
“provide a legal framework between the Member States” and secondly, to “create conditions for 
security, stability, and sustainable development between the Member States.”1082 In order to achieve 
this, the Great Lakes Pact demands the establishment of 10 additional protocols.1083 Two of them deal, 
in particular, with the protection of IDPs: The Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to Internally 
Displaced Persons and The Protocol on Property Rights of Returning Persons.1084 At the same time, 
the Great Lakes Pact also asks States to adopt and implement the Guiding Principles.1085 This legal 
instrument, however, is valid only for the Great Lakes Region, and as such, it encompasses the 
following 12 member States: “Republic of Angola, Republic of Burundi, Central African Republic, 
Republic of the Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of Kenya, Republic of Rwanda, 
Republic of South Sudan, Republic of Sudan, United Republic of Tanzania, Republic of Uganda, and 
the Republic of Zambia.”1086 
Aware of these developments, the African Union considered around the same time of the adoption of 
a convention that should be applicable across the region. In 2004 the African Union Executive Council 
decided that firstly it should be ensured that IDPs enjoy an appropriate framework that ensures their 
adequate assistance and protection.1087 In the same session, the council also decided that these kind of 
needs, specific to IDPs and their assistance, should be protected by a separate legal instrument.1088 
Later, in 2009, the Kampala Summit was held, the outcome of which was the Kampala Declaration, 
in turn leading to the Kampala Convention.1089 The convention was strongly inspired by the Guiding 
Principles and adopts therefore the same definition of IDP1090 as well as the same structure of 
provisions before and during displacement, as well as certain provisions for returning and for family 
reunion.1091  
 
1081  The Pact on Security, Stability and Development For the Great Lakes Region, opened for signature 15 
December 2006, 46 ILM 175 (entered into force 1 June 2008) ('the Great Lakes Pact'). 
1082  ibid Article 2(a) and (c); see for a comperhensive overview: Duchatellier and Phuong, above n 1076, 652. 
1083  the Great Lakes Pact Article 5-14. 
1084  ibid Article 12 and 13; all documents can be found under: International Conference on the Great Lakes 
Region,  <http://www.icglr.org/index.php/en/>; for a discussion see also: Duchatellier and Phuong, above 
n 1076, 652-4. 
1085  the Great Lakes Pact Article 12 in fine. 
1086  ibid Article 1(d). 
1087  Decision on the Situation of Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons, AU Doc. EX/CL/Dec.127 (V), 
(2004), para 8. 
1088  AU Executive Council, Decision on the Meeting of Experts on the Review of OAU/AU Treaties, 
EX.CL/Dec.129 (V) (2004), para 4(i); see also for a comprehensive overview on the topic: Duchatellier and 
Phuong, above n 1076, 654-5. 
1089  African Union, Kampala Declaration on Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, 
Ext/Assembly/AU/PA/Draft/Decl.(I) Rev.1, (23 October 2009); Duchatellier and Phuong, above n 1076, 
655. 
1090  Kampala Convention Article 1(k); Duchatellier and Phuong, above n 655-6 
1091  Kampala Convention Article 3: general provisions, Article 4: protection rom internal displacement, Articles 
5,7 and 9: protection and assistance during internal displacement, ; Report of the Represenative of the 
Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted pursant to Comission resolution 1997/39, 54th sess, 
Agenda Item 9(d), UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (11 February 1998) Annex 1, Principles 1-4: general 
provisions, Principles 5-9: protection from internal displacement, Principles 10-23: protection and 
assistance during displacement ('Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement'); see also: Maria 
Stavropoulou, 'The Kampala Convention and protection from arbitrary displacement' (2010)(36) Forced 
Migration Review 62. 
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The substantive provisions of the Kampala Convention with regard to the protection of IDPs in the 
aftermath of a natural disaster will be explored in the section below.  
 
 
2.3. Protection of IDPs in the aftermath of a disaster 
As demonstrated above, on a global level, only a soft-law instrument is applicable, while in Africa, on 
a regional basis, a hard-law instrument, the Kampala Convention, exists. This section will examine 
both instruments, the rights of IDPs and the duties of states towards IDPs in the aftermath of a natural 
disaster. 
Persons who are displaced experience different protection and assistance needs than people who are 
not displaced. Both the Guiding Principles and the Kampala Convention address this differential need, 
yet slightly differently. The focus of the Guiding Principles is primarily to remind States that human 
rights obligations apply also to IDPs, and by extension it lists specific human rights that are at stake 
for IDPs.1092 The Kampala Convention has stronger language and does not simply remind States that 
IDPs enjoy the same human rights but rather names specific obligations and duties of States towards 
IDPs.1093 With regard to the rights guaranteed or which the States get reminded, the Kampala 
Convention takes over most of the rights guaranteed within the Guiding Principles.1094  
Section III of the Guiding Principles deals with the situation during displacement. This section, 
basically, as described above, reminds States that human rights are applicable to IDPs and thus 
explains what those rights mean in the context of internal displacement.1095 The majority of those 
principles in this section relate to internal displacement caused by conflict; however, most of these 
principles are nonetheless also applicable to disaster related displacement.1096 In the context of this 
section, thus, after the emergency phase has cooled down, in particular the following principles are of 
interest: 
Principle 18 reinstates the right to an adequate standard of living, meaning that the affected State needs 
to safeguard citizens’ access to essential food and water, basic shelter and housing, appropriate 
clothing and essential medical services and sanitation.1097 The Guiding Principles also recognise the 
importance of the right to property in Principle 21. This provision especially stresses, that the property 
that has been left behind by IDPs “should be protected against destruction and arbitrary and illegal 
appropriation, occupation or use.”1098 Furthermore, Principle 23, which embodies the right to 
education, is important in this context. This principle states that, in particular, children should be given 
free and compulsory education, at least at the primary level; that positive effort should be taken to 
ensure the participation also of girls and women in the educational programmes; and finally, that there 
should be education and training facilities available in camps especially for adolescents and 
 
1092  Report of the Represenative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted pursant to 
Comission resolution 1997/39, 54th sess, Agenda Item 9(d), UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (11 February 
1998) Annex 1, Principle1, Principles 10-23 ('Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement'). 
1093  Kampala Convention Articles 5 and 9. 
1094  Duchatellier and Phuong, above n 1076, 659. 
1095  Walter Kälin, 'The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the search for a universal framework 
of protection for internally displaced persons' in Vincent Chetail and Bauloz Céline (eds)ibid. 612, 619. 
1096  ibid. 
1097  Report of the Represenative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted pursant to 
Comission resolution 1997/39, 54th sess, Agenda Item 9(d), UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (11 February 
1998) Annex 1, Principle 18(2)(a)-(d) ('Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement'). 
1098  ibid Principle 21(3). 
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women.1099 Yet, of course, the other principles are also relevant when it comes to IDPs in the context 
of natural disasters, such as Principle 10 or Principle 17, each of which deal with the right to life and 
the right to family, respectively. 
The Guiding Principles offer a perfect basis for governments of affected States to deal with IDPs that 
are displaced because of a natural disaster. As mentioned above, this instrument does not introduce 
new obligations; rather, it restates existing human rights law and explains the duties of States thereof 
with regard to IDPs. An increasing number of States, UN organisations and NGOs are applying the 
Guiding Principles, so all those stakeholders acknowledge the importance of the Guiding Principles 
and their support of them.1100 Because of this growing support, the Guiding Principles play a crucial 
role, even if they are only a soft-law instrument. Although it is most likely too premature to consider 
the Guiding Principles as customary international law, they still bring together already-existing 
customary international law and thus, despite their status as soft-law instruments, their importance and 
success cannot be neglected.1101 
 
  
 
1099  ibid Principle 23(2)-(4). 
1100  Protection of and assistance to internally displaced persons, GA Res 66/165, 66th sess, Agenda Item 69(b), 
UN Doc A/RES/66/165 (22 March 2012 ), para 12; Protection of and assistance to internally displaced 
persons, GA Res 64/162, 64th sess, Agenda Item 69(b), UN Doc A/RES/64/162 (7 March 2010), para 10; 
Protection of and assistance to internally displaced persons, GA Res 62/153, 62nd sess, Agenda Item 70(b), 
UN Doc A/RES/62/153 (6 March 2008), para 10; Kälin, above n 1095, 621. 
1101  for a comperhensive discussion on this topic see: Kälin, above n 1095, 627-30. 
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3.Conclusion 
The main conclusion from this part is that a distinct human right to receive humanitarian assistance 
does not exist. Humanitarian assistance must instead be viewed as the means to fulfil underlying 
human rights obligations, in particular deriving from survival rights such as, most importantly, the 
right to life. The UNGA also made the connection between the denial of basic humanitarian assistance 
for the victims of natural disasters and the infringement of their right to life.  
Although the existence of a distinct human right to receive humanitarian assistance has to be denied, 
the affected State still has the primary obligation to protect the victims of disasters, and if it is unable 
to cope with the disaster situation by itself, it has the obligation to seek international assistance. Both 
of these duties derive from the affected State’s sovereignty, which not only entails rights but also 
obligations. If, however, a State does not follow this obligation, offers help to the victims and does not 
seek international assistance while being obviously overwhelmed, the international community has 
several options. As humanitarian assistance is the means to fulfil core human rights obligation, 
interstate claims and relevant provisional measures are an option that can be applied in Europe and in 
the Americas. If the Draft Articles come into force, this kind of behaviour of the affected State would 
most likely constitute a breach of the embodied provisions. As such, the doors open for secondary 
rules, as found within the ARSIWA, which clearly allow countermeasures as a non-judicial method. 
Cessation would be also a possibility, while being a judicial option. Outside of the ARSIWA, retorsion 
and diplomatic protection claims are possibilities that have not been discussed in detail in this research.  
In the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in 2008, in particular the R2P was widely discussed. This right 
cannot, however, be enforced by foreign States . First of all, the conduct of the affected State would 
need to be a crime against humanity, and secondly, it is not in favour of the victims, if in particular 
Western States take military action against the State, since this action could lead to more suffering, 
leaving R2P as only an ultima ratio option.  
With regard to the protection of victims of natural disasters in the aftermath, in particular the rules 
governing IDPs are relevant, since natural disasters are one of the most predominant grounds for 
internal displacement. In this regard, the African continent is the only regional system that offers 
protection to IDPs with a special legal instrument. Globally, only the Guiding Principles are 
applicable. These principles constitute only soft law, though, and thus not legally binding. Their 
qualification as  an leglly binding instrument is, however, not necessary, since these guidelines serve 
as reminder of human rights obligations also protect IDPs and thus explain what the content of already-
existing human rights obligations mean in the case of internal displacement. Therefore, the Guiding 
Principles serve as an ideal instrument for States that shows them how to deal with the situation of 
internal displacement.  
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Chapter VI:   The Responsibility of the Affected State before 
the Disaster 
The relevant chapter above discusses early warning and disaster risk reduction in detail.1102 However, 
it considers it mostly from a financial perspective. This chapter deals with the question of disaster 
preparedness and early warning from the affected State’s perspective and thus examines its 
responsibilities and duties. It first reviews disaster prevention in general and how it is situated in 
international law and, in particular, in international human rights law. The chapter then moves on to 
the possible obligation of States to provide early warning and examines this possibility with regard to 
the relevant case law of the ECtHR.  
 
  
 
1102  See above chapter: The Promotion of Early Warning Mechanisms with UN Policies on page 50. 
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1.Disaster Prevention and International Law 
Disaster prevention is described by the UNISDR as “The outright avoidance of adverse impacts of 
hazards and related disasters.1103 As such, disaster prevention refers to actions that occur before the 
calamitous event strikes and thus leads to a disaster situation.1104 This definition is in its essence vague 
and needs further specification in order to determine what kind of actions are meant. Eduardo 
Valencia-Ospina, the Special Rapporteur on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, 
stresses in his sixth report that disaster prevention is an overarching principle that encompasses 
disaster preparedness and disaster mitigation.1105 Therefore, in order to discuss disaster prevention in 
the context of international law, it is necessary to determine the two aspects of disaster prevention. 
After these two aspects have been discussed, this section moves on to place disaster prevention into 
the context of international law.  
 
 
1.1. Disaster preparedness and disaster mitigation 
In order to place disaster prevention correctly into international law, the notion of disaster 
preparedness needs first to be examined. As already explored, disaster prevention encompasses both 
disaster preparedness and disaster mitigation. First, a close look on disaster preparedness is given, 
followed by an examination of disaster mitigation.  
 
 
1.1.1. Disaster preparedness 
Disaster preparedness is one of the two aspects of disaster prevention. In order to fully understand the 
term, a close look at possible definitions is necessary. Yet, there exists more than only one 
understanding of disaster preparedness: in particular the UNISDR and the Special Rapporteur on the 
Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters use different approaches.  
This research already defined early warning mechanisms and disaster prevention according to the 
understanding of the UNISDR.1106 As such, their definition of disaster preparedness is considered at 
this stage. The UNISDR defines disaster preparedness thus:  
 “The knowledge and capacities developed by governments, professional response and recovery 
organizations, communities and individuals to effectively anticipate, respond to, and recover from, the 
impacts of likely, imminent or current hazard events or conditions.”1107 
This understanding of the notion creates a strong focus on the respective knowledge and capacities of 
all involved actors, which obviously implies a subjective element. This subjective element is 
demonstrated through the UNISDR’s further explanations: Preparedness has the aim of enhancing 
capacities in advance through appropriate actions, which are not only of institutional and legislative 
nature.1108   
 
1103  UNISDR, UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction, above n 404,22. 
1104  ibid.  
1105  Valencia-Ospina, Special Rapporteur, Sixth report on the protection of persons in th event of disasters, 65th 
sess, UN Doc A/CN.4/662 (3 May 2013), 14[40]. 
1106  For early warning mechanisms see above Financing Early Warning Mechanisms on page 49 
1107  UNISDR, UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction, above n 404, 21. 
1108  ibid.  
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Consequently, according to the UNISDR, disaster preparedness includes, among other things, first of 
all the risk assessment of various hazards and in this regard also the connection of hazards to early 
warning mechanisms. It includes, secondly, advanced measures for the management of the emergency 
relief phase, such as the stockpiling of supplies and equipment, the development of coordination 
arrangements and the associated training of personnel.1109 
The Special Rapporteur on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, on the other hand, 
focuses his understanding of disaster preparedness not to the same extent on enhancing capacity and 
knowledge, but rather on the management of resources that allow effective response, such as early 
warning systems and evacuations.1110 
Given the definition of ‘disaster’ used in this research, it is clear that capacity for disaster response is 
of crucial relevance.1111 The capacity element decides whether the calamitous event leads to a disaster 
situation that requires international attention. Thus, neglecting this capacity element when talking of 
disaster preparedness seems unjust: in order to be prepared for a calamitous event and its 
consequences, response capacity needs to be built. This capacity includes the knowledge of individuals 
on how to respond to such a calamitous event and the means to be prepared. Therefore, for the purpose 
of this research, the understanding of the UNISDR with regard to disaster preparedness is more apt, 
since it includes a subjective element and therefore focuses on the enhancement of the capacity to 
respond to a calamitous event, which is important according to the definition of ‘disaster’ in this 
research.1112  
The international community has also stressed the importance of disaster preparedness. The Sendai 
Framework, for example, explicitly deals with the disaster preparedness. It declares disaster 
preparedness as one of the top priorities for 2015 – 2030.1113 The framework clearly explains that 
preparedness is necessary in order for a society to bounce back accordingly and that preparedness is 
essential to ensure effective response, thus also emergency relief.1114 At the same time, the framework 
stresses the link between all phases of the disaster cycle, and as such that disaster preparedness is 
happening not only during one phase rather predominates in all of them.1115 Still, this is a soft-law 
instrument and is therefore not legally binding. In terms of possible future treaty law, the importance 
of disaster preparedness is furthermore recognised. Article 9 of the Draft Articles deals with the 
question of disaster preparedness and explains the duties of States in this regard. This provision clearly 
defines that it is each State’s own responsibility to minimize risk and prepare for natural disasters.1116 
This preparation includes, inter alia, the adoption of appropriate legislation and policies.1117 Thus, the 
importance of being prepared for a natural disaster cannot be neglected, as is also demonstrated by the 
awareness of international policy makers in respective instruments and future instruments. The 
questions regarding the position of disaster preparedness in international law is examined together 
with disaster prevention in general in the relevant section below.  
 
1109  ibid.  
1110  Valencia-Ospina, Special Rapporteur, Sixth report on the protection of persons in th event of disasters, 65th 
sess, UN Doc A/CN.4/662 (3 May 2013), 13 [38]. 
1111  For the definition see above chapter: Disasters Defined on page 5 and following.  
1112  Also the ILC decided to follow the UNISDR’s terminology: Report of the International Law Commission - 
Sixty-eight session (2 May - 10 June and 4 July - 12 August 2016), GAOR, 71st sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc 
A/71/10, 49. 
1113  Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, GA Res 69/283, 69th sess, 92nd plenary mtg, 
Agenda Item 19 (c), UN Doc A/RES/69/283 (23 June 2015), 8[20], 16-8 [32]-[34]. 
1114  ibid 16 [32]. 
1115  ibid. 
1116  Report of the International Law Commission - Sixty-eight session (2 May - 10 June and 4 July - 12 August 
2016), GAOR, 71st sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/71/10, 15 Article 9(1). 
1117  ibid. 
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1.1.2. Disaster mitigation 
The second aspect of disaster prevention is disaster mitigation. In this context, mitigation enjoys a 
different understanding than it does in the context of climate change, where it means essentially the 
reduction of CO2 emissions.1118 In the context of disaster mitigation, ‘mitigation’  means ‘the lessening 
or limitation of the adverse impacts of hazards and related disasters.’1119 Thus, contrary to the 
understanding of mitigation in the context of climate change, the notion deployed here does not aim 
to lessen the cause of natural disasters but rather aims to reduce their adverse effects. This aim means, 
with regard to possible measures, that disaster mitigation refers to both structural and non-structural 
measures. Examples include engineering techniques, hazard-resistant constructions, the improvement 
of environmental policies and public awareness of the possible danger.1120  
The comparison of disaster mitigation and the overarching principle of disaster prevention reveals that 
the two notions have similar definitions. Thus, the terms ‘disaster mitigation’ and ‘disaster prevention’ 
are interchangeable, depending on the specific situation.1121 However, disaster mitigation means 
disaster prevention in a stricter sense, while disaster mitigation does not include a subjective element, 
although this element is embodied within the notion of disaster preparedness. This subjective element 
is indispensable for the ‘outright avoidance of adverse impacts of hazards and related disasters.’1122 
The main and obvious reason for its importance is that not only objective measures such as hazard-
resistant constructions are necessary. The subjective point of enhancing the knowledge of people with 
regard to the danger and how to behave in an emergency situation – for example seeking shelter 
appropriately and enhancing the capacity to deal with these kinds of situations – is as important if not 
more important. Therefore, the umbrella of disaster prevention encompasses not only disaster 
mitigation but rather also includes disaster preparedness.  
 
 
1.2. Disaster prevention in international law 
This research has dealt already with the question of preventive measures above, in the context of 
reconstruction. There, it was argued that reconstruction that aims to build back better reflects a 
preventive measure.1123 This chapter, on the other hand, takes a different perspective, assessing the 
duties of the affected State towards the victims of a natural disaster. As such, this section examines 
first how disaster prevention is situated in international law in general. The following sections look 
then more closely at the State’s obligation to provide early warning.  
 
1118  See for more details above Chapter: International climate law regime on page 37; see also: UNISDR, 
UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction, above n 404, 19-20. 
1119  ibid.; Report of the International Law Commission - Sixty-eight session (2 May - 10 June and 4 July - 12 
August 2016), GAOR, 71st sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/71/10, 49.; see also above Chapter: Risk mitigation 
on page 15.  
1120  Valencia-Ospina, Special Rapporteur, Sixth report on the protection of persons in th event of disasters, 65th 
sess, UN Doc A/CN.4/662 (3 May 2013), 13-4 [39]; UNISDR, UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk 
Reduction, above n 404, 19 – 20. 
1121  see also: UNISDR, UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction, above n  404, 22. 
1122  ibid. 
1123  See above: Reconstruction and build back better as a preventive measure on page 84.  
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The duty to prevent harm can be recognised as a general principle of international law.1124 Firstly, the 
UN Charter itself suggests this recognition. The charter states that one purpose of the UN is  
“to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for 
the prevention and removal of threats to the peace […].”1125  
Secondly, the ILC concluded the same, while dealing with the topic Prevention of Transboundary 
Harm from Hazardous Activities. It considered the duty to prevent harm as a ‘well-established 
principle’.1126 Indeed, the duty to prevent harm is found in both international human rights law and in 
international environmental law.1127 The environmental aspect is discussed above in the context of 
reconstruction.1128 Since this chapter deals mainly with rights and duties in the vertical dimension, a 
stronger focus lies on international human rights law. 
International human rights law offers guidance for the affected State on how to manage pre- and post-
disaster situations in the vertical dimension, thus with regard to the victims.1129 As explained, IHRL 
offers each right in three dimensions: the obligations to respect, fulfil and protect. The latter embodies 
the State’s duty to prevent human rights violations. This aspect of the duty to protect is described 
above.1130 Nevertheless, it is important to repeat this concept, since it is a fundament of the following 
arguments.  
The duty to prevent human rights violations is embodied in the State’s duty to protect individuals from 
human rights violations. This duty to protect is, for example, expressly required within the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention), as well as the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CAT).1131 At the regional level, the duty to prevent is enshrined in the respective court’s 
jurisprudence. The IACtHR describes the duty to prevent human rights violations in its landmark 
decision Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras.1132 In that decision, the IACtHR explained that even if the 
act that is violating the human rights of an individual cannot be traced back to the respondent State 
but rather to a third party, the respondent State is still liable because of its lack of due diligence to 
prevent the violation.1133 The court goes on to explain what preventive measures, among other things, 
include: all means that are of legal, administrative and cultural nature that ensure the promotion and 
protection of human rights and that all acts which violate human rights are recognised as illegal.1134 
 
1124  Valencia-Ospina, Special Rapporteur, Sixth report on the protection of persons in th event of disasters, 65th 
sess, UN Doc A/CN.4/662 (3 May 2013), 14 [40]. 
1125  UN Charter Article 1(1); see also: Valencia-Ospina, Special Rapporteur, Sixth report on the protection of 
persons in th event of disasters, 65th sess, UN Doc A/CN.4/662 (3 May 2013), 14 [40]. 
1126  Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-third session, (23 April - 1 June and 2 July - 10 August 
2001), GAOR, 56th sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/56/10(SUPP), 378 [98(4); Valencia-Ospina, Special 
Rapporteur, Sixth report on the protection of persons in th event of disasters, 65th sess, UN Doc A/CN.4/662 
(3 May 2013), 14[40]. 
1127  see also: Valencia-Ospina, Special Rapporteur, Sixth report on the protection of persons in th event of 
disasters, 65th sess, UN Doc A/CN.4/662 (3 May 2013), 14 [41]. 
1128  See above Chapter: Customary international law: No-harm rule and polluter pays principle on page 83. 
1129  See above in a more general way the Chapter: International human rights law on page 31. 
1130  See above Chapter: Application of human rights prior to the disastrous event on page 34. 
1131  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for signature 9 December 
1948, 78 UNTS 277 (entered into force 12 January 1951) Article 1 ('Genocide Convention'); Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature 
10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987) Article 2(1) ('CAT'); Valencia-Ospina, 
Special Rapporteur, Sixth report on the protection of persons in th event of disasters, 65th sess, UN Doc 
A/CN.4/662 (3 May 2013), 15 [43]. 
1132  Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras [1988] IACtHR Series C No 4. 
1133  ibid [172]. 
1134  ibid [175]. 
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The ECtHR follows a similar approach. The ECtHR recognised under the positive obligations of the 
right to life, that a State has to take preventive measures, in particular, to avoid dangerous activities.1135 
This was later reaffirmed by the court in a case in which a mudslide caused the death of several 
individuals in Russia.1136 
International human rights law, therefore, again serves as a comprehensive guiding instrument for 
States, also in the situation prior to a calamitous event. As described above with regard to humanitarian 
assistance, several human rights are at stake in a disaster situation.1137 Thus, States have a duty to 
prevent human right violations caused by disasters and, thus, have to undertake preventive measures 
– especially since it is well known that climate change is increasing the frequency of extreme weather 
events, such as storms and floods, which can create disaster situations. Above, this research already 
discussed the question of financing early warning mechanisms. The research argued that both the 
developed world and emerging markets have an obligation under international law to financially assist 
disaster-prone developing States with regard to the establishment of early warning mechanisms.1138 
This chapter offers a different perspective, examining in the following sections the duty of States to 
provide early warning.   
 
1135  Öneryldiz v. Turkey [2004] XIII Eur Court HR 79, 115 [90] ('Öneryldiz v. Turkey'). 
1136  Budayeva and Others v. Russia [2008] II Eur Court HR 267, 289 [130] ('Budayeva v. Russia'). 
1137  See above Chapter: The Responsibility of the Affected State During and in the Aftermath of a Disaster on 
page 105.The Responsibility of the Affected State During and in the Aftermath of a Disaster 
1138  See above Financing Early Warning Mechanisms on page 49. 
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2.Possible Obligation to Provide Early Warning 
This section discusses the possible right to receive early warning. Already in the context of financing 
early warning projects, the important role that early warning mechanisms play was highlighted. Early 
warning mechanism not only save lives, but also reduce economic loss by up to 50%.1139 Thus, early 
warning mechanisms play a significant role in reducing casualties and supporting the affected State’s 
recovery after such a calamitous event.  
In order to establish a possible duty of States to provide early warning, a close look at human rights is 
necessary. As such, the sections below first discuss the right to life, which is mainly triggered by the 
neglect of early warning measures.  
 
 
2.1. Early warning mechanisms and human rights 
Here, the question is whether neglecting early warning before a calamitous event strikes results in a 
human rights violation. This question is pursued in this section with a focus on the right to life. The 
second part of this section looks at the ground-breaking case law from the ECtHR, which has already 
dealt on two occasions with natural and human-made disasters. 
 
 
2.1.1. Right to life 
The chapter above concerning the obligation to provide humanitarian assistance describes already 
where the right to life is anchored and the fact that the right to life entails positive obligations.1140 Yet, 
for the following arguments, it is necessary to repeat and adjust the notion of the right to life to early 
warnings.  
The right to life is anchored in all major global human rights treaties as well as in all regional treaties: 
Article 6 ICCPR, Article 2 ECHR, Article 4 ACHR and Article 4 ACHPR. This right imparts not only 
negative obligations but also includes positive obligations.1141 In the context of disaster prevention, 
and thus the establishment of early warning mechanisms in particular, the positive obligations are of 
importance. However, in the context of this chapter, specifically in the examination of the case law of 
the ECtHR in the section below, this section deals mainly with regional systems in Europe and in the 
Americas.  
 
2.1.1.1. Positive obligations of the right to life in the European system 
The ECtHR clearly states with regard to the right to life that a State has “not only to refrain from the 
intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those 
within its jurisdiction.”1142 The court explains further that the right to life implies  
 
1139  Hallegatte et al, above n 131, 125; see above Financing Early Warning Mechanisms on page 49. 
1140  See above Chapter: Right to life on page 107. 
1141  Report of the Human Rights Committee, Supp No 40, UN Doc A/37/40(SUPP) (22 September 1982) Annex 
V, 93 ('General comments under article 40, paragraph 4 of the Covenant'); Budayeva and Others v. Russia 
[2008] II Eur Court HR 267, 288-9 [128] - [129] ('Budayeva v. Russia'). 
1142  L.C.B. v The United Kingdom [1998] III Eur Court HR, [36] ('L.C.B. v The United Kingdom'); Osman v The 
United Kingdom [1998] VIII Eur Court HR, [115] ('Osman v The United Kingdom'). 
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“a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an 
individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual .”1143  
Thus, the right to life embodies, according the ECtHR, the positive obligation to protect, which can 
be translated into the obligation to prevent the death of individuals within the State’s jurisdiction 
through appropriate safeguarding steps. Yet, whether a state is to be held liable for a failure to prevent 
a violation of the right to life of an individual is clarified through the so-called Osman Test.1144 This 
test was developed by the ECtHR in the judgment of the case Osman v The United Kingdom in the 
year 1998.1145 In this case, the court decided that, next to the fact that the right to life contains positive 
obligations, the State can be liable for these positive obligations only if the following conditions are 
met: 
 “[…] it must be established to its satisfaction that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the 
time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals 
from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their 
powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk.”1146 
Thus, the requirements are (1) the existence of a risk to the right to life that is (2) real and (3) 
immediate, and that (4) concerns an identified individual or individuals and, finally, (5) where the 
State knew or should have known of this risk.1147  
Since its adoption in 1998, this test has been applied several times and extended by the ECtHR.1148 In 
general, there are three groups of application for the test: (a) risks caused by non-state actors, (b) risks 
which are non-attributable to a specific actor, for example accidents, and (c) risks that involve the 
State’s conduct.1149 For the case of natural disasters, both the second and the third group are of interest. 
The application of it will be discussed below in the discussion of the relevant case law of the ECtHR 
as it applies to natural and human-made disasters. 
 
2.1.1.2. Positive obligations of the right to life in the Inter-American system 
As explained above, also the ACHR protects the right to life.1150 Similar to the ECtHR, the IACtHR 
recognises positive obligations under the right to life, dating back to one of its first cases, in the year 
1988.1151 There, the court stated that Article 4, the right to life, in conjunction with Article 1, the 
obligation to respect rights,  
‘imply an obligation on the part of State Parties to take reasonable steps to prevent situations that could 
result in the violation of that right.’1152 
 
1143  Osman v The United Kingdom [1998] VIII Eur Court HR, [115] ('Osman v The United Kingdom'). 
1144  for a comperhensive overview of the Osman test see in general: Franz Christian Ebert and Romina 
Sijniensky, 'Preventing Violations of the Right to Life in the European and the Inter-American Human 
Rights Systems: From the Osman Test to a Coherent Doctrine on Risk Prevention?' (2015) 15(2) Human 
Rights Law Review 343. 
1145  Osman v The United Kingdom [1998] VIII Eur Court HR  ('Osman v The United Kingdom'). 
1146  ibid [116]. 
1147  Ebert and Sijniensky, above n 1144, 347. 
1148  ibid 348. 
1149  citing relevant respective case law: ibid. 
1150  ACHR Article 4(1): “Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by 
law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life”. 
1151  Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras [1988] IACtHR Series C No 4; Ebert and Sijniensky, above n 1144, 352. 
1152  Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras [1988] IACtHR Series C No 4, [188]. 
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Thus, according to the IACtHR a State is liable for a violation of the right to life or any other right 
enshrined in the ACHR if it lacked due diligence that could have prevented this violation.1153  
Later in 2006, the IACtHR included the ECtHR’s approach of the Osman Test into its case law.1154 
Firstly the court stated that the possible attribution to the State depends largely on the specific 
circumstances of the case and the protection required by the individual.1155 In order to define 
afterwards the specific responsibility in that case, the IACtHR considered the ECtHR’s Osman Test 
and stated the following: 
“the Court acknowledges that a State cannot be responsible for all the human rights violations 
committed between individuals within its jurisdiction. Indeed, the nature erga omnes of the treaty-
based guarantee obligations of the States does not imply their unlimited responsibility for all acts or 
deeds of individuals, because its obligations to adopt prevention and protection measures for 
individuals in their relationships with each other are conditioned by the awareness of a situation of 
real and imminent danger for a specific individual or group of individuals and to the reasonable 
possibilities of preventing or avoiding that danger.”1156 
Thus, this means, in consequence, that both the Inter-American and the European system follow a 
similar approach and that the right to life enjoys similar protection, with regard to the protection of an 
individual’s life by the State. What this approach to the protection of the right to life means in the case 
of natural and human-made disasters is explored below with regard to the relevant case law from the 
ECtHR.  
 
 
2.2. Ground-breaking case law of the ECtHR in the case of natural and 
human-made disasters 
The ECtHR delivered two ground-breaking decisions with regard to human-made and natural 
disasters: Öneryildiz v Turkey and Budayeva and Others v Russia.1157 The first deals with a human-
made disaster and the second with a natural disaster. The facts of both cases were already described 
above.1158 This section will mainly focus on the findings of the ECtHR and explain why they are so 
important with regard to the establishment of early warning mechanisms, repeating the most relevant 
aspects of the cases. 
 
2.2.1. Öneryildiz v Turkey 
This case concerned a rubbish tip (i.e. garbage dump) close to Istanbul. The applicant lived with his 
relatives in a slum situated below the rubbish tip. An expert report highlighted that this rubbish site 
demonstrated a risk for the health and lives of the inhabitants of the slums below the rubbish tip. 
However, the inhabitants were not informed, and neither was anything done by the authorities to 
 
1153  ibid [172]; see also for a comprehensive overview: Ebert and Sijniensky, above n 1144, 352. 
1154  Pueblo Bello Massacre v Colombia [2006] IACtHR Series C No 140, [123] – [124]; see also: Ebert and 
Sijniensky, above n 1144, 352-3. 
1155  Pueblo Bello Massacre v Colombia [2006] IACtHR Series C No 140, [116] – [117]. 
1156  ibid [123]; see for a similar analysis: Ebert and Sijniensky, above n 1144, 353. 
1157  Öneryldiz v. Turkey [2004] XIII Eur Court HR 79 ('Öneryldiz v. Turkey'); Budayeva and Others v. Russia 
[2008] II Eur Court HR 267 ('Budayeva v. Russia'). 
1158  See above Chapter: Application of human rights prior to the disastrous event on page 34.  
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reduce the risk. On 28 April 1993, a methane explosion on the rubbish tip caused a landslide of refuse, 
which destroyed around 10 homes in the slums and killed around 39 people.1159 
Although this case does not concern a natural disaster per se, the key findings with regard to the right 
to life are still important and valuable with respect to the discussion below of the Budayeva v Russia 
case.  
The ECtHR firstly stresses that Article 2 embodies not only negative aspects but rather also includes 
positive obligations and that this positive obligation entails above all the obligations to “put in place a 
legislative and administrative framework designed to provide effective deterrence against threats to 
the right to life.”.1160 So far, this was a reaffirmation of the principles of the above-discussed principles 
of the right to life under the ECHR. The court further explains that this principle applies in the context 
of any activity, but in particular with regard to dangerous ones such as those that occur at rubbish 
sites.1161 This particular link to any potential dangerous activity is new.  
Another innovation in this judgment is the court’s assessment that the right to life also embodies 
preventive measures such as, in particular, the public’s right to information.1162 This right was already 
recognised by the court under Article 8 ECHR, which contains the right to private life.1163 In Guerra 
and Others v Italy, the applicant complained that the authorities did not provide any information with 
regard to the danger the nearby chemical factory imposed and that no information was rendered with 
regard to evacuation in the case of an accident which had happened before.1164 The court noted that  
“severe environmental pollution may affect individuals’ well-being and prevent them from enjoying 
their homes in such a way as to affect their private and family life adversely […]. In the instant case 
the applicants waited, right up until the production of fertilisers ceased in 1994, for essential 
information that would have enabled them to assess the risks they and their families might run if they 
continued to live at Manfredonia, a town particularly exposed to danger in the event of an accident at 
the factory. The Court holds, therefore, that the respondent State did not fulfil its obligation to secure 
the applicants’ right to respect for their private and family life, in breach of Article 8 of the 
Convention.”1165 
In Öneryildiz v Turkey the ECtHR relied on this reasoning to establish the public’s right to information 
under the right to life.1166 This rationale justified this elaboration of the content of the right to life 
additionally with the current development in European standards and referred explicitly to Resolution 
1087 (1996) of the Council of Europe, which deals with the consequences of the Chernobyl 
disaster.1167 There, the Council of Europe stated that it believes access to public information is a basic 
human right.1168 
 
1159  Öneryldiz v. Turkey [2004] XIII Eur Court HR 79, 89-100 [9] – [43] ('Öneryldiz v. Turkey'). 
1160  ibid 110 [71], 115 [89]. 
1161  ibid 110 [71], 115 [90]. 
1162  ibid 115 [90]. 
1163  see for an overview on the fundamental right to receive state held information: Wouter Hins and Dirk 
Voorhoof, 'Access to state-held information as a fundamental right under the European Convention on 
Human Rights' (2007) 3(1) European Constitutional Law Review 114. 
1164  Guerra and Others v Italy [1998] I Eur Court HR, [12] – [36] ('Guerra and Others v Italy'). 
1165  ibid [60]. 
1166  Öneryldiz v. Turkey [2004] XIII Eur Court HR 79, 115 [90] ('Öneryldiz v. Turkey'). 
1167  ibid.; Council of Europe, Consequences of the Chernobyl disaster, Resolution 1087 (1996), (26 April 1996). 
1168  Council of Europe, Resolution 1087 (1996), (26 April 1996), para 4. 
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In order to find a violation of the right to life by Turkey in that case, the ECtHR applied with regard 
to the first aspect, namely the failure to take preventive measures, the Osman Test.1169 The court found 
a violation of the right to life by Turkey in both aspects.1170 
 
 
2.2.2. Budayeva v Russia 
Contrary to Öneryildiz v Turkey, the case of Budayeva v Russia concerns a natural disaster and is 
therefore of great relevance to this research. The case is described in brief above; nonetheless, the 
major facts and key findings are discussed here again.1171  
The case concerned a mudslide in the Russian town of Tyranauz that killed eight people. The town is 
prone to mudslides, and these were registered nearly every years; the inhabitants and the local 
authorities were generally aware of the risk. In August 1999, mud and debris flow damaged the dam, 
which protected the town from the mudslides. However, the dam was never repaired, although the 
Mountain Institute, a State agency responsible for monitoring the weather and hazards at high 
altitudes, warned the local authorities on several occasions of the immediate risk the damaged dam 
posed. On 7 July 2000, the Mountain Institute suggested that local authorities set up observation points 
on the Gerhozhansu River in order to monitor the river at all times and thus to issue an emergency 
warning in the case of a mudslide. This suggestion was not implemented. Thus, the disastrous 
mudslide hit Tyranauz in several waves from 18 – 25 July 2000.1172 The applicants claimed that the 
authorities failed to comply with their obligations under the right to life to take appropriate steps to 
mitigate the risks to their lives.1173  
Before applying the law to the case at hand, the ECtHR firstly explained the main principles with 
regard to the right to life, referring to a large extent to Öneryildiz v Turkey.  
As in the case of Öneryildiz v Turkey, the ECtHR expressed that the right to life also embodies positive 
obligations, in particular to take appropriate measures to safeguard the lives of individuals within the 
State’s jurisdiction, and above all to ensure a legislative and administrative framework in this 
respect.1174 The court goes on to apply the principle adopted in Öneryildiz v Turkey, namely that 
obligations apply in the context of any activity, but in particular with regard to dangerous activities.1175  
That is not the only principle that the ECtHR repeated from Öneryildiz v Turkey. It stresses that the 
right to life also embodies, like the right to private and family life according to Article 8 ECHR, the 
positive obligation “to adequately inform the public about any life-threatening emergency […].1176 
The ECtHR elaborates at this point this new approach and opens even more towards Article 8 by 
stating the following:  
“It has been recognised that in the context of dangerous activities the scope of the positive obligations 
under Article 2 of the Convention largely overlap with those under Article 8 [...]. Consequently, the 
 
1169  Öneryldiz v. Turkey [2004] XIII Eur Court HR 79, 119 [101] ('Öneryldiz v. Turkey'). 
1170  ibid 122 [110]. 
1171  See above Chapter: Application of human rights prior to the disastrous event on page 34. 
1172  for the facts see: Budayeva and Others v. Russia [2008] II Eur Court HR 267, 276 [7] – 280 [38] ('Budayeva 
v. Russia'). 
1173  ibid 285-6 [116]. 
1174  ibid 288-9 [128] – [129]. 
1175  ibid 289 [130]. 
1176  ibid 289 [131]. 
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principles developed in the Court’s case-law relating to planning and environmental matters affecting 
private life and home may also be relied on for the protection of the right to life.”1177 
In the subsequent paragraph, the ECtHR refers to the established case law with regard to environmental 
matters under Article 8. It refers in particular to Fadeyeva v Russia and explains that in a case where 
a State has to take positive measures, the choice of means falls within the State’s margin of 
appreciation.1178 Simultaneously, the ECtHR clarifies that because of the wide margin of appreciation, 
the positive obligations of the right to life must not impose a disproportionate burden upon States 
without considering the operational choices States have to make in the light of priorities and 
resources.1179 The ECtHR takes this rule and applies it to the case of natural disasters and states: 
“This consideration must be afforded even greater weight in the sphere of emergency relief in relation 
to a meteorological event, which is as such beyond human control, than in the sphere of dangerous 
activities of a man-made nature.”1180 
Finally, the court explains that it has to consider all relevant circumstances of the particular case when 
determining whether the State failed to comply with its positive obligations.1181 With regard to 
emergency relief, the ECtHR stated, 
“In the sphere of emergency relief, where the State is directly involved in the protection of human 
lives through the mitigation of natural hazards, these considerations should apply in so far as the 
circumstances of  particular case point to the imminence of a natural hazard that had been clearly 
identifiable, and especially where it concerned a recurring calamity affecting a distinct area developed 
for human habitation or use […]. The scope of the positive obligations imputable to the State in the 
particular circumstance would depend on the origin of the threat and the extent to which one or the 
other risk is susceptible to mitigation.”1182 
The ECtHR concluded with regard to the case at hand that Russia was unable to justify its omissions 
in this case. The court even concluded that although Russia enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation 
with regard what kinds of measures it could take in order to fulfil its positive obligations, it did not 
take up any measure at all. Consequently, Russia violated the applicants’ right to life.1183 
 
 
3.Obligation to Provide Early Warning 
This section now applies the above-stated principles to the question whether States have an obligation 
to provide early warning. The answer has to be in the affirmative, despite that a distinct right to receive 
early warning does not exist. The reasons for this conclusion are discussed in this section.  
That the right to life embodies also the positive obligation to take appropriate steps to safeguard the 
lives of the individuals within the jurisdiction of a State is undoubted.1184 Such positive obligations 
 
1177  ibid 289 [133]. 
1178  Fadeyeva v Russia [2005] IV Eur Court HR 255 ('Fadeyeva v Russia'); Budayeva and Others v. Russia 
[2008] II Eur Court HR 267, 289-90 [134] ('Budayeva v. Russia'). 
1179  Budayeva and Others v. Russia [2008] II Eur Court HR 267, 290 [135] ('Budayeva v. Russia'). 
1180  ibid. 
1181  ibid 290 [136]. 
1182  ibid 290 [137]. 
1183  ibid 293-6 [147]-[160]. 
1184  Report of the Human Rights Committee, Supp No 40, UN Doc A/37/40(SUPP) (22 September 1982) Annex 
V, 93 [5] ('General comments under article 40, paragraph 4 of the Covenant'); Budayeva and Others v. 
Russia [2008] II Eur Court HR 267, 290 [135] ('Budayeva v. Russia'); Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras 
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can also be translated to preventive measures. Types of measures have been largely identified and 
named by the ECtHR in the case of dangerous activities, whereby the court pays special attention to 
the public’s right to information in this matter.1185 Although this principle was adopted in the case of 
‘dangerous activities’, the ECtHR applied it also in Budayeva v Russia, which concerned a mudslide, 
thus a natural hazard.1186 Since, in this case specifically, the neglect of the local authorities to repair 
the damaged dam and to observe the situation, although they knew about the increased risk of 
mudslides leading to the catastrophe, the ECtHR reasoned as follows:  
“In such circumstances the authorities could reasonably be expected to acknowledge the increased risk 
of accidents in the event of a mudslide that year and to show all possible diligence in informing the 
civilians and making advanced arrangement for the emergency evacuation. In any event, informing 
the public about inherent risks was one of the essential practical measures needed to ensure effective 
protection of the citizen concerned.”1187 
Thus, although positive obligations should not impose disproportionate burden onto the State, and this 
in particular in the cases of natural hazards, since they go beyond human control, the State still needs 
to act with diligence towards the individuals within its jurisdiction.1188 This requirement applies, in 
particular, if the State in question has knowledge of the risk at hand. Through this knowledge, the 
Osman Test, which requires knowledge of the immediate danger for a specific individual by the State 
in question in order to trigger positive obligations, is fulfilled. Since the IACtHR also applied the 
Osman Test in its case-law, it seems just to reason that the IACtHR would also follow the ECtHR’s 
Budayeva v Russia decision, since it demonstrates in its essence a special application of the Osman 
Test. Thus, this gives more weight to the ECtHR’s judgment with regard to natural hazards.  
The ECtHR’s judgment in the case of Budayeva v Russia also applies to extreme weather events 
connected to climate change. As examined above on several occasions, it is scientifically proven that 
climate-change-induced global warming increases the frequency of extreme weather events.1189 It is 
not only the scientific community that has expressed awareness of this fact, but also the international 
community.1190 Thus, at least the governments of all States should know extreme weather events will 
increase in frequency in the future. 
Transferring this understanding to the question of whether State have an obligation to provide early 
warning yield the answer that, yes, States have an obligation to provide early warning. First of all, 
they know of the fact that extreme weather events, such as cyclones or hurricanes, are increasing in 
frequency. Thus, States, especially disaster-prone States, have a positive obligation under the right to 
life to provide the public with information about immediate risks. This information could, for example, 
be offered in the form of raising public awareness of the danger of increasing frequencies of extreme 
weather events and the early warning of the immediate danger. Secondly, although these events are 
the results of natural hazards, and as such beyond human control – which has to be given due 
consideration according to the ECtHR –, the disaster-prone States cannot hide behind this lack of 
control: they have the knowledge, and as the ECtHR stated in its Budayeva v Russia judgment, in cases 
where the State has knowledge of the danger, it could at least be expected that the State informs the 
public about the immediate danger.1191 This expectation is also reflected in Article 9 of the Draft 
 
[1988] IACtHR Series C No 4, [188]. 
1185  Budayeva and Others v. Russia [2008] II Eur Court HR 267, 289[132] ('Budayeva v. Russia'); Öneryldiz v. 
Turkey [2004] XIII Eur Court HR 79, 115 [90] ('Öneryldiz v. Turkey'). 
1186  Budayeva and Others v. Russia [2008] II Eur Court HR 267, 293-6 [147] [160] ('Budayeva v. Russia'). 
1187  ibid 294 [152]. 
1188  ibid 290 [135]. 
1189  See in particular above Chapter: The no-harm rule on page 68; IPCC, above n 2, 53. 
1190  see for example: World Conference on Disaster Reduction, UN Doc A/CONF.224/L.2 (7 April 2015), 3 
[4]. 
1191  see also: Kälin and Dale, above n 258. 
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Articles. There, the provision clearly expresses that each State has an obligation to ensure domestic 
disaster preparedness, including the provision of early warning.1192 
Thus, disaster-prone States have an obligation under the right to life to perform disaster preparedness 
by, for example, raising public awareness of the danger and then issuing early warnings in cases of 
immediate danger. As such, early warning should be viewed as a tool to fulfil the right to life. The 
fast-evolving law behind the right to life offers enough flexibility of application to cover this matter, 
making it unnecessary to argue for the adoption of a distinct human right to receive early warning.  
 
1192  Report of the International Law Commission - Sixty-eight session (2 May - 10 June and 4 July - 12 August 
2016), GAOR, 71st sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/71/10, 15 Article 9. 
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4.Conclusion 
Early warning mechanisms are one part of the bigger picture that disaster prevention offers. Disaster 
prevention encompasses both a subjective element, where the knowledge of persons and the capacity 
of societies is enhanced, and an objective part, which demands for example hazard-resistant 
infrastructure. Disaster prevention is well situated in international law, especially in international 
human rights law.  
Within international human rights law, in particular the right to life offers comprehensive guidance 
for States on how to deal with questions of disaster prevention. The right to life embodies a positive 
obligation to prevent, thus to safeguard, the lives of the individuals within the jurisdiction of the State. 
In two landmark decisions, the ECtHR examined the right to life with regard to human-made and 
natural disasters. It reasoned that if the State has knowledge of the risk and fails to do anything in its 
power to protect the individuals, it violates their right to life. In particular, the court expected the State 
to, at minimum, inform the public of the danger.  
This argumentation also applies to natural disasters connected to climate change. It cannot be ignored 
that it is scientifically proven that the frequency of extreme weather events is increasing because of 
climate-change-induced global warming. This has also been acknowledged within the international 
community. Thus, the governments around the world have knowledge of this fact. This leaves States 
that are often subject to extreme weather events with the duty to take positive obligations, and at least 
inform the public of the danger and issue early warnings. As such, early warning represents a tool to 
support the right to life and cannot be considered to be a distinct human right. 
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Part 4: Final Conclusions and Summary 
This part draws the final conclusion of this research and serves at the same time as a summary. It 
includes the major findings of each chapter and starts with an introduction that aims to place the topic 
of this research in its context. This part closes with suggestions of actions required of the international 
community to ensure the effective protection of the victims of natural disasters. 
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Chapter VII:  Final Conclusion and Summary 
1.Introduction 
This is scientifically proven: climate-change-induced global warming is increasing the frequency of 
natural disasters, such as extreme weather events. That extreme weather events have devastating 
impacts can be shown in many examples: Hurricane Matthew, which devastated Haiti in 2016, or the 
hurricane season in 2017, which hit the whole Caribbean several times severely. Data on GHG 
emissions show that the disaster-prone States, which also often happen to be developing States (e.g., 
Pacific or Caribbean islands), are not contributing as much to anthropogenic climate change as are 
other states; however, at the same time, these States are the ones that suffer the most from natural 
disasters. This applies also in the case of financial means for disaster preparedness measures, for 
example for early warning mechanisms and post-disaster reconstruction. This research is based on this 
injustice. Therefore, the starting points of this research are the questions of responsibilities and duties 
of both the unaffected and affected State in order to guarantee effective protection of the victims of 
natural disasters. The first aspect is relevant to financial assistance in the case of early warning systems 
and post-disaster reconstruction. The latter enjoys significance in the light of the obligation to provide 
humanitarian assistance and to seek international help, as well as the obligation to provide early 
warning to individuals suffering from natural disasters. 
Therefore, the two primary research questions were as follows:  
(1) Do developed states and emerging markets have a responsibility under international law to 
financially assist disaster-prone developing states with regard to early-warning mechanisms and post-
disaster reconstruction? 
(2) Does the state affected by a disaster have an obligation under international law to provide early 
warning and humanitarian assistance to the affected population? If the affected state is not able to 
provide early warning and humanitarian assistance by itself, does it have an obligation to seek 
international assistance?  
In order to answer these two questions, this research first defines the most relevant terms and lays out 
the relevant legal framework, where also the fact is discussed that there is no coherent international 
legal system with regard to the law governing natural disasters. The research moves then in the second 
part to answer the first question, and in the third part, it examines the second question. The respective 
results and key findings of each part are discussed here.  
 
 
2.Lack of a Coherent Legal System Dealing with Natural Disasters 
Before examining the two main research questions, this research puts the topic into its context, 
explains the surrounding terms and maps the relevant legal framework. The major finding of this 
chapter is that there is no coherent legal framework with regard to natural disasters. It is rather a 
mixture of different areas of law such as human rights law, humanitarian law, international 
environmental law, international climate change law and general public international law.1193 If the 
Draft Articles were adopted, they would constitute the first universally instrument dealing with all 
sorts of disasters, thus human-made or natural disaster and the protection of the victims. So far, they 
have not been adopted. They were transferred for treaty adoption to the UNGA in 2016, which 
 
1193  See above Chapter: Mapping the Legal Framework on page 22. 
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discussed this matter in 2018. Thus, as the law currently stands, there is no clear-cut system of law 
applicable in the context of natural disasters. 
That there is no definite legal framework for the case of natural disasters is also indicated by the fact 
that there is no coherent definition of ‘disaster’. Since this term is crucial for this research, it is 
therefore necessary to develop a definition that works for the scope of this research, by looking at 
other instruments that deal with natural disasters, such as the Tampere Convention and the IFRC 
Guidelines. The latter describes a ‘disaster’ as an event, while the former views a ‘disaster’ as a 
situation, thus the consequence of a calamitous event. This research has treated a ‘disaster’ as 
consequential situation, because of the strong focus on disaster prevention. The event cannot be 
stopped, but its devastating consequences can be minimised. This makes it necessary to view disaster 
as the consequence of a calamitous event. Next, to pursue the situational approach, it is also necessary 
to include an element of local capacity in the definition, because of the other focus of this research: 
the obligation to seek international assistance. This research looks, in particular, at situations in which 
the affected government is unable to cope with the situation that follows the calamitous event, and 
therefore the definition should include a reference to capacity. Therefore, according to this research, a 
‘disaster’ is a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or society, posing significant threat 
to human life, health, property or the environment, whether developed suddenly or as the result of 
complex long-term processes, and which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to 
cope using its own resources. 
This definition reflects a combination of the definition used in the Tampere Convention and by the 
IASC.  
Since, this definition is rather complex, it can be illustrated with a formula, as modelled by the IFRC. 
However, the original formula of the IFCRC has to be tailored to the understanding of ‘disaster’ 
pursued by this research, as the understandings are not identical. The formula that suits the approach 
of this research looks as follows: 
(Vulnerability × Event) / Ability to Cope = Intensity of Disaster Situation. 
By dividing the vulnerability to a certain event, multiplied by the actual event, with the ability to cope 
with the consequential situation, the focus falls on ability to cope. This emphasis is also mirrored in 
the written definition, which clearly states that it is only a disaster according to this research if the 
community or society is not able to cope with the consequences.1194  
 
 
3.Legal Obligation of Developed States and Emerging Markets to 
Financially Assist Disaster-Prone Developing States 
The second part of this study deals with two questions: firstly, whether developed States and emerging 
markets have an obligation under international law to financially assist disaster-prone States with 
regard to the establishment of early warning mechanisms; and secondly, whether developed States and 
emerging markets have an obligation to financially assist disaster-prone developing States in post-
disaster reconstruction. Both questions are answered in the affirmative, each on similar but not 
identical grounds. 
 
 
1194  See above Chapter: Disasters Defined on page 5.  
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3.1. Financial assistance with regard to early warning mechanisms 
Early warning mechanisms not only save lives but decrease economic losses due to natural disasters 
by about 50%. However, disaster-prone developing States lack the ability to provide early warning 
mechanisms to people. At the same time, they also lack the appropriate capacities, skills and resources 
to create these mechanisms. This shortfall has been pointed out by the international community in its 
Sendai Framework for the time period 2015 – 2030. One of its main goals is to enhance the access to 
multi-hazard early warning mechanisms by 2030. Since this is a very ambitious target, the Sendai 
Framework also stresses the need for financial assistance, which is necessary in order to achieve this 
target. Yet, the Sendai Framework is not a legally binding instrument and as such does not contain 
any enforceable obligations. Thus, the international community agrees to the enhancement of the 
access to early warning mechanisms and that this should be supported financially.  
The international climate-change-law regime already has the means to financially assist developing 
States with regard to the establishment of early warning mechanisms through specialised funds: The 
Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund. Although the means are 
available, the question of how those funds are to be distributed remains unanswered. The international 
climate change regime acknowledges an annual USD 100 billion target for climate finance. This goal 
has been included in numerous COP decisions, and during the negotiations of the Paris Agreement it 
was considered for inclusion in the treaty text. This inclusion, however, did not happen, so the target 
is only anchored in COP decisions, which are not legally binding and demonstrate only political will. 
Yet, during the Paris negotiations, a new approach in climate finance was included: loss and damage. 
This approach addresses generally the adverse effects of climate change to which no adaptation is 
possible or which exceed the capacity of the adaptation measures. The Paris Agreement explicitly 
refers to extreme weather events and slow-onset events as circumstances that could lead to loss and 
damage caused by climate change. However, this system is not yet in place to effectively support 
disaster-prone developing States. The COP decision that accompanies the Paris Agreement clearly 
states that the loss and damage provision cannot be understood as a ground for liability. Since this 
provision was included, however, into the text of the COP decision, the provision may be implemented 
in the Paris Agreement in future, which would open the door to disaster-prone developing States to 
get financial assistance through the loss and damage system, for example. 
The obligation of developed States and emerging markets rather derives from the no-harm rule, which 
constitutes customary international law, and from the application of the CBDRRC principles that is a 
cornerstone of international climate change law. 
The no-harm rule demands that no State exercises its own sovereign rights in a way that would harm 
another State, including the environment of the other State. This rule has been implemented in Article 
3 of the Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities. This 
provision asks emitting States to take appropriate measures to prevent significant transboundary harm. 
These Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities apply to cases 
where the conduct (e.g. the emission of GHGs) is not prohibited by international law. 
In fact, the emission of GHGs is not prohibited under international law. International climate change 
law limits it by introducing reduction targets but does not prohibit the emission. Additionally, the 
emission of GHGs is linked with global warming and thus the increase of the frequency of extreme 
weather events, which have the potential to trigger major disasters with devastating impacts. Those 
impacts can be sufficiently diminished with the establishment of appropriate early-warning 
mechanisms. Article 3 asks for preventive measures, and the establishment of appropriate early 
warning systems is definitely a preventive measure. Thus, by financially supporting disaster-prone 
developing States, developed States would fulfil their obligations under the no-harm rule.  
In addition, the newer data on GHG emission show that it is not only developed States that contribute 
the most to climate change. Rather, emerging markets such as China or India have a great share in the 
4. Part: Summary and Conclusion 158 
global emissions and are not yet decreasing these emissions. The CBRRC principle has the aim of 
ensuring that climate change as a common concern of humankind is tackled with fairness. Since the 
newest data on GHG emissions show that the emerging markets raising emission both in total and per 
capita, while developed States are constantly decreasing theirs has to be taken into account. This 
insight is mirrored in the Paris Agreement, which lets the wall between developed and developing 
states tumble by inviting all States to reduce their GHG emissions.  
Therefore, the question of whether there is an obligation for developed states and emerging markets 
to financially support disaster-prone States with regard to the establishment of early warning 
mechanisms has to be answered in the affirmative. This obligation could be performed by contributing 
to the respective funds that will distribute the financial aid to the State in need. Thus, the financial 
target of, for example, the annual USD 100 billion target should be fixed into treaty and made a 
positive obligation.1195  
 
3.2. Financial assistance for the post-disaster reconstruction 
Next to the establishment of early warning mechanisms before the calamitous event hits a State, post-
disaster reconstruction also plays a significant role in enhancing societies’ or communities’ ability to 
cope with a disaster situation, which is particularly costly.  
States with appropriate private insurance availability and affordability are more likely to bounce back 
faster after a disastrous event hits. However, in disaster-prone developing States, the access to and 
affordability of private insurance is lacking. Therefore, these States are more dependent on other ways 
to overcome the financial obstacles of natural disasters. There are several ways to overcome these 
obstacles: (1) ex post disaster budget allocation, which is very time consuming; (2) financial assistance 
form international financial institutes such as the World Bank or the IMF; (3) reliance on donations; 
and (4) macro insurance. The latter is the newest approach and the most promising. Mexico is in this 
regard the pioneer, with its program called FONDEN. In order to protect itself against the financial 
risk of natural disasters, the Mexican Government transfers some of its financial risks to the 
international reinsurance and capital markets. Similar approaches, but not identical, are under 
development in the Caribbean, Africa and the Pacific Islands. Although those financial means are 
available, disaster-prone developing states still rely upon external donations for reconstruction, so the 
question of liability remains. 
Contrary to other academic work, this research argues not for the State responsibility of GHG-emitting 
States under the ARSIWA, because such an approach suffers from legal obstacles. Firstly, it is not 
only the conduct of one State causes anthropogenic climate change, but rather the GHG emissions of 
a large group of States together. At the same time, not all States contribute the same amount of 
emissions. The question thus arises of how much GHGs a State is allowed to emit and when the 
threshold is met to impart a responsibility for the consequences of climate change. Secondly, causation 
imposes another obstacle. Strict causation, as described with the conditio sine qua non formula, is 
difficult to determine because climate change and its consequences are still accompanied by 
uncertainty. This uncertainty cannot be ignored, while establishing a strict causal link between the 
GHG emissions of a certain State and the and the extreme weather events responsible for the 
reconstruction phase. 
This research argues, however, that disasters are cyclical. Therefore, every stage of preventative action 
in the disaster cycle can contribute to a more resilient community and society. Within the 
reconstruction phase, this possibility is known as the aim to ‘build back better’. This effort has ultimate 
aim to make the community more resilient for future events by using the reconstruction phase to build 
 
1195  See above the Chapter: Financing Early Warning Mechanisms on 49. 
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back in a safer way. As such, post-disaster reconstruction that aims to build back better is a pre-disaster 
preventive phase.  
By accepting reconstruction as a preventive and not reactive measure, a similar approach to that of 
financing early warning mechanisms can be used. Here, the no-harm rule in conjunction with the 
CBDRRC principles apply. Again, an emitting State has the duty to prevent harm from its emissions 
in another State. Like the adoption of early warning mechanisms, the financial support of the 
reconstruction phase aims to build back better as an appropriate preventive measure. Therefore, both 
developed States and emerging markets have the legal obligation under customary international law 
to financially support disaster-prone developing States with regard to the pre-disaster reconstruction 
phase. 
A very pragmatic solution for those States to fulfil their obligation would be to financially support the 
respective insurance facility that offers insurance to the concerned governments: ARC Ltd in Africa, 
CCRIF in the Caribbean and the PCRAFI Facility in the Pacific. The latter receives funds from the 
PCRAFI Multi-Donor Trust Fund with the donors from Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the 
US. This list of donors should be completed with developed States and emerging economies in general, 
in order to tackle climate change as a common concern of humankind.1196 
 
 
4.Legal Obligation of the Affected State During the Disaster Situation 
The third examines disasters from a vertical perspective, investigating what obligations and duties the 
affected State have towards victims in those States. This part answered two questions: firstly, whether 
the affected State has an obligation to provide humanitarian assistance to the victims of a disaster; and 
secondly, whether the affected State has an obligation to provide early warning. Both questions are 
answered in the affirmative, with a similar but not identical justification.  
 
4.1. Obligation of the affected State during the disaster situation 
Humanitarian assistance is crucial for the survival of the victims of a natural disaster and is situated in 
the emergency phase of the disaster cycle. However, it is not always the case that the affected State 
actually renders humanitarian assistance to the victims and seeks international help if it is 
overwhelmed with the situation. For instance, in 2008 when Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar, the 
government refused international assistance for nearly four weeks, although it was obviously 
overwhelmed by the situation.  
The obligation to provide humanitarian assistance is anchored in international human rights law, yet 
not as a distinct human right. The provision of humanitarian assistance is rather a means to fulfil 
underlying human rights. Foremost are the right to life, right to adequate standard of living, right to 
health and right to safe drinking water and sanitation. In particular with regard to the right to life, the 
UNGA has stated that the abandonment of victims of natural disaster without humanitarian assistance 
has to be considered as a threat to human life and is as such not in accordance with the right to life.  
If, the affected State is not able to cope alone with the situation, it has to seek international assistance 
in order to fulfil its human rights obligations and as such to provide humanitarian assistance. This 
obligation is reflected in the Draft Articles, where it is acknowledged that if the affected State’s 
capacity to respond accurately to the natural disaster is exceeded, it has to seek international help from 
 
1196  See above  Funding for the Reconstruction Phase on page 78. 
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the UN or other States. At the same time, the Draft Articles also stress that the consent of the affected 
State is needed before an assisting party is allowed to enter the territory of the affected State. This 
consent, however, cannot be withheld arbitrarily. The ILC argues that both the obligation to seek 
international assistance and the consent requirement derive from the affected State’s internal and 
external sovereignty, respectively.  
In the example of Cyclone Nargis, however, the question remains what can be done if a State refuses 
to accept international assistance. There, the R2P doctrine was considered to be an option. However, 
unless the behaviour of the government during the emergency phase constitutes a crime against 
humanity, the R2P doctrine is not applicable and was in the case of Nargis not supported by the 
international community. Thus, the question of enforcement of the obligation to seek and accept 
international assistance remains.  
Since humanitarian assistance serves to fulfil underlying human rights obligations, the enforcement is 
also possible through the different human rights systems (e.g. through interstate claims in Europe or 
the Americas and by requesting provisional measures). However, since the most disaster-prone States 
are not within Europe or the Americas, but Asia and Africa, this solution is difficult to implement. The 
Additional Protocols to the ICCPR and ICESCR, respectively, that allow proceedings before an 
international human rights body do not have high ratification numbers in these areas of the world. As 
such, this option is a possibility only in Europe and the Americas.  
If, however, the Draft Articles are adopted as they currently stand and enter into force, this move 
would open the door for the ARSIWA. The affected State’s behaviour not to accept any international 
assistance although it is obviously overwhelmed would most likely breach the primary obligations 
enshrined in the Draft Articles. The ARSIWA offers a range of options. The most useful option is 
clearly cessation, as it would demand the affected State to immediately accept international assistance.  
Additionally, the affected State has not only a duty to protect the victims of a natural disaster during 
the emergency phase, but rather also when this phase cools down and slowly the reconstruction phase 
begins. In this phase, in particular the problem of IDPs becomes predominant. The Guiding Principles 
serve as an excellent guidance for State on how to deal with this situation. Yet, this instrument is a 
soft-law instrument and is, as such, not legally binding, which is not a disadvantage at all, because it 
rather summarises and interprets existing human rights law to the case of IDPs.1197 
 
4.2. Obligation of the affected state to provide early warning 
In order to close the circle of this research, it also deals with the question whether the affected State 
has to ensure early warning to its population. Again, this can be answered in the affirmative, with a 
similar approach to the question of the provision of humanitarian assistance.  
Early warning mechanisms play a significant role in disaster prevention. Prevention itself is a principle 
of international law, specifically within human rights law. In particular, the right to life offers perfect 
guidance for States on how to deal with disaster prevention. In this regard, in particular the ECtHR 
has already dealt with two cases dealing with human-made and natural disasters, respectively. In both 
cases, the ECtHR noted the respondent State’s failure to prevent harm although it was aware of the 
risk and described it as a violation of the right to life. In particular, the court expected the State to, at 
minimum, inform the public of the danger.  
Since it cannot be ignored that it is scientifically proven that the frequency of extreme weather events 
is increasing because of climate-change-induced global warming, the ECtHR’s view also applies to 
climate-change-related disasters. In fact, governments around the world have knowledge of this 
 
1197  See above The Responsibility of the Affected State During and in the Aftermath of a Disaster on page 105. 
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scientific fact. This leaves States that are often subject to extreme weather events with the duty to 
uphold their positive obligations and at least inform the public of the danger and prepare to issue early 
warnings. As such, early warning represents a tool to fulfil the right to life and cannot be considered 
a distinct human right.1198  
 
 
5.Actions Required by the International Community to Effectively 
Protect the Victims of Natural Disasters 
This research shows that disaster law comes from many sources and relies heavily on customary 
international law. As such, it is time that a single instrument comes into force and to give clear 
guidance to the States on their duties and on how to react in these kinds of situations. This guidance 
could be afforded by the adoption of the Draft Articles into the form of a treaty. Additionally, the 
international climate change regime offers the flexibility to achieve a greater protection, in particular 
with regard the financial aspect of natural disasters, such as financing early warning systems and 
reconstruction efforts. Therefore, in the view of this research, the following steps are necessary to 
ensure improvement to the protection of the victims of natural disasters: 
 
• The Draft Articles are, as they stand, a good instrument to achieve this protection. In particular with 
regard to the duties of the affected State, they offer a promising legal pathway. The ILC referred them 
to the UNGA for treaty adoption in May 2016. They have since been endorsed by the UNGA. It is 
thus advisable that they be adopted into the form of a treaty as soon as possible, ideally as they were 
drafted by the ILC.  
• Elaborate and manifest the loss and damage pathway within the climate change regime. The concept 
of loss and damage could help potentially disaster-prone developing States to get the financial aid they 
need in order to enhance their disaster preparedness with regard to post-disaster reconstruction. 
• Opt for a legally binding climate finance target for developed States and emerging markets in order to 
ensure financial assistance for disaster-prone developing States with regard to preventive measures, 
such as early warning mechanisms or disaster-safe constructions in order to enhance their resilience.  
• Enhance the affordability of developing States to opt for sovereign risk transfer, thus macro insurance. 
Insurance helps the affected State’s economy to recuperate in a timely manner and as such lessens 
both the economic loss as well as disaster-induced development setbacks. This enhancement could be 
achieved if the developed States and emerging markets would contribute financially to those insurance 
facilities. This is supported by their obligation to financially assist disaster-prone developing States 
with regard to reconstruction efforts. 
 
 
1198  See above  The Responsibility of the Affected State before the Disaster on page 139 
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